China-U.S. strategic competition has become the defining feature of 21st century international relations. How each power conceptualizes and prosecutes this rivalry, however, varies considerably, and those differences carry significant strategic consequences. American policymakers have generally approached competition through a framework that prizes clear alignment, incentivizing partner states to demonstrate commitment to the U.S.-led order. Beijing, by contrast, operates with a considerably lower threshold: it does not require explicit alignment, only that states refrain from actively undermining Chinese interests. Of course, Beijing is willing to reward those who will actively support its positions.
This asymmetry in approach matters. In the Pacific Islands, where strategic imperatives of sovereignty, development, and non-alignment shape foreign policy choices, Washington’s framework creates friction that Beijing’s more flexible posture does not. Bridging this gap between how the United States frames strategic competition and the realities in which Pacific Island states operate is essential to advancing American interests in the region. Understanding how Beijing exploits this space is the first step toward closing it.
China’s Approach
Beijing’s engagement in the Pacific is not premised on winning formal alliances, but on making non-alignment with the United States the path of least resistance. Through the Belt and Road Initiative, bilateral aid packages, and security agreements deliberately framed around sovereignty and non-interference, Beijing offers Pacific Island states tangible benefits without demanding ideological commitment in return. Beijing has been explicit about this posture, formally committing to “no political strings attached” to its assistance and pledging full respect for Pacific Island sovereignty.
China’s 2022 security agreement with Solomon Islands exemplifies this logic in practice. Honiara secured infrastructure investment, police training, and diplomatic leverage over its traditional partners, all without formally aligning against the United States. While the consequences included considerable domestic and international political frictions, which contributed to Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare’s electoral ouster in 2024, many Pacific governments will see the allure of Beijing’s model.
Indeed, Pacific Island states have increasingly used this competitive dynamic to their advantage, extracting concessions from both Washington and Beijing while resisting pressure to commit to either. China’s low threshold makes these hedging efforts far easier to sustain, gradually eroding the strategic access and influence the United States depends upon in the region.
The U.S. and Allied Approach
Meanwhile efforts by the United States and its allies to gain ground in the Pacific Islands have centered on developing multilateral frameworks, which require as a first step obtaining commitments from foreign governments declaring that they are “all in.” Perhaps the most glaring example was the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) where countries were asked to sign up before the substantive details were even composed. That 13 countries did sign up, without knowing what they would receive in return, is a strong signal of the extant demand for U.S. leadership and engagement.
As another example, the Partners in the Blue Pacific (PBP) on its face was an effort to align foreign assistance from external partners with the endogenously identified development priorities Pacific Islands Forum members codified in the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent. In function, the PBP was a signaling mechanism for external donors to align with U.S.-led attempts to counter what Washington saw as “covert, coercive, and corrupting” influence from Beijing. In fact, both IPEF and the PBP, and some would argue the entire “Pivot” to the Asia-Pacific, were widely seen as signs of U.S. alarm about the rise of China rather than genuine interest in the region.
The problem is not uniquely American. Contrast the 2022 China-Solomon Islands security agreement with the 2023 Falepili Union between Australia and Tuvalu and the 2024 Nauru-Australia Treaty. These arrangements provide Tuvalu and Nauru strong commitments from Australia toward their traditional, environmental, and economic security at the cost of giving Canberra an effective veto over some areas of those countries’ national security policy. Such initiatives, like the United States’ Compacts of Free Association from which they drew inspiration, start with a mutual and exclusive commitment.
The Path Ahead
Countries throughout the Indo-Pacific prize their sovereign right to choose. Part of that is staying out of the position where Washington feels it can assume their assumed support for every policy initiative it presents. Regional voices refuse to be forced into a global rivalry that undermines their interests. There has never been a better time for U.S. foreign policy to be grounded in the “realities of power and interests.” No matter how much one believes that U.S. and Pacific values comport, the success of American strategy will depend on meeting partners at the interest level.
One interest Pacific Islands share with the United States is maintaining relations with Beijing that are “not unnecessarily confrontational.” To be sure, they want the United States to compete with China, but compete in the sense that Washington aims for its initiatives to show greater merit than Beijing’s, not by treating every issue as a geostrategic football.
Pacific Islands, the Indo-Pacific, and the world generally want fixed rules of the road and for the great powers to enforce them (including through their own example). A free and open regional order that preserves the sovereignty of all states is a public good these countries desire, and they are willing to bear significant burdens to support it. However, they are reluctant to sign on to policies that seem to aim only at constraining China’s power. Limiting Chinese power feels less like a defense of the international order than Washington’s play to retain primacy within that order.
The United States and its allies should focus on specific solutions to specific challenges. A counterintuitive example of this approach is the second pillar of AUKUS. While the initial announcement that the United Kingdom and United States would assist Australia’s acquisition of conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines sparked concern by some in the region, once the details became clear, the Beijing-spurred anxiety gave way to acceptance and even support. Within a couple years of the initial announcement, the primary question regarding AUKUS became which countries might be able to join Pillar II to co-develop emerging defense technologies.
Such a sweat-the-details approach would enable the United States to draw starker lines for the issues where alignment is either unmistakable or essential. Such examples include economic sanctions, export controls, or 5G infrastructure. The United States and its allies should stop losing sleep over Chinese firms building roads, airports, and hospitals. They should focus their efforts on ensuring that their development assistance, including that administered through multilateral institutions, meets local needs, follows transparent processes, and achieves the intended effects.
In short, the United States needs to deal more in party planning and less in marriage proposals.
Lastly, we offer a final caution about one inconvenient reality. The United States will have to accept that countries who feel the weight of Chinese pressure most strongly will hedge. This means these countries will occasionally engage in behaviors that undermine their interests in specific areas to avoid the appearance of wholesale alignment. On any given issue, no matter how well-suited it is to partners’ strategic needs, there may be countries that opt out just to demonstrate their non-alignment as a signal to both Beijing and Washington. U.S. strategists need to be okay with that.