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The government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo has yielded to long-standing calls for a national dialogue, but questions remain over who will be invited, what will be discussed, and whether it will address the entrenched security and humanitarian crisis in the east of the country.
The initiative – pushed for by church leaders, opposition groups, and diplomats – comes as vast areas of eastern DRC have come under the control of the M23 rebel group, which is supported by thousands of troops from neighbouring Rwanda.
It also comes at a time of massive internal political tension, as President Félix Tshisekedi backs a process that could lead to constitutional changes, potentially allowing him to seek a third term in office.
With so many issues at stake, Trésor Kibangula, an analyst and director of the political programme at the Congolese research institute Ebuteli, said the objective of the talks remains unclear, creating a risk that “everyone engages in a different dialogue”.
“Is the aim to strengthen national unity in the face of external aggression? To address internal political tensions? To support ongoing peace processes? Or to respond to multiple crises simultaneously?” he asked.
Nearly ten million people were displaced by conflict in DRC last year alone. The vast majority are in the east of the country, where there are more than 100 armed groups, some nominally aligned to the government and others leading violent insurgencies.
Two peace processes are currently underway to address the highest-profile rebellion, that of the M23, but neither has produced a breakthrough for those suffering on the ground.
Many fear the talks could follow the path of previous national dialogues, which have rarely addressed the root causes of crises in DRC. Instead, they have served as vehicles for the government to neuter dissent by co-opting rivals.
The M23 now acts as a de facto government in an area it says is home to 11 million people, and controls the two largest cities in the east – Goma and Bukavu, which are also humanitarian aid hubs.
As the conflict has deepened domestic instability, Tshisekedi has worsened his standing through authoritarian consolidation, shrinking civic space, and arresting political rivals.
Some see a national dialogue as an opportunity to ease tensions in a deeply challenging context. Others, however, remain sceptical of the government’s intentions, particularly because it is still unclear what issues will be discussed and who will take part.
Many fear the talks could follow the path of previous national dialogues, which have rarely addressed the root causes of crises in DRC. Instead, they have served as vehicles for the government to neuter dissent by co-opting rivals.
Stewart Muhindo, a researcher, warned that the dialogue must not become “a ploy to cling to power or merely a marketplace for negotiating political posts”. “Congo is burning on all fronts,” he added.
Who’s invited?
DRC’s conflict is multifaceted, but the backdrop is of a country long deprived of its riches – first under Belgian colonial rule and today through the international trade in its mineral wealth.
Conflict intensified in the 1990s after the genocide of the Tutsi in Rwanda. When Hutu genocidaires fled into eastern DRC, Rwanda’s government chased them across the border, backing rebels that challenged and toppled Congolese administrations.
The M23 is the latest in this long line of Rwanda-backed groups, which Kigali justifies by saying genocidal forces are still active. Critics, however, say it uses the threat of genocidaires as a pretext for territorial expansion and capturing economic interests in DRC.
No side has yet made concessions needed to end the conflict, and Kibangula urged caution in thinking a dialogue could end the M23 occupation. “Assigning it that responsibility would create expectations it cannot meet,” he said.
The government already appears to have ruled out the participation of the M23 and political forces that are close to the movement, including former President Joseph Kabila.
Some feel that may not be a bad thing. The government and the M23 are already holding talks in Doha on issues with far-reaching implications, including the return of state administration to rebel-occupied areas and broader institutional reforms.
“At some point, these issues will have to be addressed within a broader framework than merely a negotiation between a rebel group and the government,” Kibangula said, arguing that these issues “concern the nation as a whole”.
In Kibangula’s view, resolving the conflict in the east will be difficult if political leaders remain at odds over the causes of the war and how best to respond to it. For that reason, he said, the idea of a national dialogue among themselves is “logical”.
At the same time, however, Kibangula said the grievances of the M23 and its political wing, the AFC, cannot be separated from those of other Congolese political actors, as the issues animating them are “deeply intertwined”.
