Anxiety from Kyiv to Tokyo. Follow a historic meeting between Trump, Xi, and Putin. What are the stakes and why do critics say it resembles another event from the last century with enormous implications?

Anticipation surrounds an upcoming summit between U.S. President Donald Trump, Chinese leader Xi Jinping, and Russian President Vladimir Putin during the APEC meeting in Shenzhen. The event is being compared to the 1945 Yalta Conference, with regional reactions varying drastically: Russian nationalists see it as confirmation of a multipolar world that benefits Moscow's objectives concerning Ukraine, while smaller nations like Ukraine voice serious concerns about secret power redistribution akin to "Yalta 2, 3, 4."
The stakes are multifaceted. Putin seeks an agreement regarding the war in Ukraine favorable to Russia, and Trump may aim for international diplomatic successes alongside potential discussions on nuclear arms control. For Xi Jinping, the meeting carries risks; his administration reportedly opposes immediate arms control discussions with Washington and Moscow due to Beijing's relative disadvantage in current nuclear parity. Furthermore, disagreements over agenda items are evident, as an anonymous source indicated Moscow pushed for discussion on Ukraine while Beijing opposed it, a stance seemingly echoed by an American official suggesting that topic is ill-suited for this format.

Donald Trump will meet with Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin next week.
The meeting is scheduled to take place on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in Shenzhen.
The White House officially confirmed the planned summit between the three leaders.
Russia views the summit as "deeply symbolic" confirmation of a multipolar world.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky expressed worry about the possibility of influence redistribution resembling past conferences.
Russian President Vladimir Putin aims to obtain an agreement for resolving the conflict in Ukraine on Moscow's terms.
Trump may seek external successes and potential progress toward a three-way nuclear arms control agreement.
Chinese leader Xi Jinping faces unpredictability in the summit, particularly regarding arms discussions.
Russia sought discussion regarding the war in Ukraine at the meeting.
Beijing opposed including the war in Ukraine as an agenda topic.
An American official stated it is unlikely Trump will bring the war in Ukraine to the discussion.

The narrative structure employs a high-stakes temporal parallel—comparing this gathering to Yalta 1945—to immediately elevate the diplomatic significance of the meeting, framing geopolitical maneuvers not just as policy discussions but as foundational acts that shape world order. The tension between domestic narratives (Russian nationalist enthusiasm vs. Ukrainian apprehension) functions as both context and a mechanism to highlight diverging interests in global power dynamics.
The central friction appears to stem from an incompatibility in objectives: Moscow's prioritized focus on the Ukraine war versus Beijing’s cautious stance, especially regarding arms control discussions that might expose China's relative status among nuclear powers. The resistance by Chinese officials against discussing disarmament when they perceive a systemic disadvantage suggests a defensive posture rooted in maintaining autonomy within a perceived great-power competition framework.
The assumption underpinning this entire geopolitical drama is the primacy of 'great power consensus,' echoing historical precedents where major actors define the rules for lesser states. The risk, as articulated by Kyiv, is that strategic alignment between Washington and Beijing sidelines regional concerns entirely. We must question whether this meeting genuinely represents a convergence toward a new global structure or merely a temporary realignment to manage escalating crises in ways that benefit incumbents, potentially sidelining agency outside the capitals of these three nations. If one were to hypothesize an influence campaign pushing this narrative, it would likely employ ARC-0015 Bandwagon, framing the summit's mere existence as proof of inevitable global restructuring, thereby pre-validating Moscow’s or Beijing's desired outcomes before negotiations even begin.
Bridge questions: How do the stated positions on nuclear disarmament differ structurally from how they have been addressed in previous US-China engagement eras? What alternative diplomatic formats exist that might allow for addressing Ukraine without immediately invoking a historical 'spheres of influence' comparison?