“If negotiations with the AFC/M23 progress without a political consensus in Kinshasa, or if an internal dialogue takes place without linking AFC/M23-related issues to the Doha process, each track risks running up against the limitations of the other,” he said.
For Muhindo, the researcher, the dialogue will only be useful if it helps end the occupation of Congolese territory by the M23 and Rwanda, but that won’t happen if the conflict’s key players are not included.
“I understand those who fear that involving armed groups amounts to rewarding them. But without involving them, peace cannot be achieved,” said Muhindo, who is also part of the civil society group La Lucha.
A political marketplace
Alongside the conflict, many hope the national dialogue will allow Congolese politicians to focus on domestic disputes that have grown increasingly rancorous in recent months.
The disputes are largely driven by fears that Tshisekedi – once an opposition outsider who campaigned on a platform of reform – wants to stay in power beyond 2028, when his second term is due to end.
DRC’s constitution currently limits presidents to two terms. But parliament in June approved a bill allowing proposed constitutional changes to be put to a referendum, which many fear could allow Tshisekedi to seek a third term.
Several opposition parties and civil society groups have formed an alliance to challenge what they see as a power grab, prompting thousands of people to take to the streets in protest.
So far, however, this domestic political crisis has largely been “sidelined”, Kibangula said, as political and diplomatic attention has focused on the US-mediated talks between DRC and Rwanda and the Qatar-brokered discussions between Kinshasa and the M23.
“The dialogue must be neither a ploy to cling to power nor a mere marketplace for negotiating political posts.”
It remains unclear whether Tshisekedi will be willing to address issues that are central to the opposition and civil society, including debates around presidential term limits, the independence of the election commission, and concerns around civil liberties.
For now, his ruling party appears to see the talks as a way of buying time during a period of intense political pressure, while seeking to steer the conversation onto more favourable ground: uniting the political class against Rwandan aggression.
Rather than fostering national reconciliation, past dialogues have served as vehicles for the government to co-opt disgruntled rivals by doling out ministry posts, jobs in state-owned companies, and other spoils.
Should the M23/AFC take part in the dialogue, analysts say it would likely seek amnesties and high-profile positions, effectively rewarding rebellion and creating incentives for future armed groups to follow the same path.
“The dialogue must be neither a ploy to cling to power nor a mere marketplace for negotiating political posts,” said Reagan Miviri, an analyst and senior researcher at Ebuteli.
Kibangula agreed that what past dialogues have in common is that they rarely eliminated the root causes of crises, instead forging a fragile compromise between elites at a specific moment in time.
“When a significant number of stakeholders feel that the rules were set without their input, or that the conclusions primarily serve the interests of one side, the compromise quickly loses its legitimacy,” Kibangula said.
Truth and accountability
Happiness Binja, an activist with La Lucha, said the dialogue must produce concrete results and avoid becoming a vehicle for power-sharing. “The deaths of Congolese people must no longer be used to advance personal political agendas,” she said.
“Several agreements have already been signed, but compliance and implementation remain the real problem, while the [conflict] death toll among the Congolese people continues to rise,” she added in reference to the Washington and Doha peace processes.
Évariste Iragi, a lawyer and human rights defender, said talks should focus on truth and accountability. “A truly inclusive dialogue must provide a framework where truths can be spoken without taboos and where responsibility for the current crisis is clearly established,” he said.
By “truths”, Iragi was referring to examining the roles played by political, military, and foreign actors in prolonging conflict in the east, as well as the weaknesses of the Congolese state that have fuelled violence for decades.
Whatever is discussed, Jacinthe Maarifa, a humanitarian worker with the local NGO AGIR-RDC, said the hardline positions of the ruling majority, opposition groups, former leaders, and rebel movements will make consensus difficult to achieve.
“Never before have the protagonists hurled such insults at one another,” he said, adding that the facilitators will therefore need to expend “far more energy than in the past” to bring the sides together.
Edited by Philip Kleinfeld.