Last week, my wife and I visited Poland for an event hosted by the Polish president and the Sobieski Institute. It was a week in which Russia intensified what is called hybrid warfare – a combination of sabotage operations and psychological warfare – in Europe. There have been several reports of Russian attempts to sabotage various things in various European countries that were detected and foiled by intelligence and security agencies. One Russian drone struck a site near the Polish-Ukrainian border, albeit on the Ukrainian side.
Russia’s intent is obvious. It wants to warn Europe that its continued military and intelligence support of Ukraine is forcing Russia to attack Europe. That the operations were detected, and that there was a drone strike near Poland, is designed to create anxiety among NATO countries, rousing the public to demand an end to aiding Ukraine. Among the psychological weapons is an implicit threat that if NATO does not do so, it might itself be attacked and possibly invaded. Moscow is also leveraging U.S. efforts to negotiate with Russia, the U.S. desire to reduce its presence in NATO and the Iran war to convince European countries that Washington will abandon them.
In speaking to officials in Poland, I saw no indication that Russia’s strategy was working. Perhaps more important, in walking the streets of Warsaw and speaking with non-government folks, I noticed they were aware there was a possibility of war, however remote, and that they were therefore preparing in case it came. I found no one eager to capitulate. Instead, I found confident defiance.
Poland is now the most strategically important country in NATO. During the Cold War, when Germany was divided, it was the most strategically important country. Poland is the easternmost NATO member, which borders Ukraine and Belarus and serves as the foundation for defending the Baltic countries if Russia ever decides to strike them.
If Russia were to attempt to attack and occupy the European mainland, it would first have to attack, defeat and to a great extent occupy Poland. Poland is thus what West Germany was in the Cold War. The U.S. has about 10,000 troops there, sometimes less depending on rotation. More important, Washington has announced that it is planning to develop military bases for a permanent presence in the country, just as it had in West Germany. During my visit, the search for appropriate locations for bases was underway, and I assume once they are built, the U.S. will also close its bases in Germany, or at least some of them. This is obviously not something Moscow would like, given that it would place U.S. forces closer to Russia.
All of this explains Russian hybrid warfare operations. Because Russia does not border Poland, Russian troops are blocked by Ukrainian forces. The only practical way Russia could attack Poland is through Belarus, with which it shares a 250-mile-long (400-kilometer-long) border. Such an attack would require the deployment of massive numbers of Russian troops in Belarus. This would be made possible by Russia’s relationship with Belarus – which is a de facto client state.
However, the buildup of troops and the logistics needed to service them would be readily visible to European and U.S. satellites. Everyone would have ample time for preparation. Russia’s other option would be to invade the Baltic states, where there are already some NATO forces deployed. There is only a very short border between Poland and Lithuania. But even if Russian forces could successfully reach that border, Poland and NATO could block their advance.
The point is that a surprise attack on Poland by Russian ground forces is unrealistic, and the fact that they would likely face Polish, U.S. and NATO forces makes this unlikely.
Russia’s only other course of action would be to attack Europe with drones and missiles in the hope of inflicting massive casualties and destroying much of NATO’s forces. The problem with this strategy is that though it could cripple NATO in the short term, it would unite the alliance in purpose and, in all likelihood, invite commensurate NATO reprisals in the short and the long term. This is based on the reality that Russia can damage Europe but cannot occupy it so long as Ukraine and Poland remain intact. You can damage a country massively with drones, but as the Ukrainians have demonstrated, you cannot defeat and occupy countries with aerial weapons alone.
The Russian strategy, then, is at this point based on psychological warfare, attempting to convince Europe that it is facing catastrophe without triggering a full-scale war it would probably lose. And this is why my visit to Poland was so valuable. Poland is the doorway to Europe. It is indispensable to Russia if it wants to attack, and it is indispensable for European security. Even if the rest of Europe were rattled, I do not think the Poles would be rattled. They know by experience what a Russian occupation means.
Geopolitics is a fine analytical tool. A visit to a nation allows for a more intimate understanding of reality.
Facts Only
* The author visited Poland during an event hosted by the Polish president and the Sobieski Institute.
* Russia intensified hybrid warfare (sabotage and psychological warfare) in Europe during this time.
* A Russian drone struck a site near the Polish-Ukrainian border on the Ukrainian side.
* Russia's intent is to warn Europe about the consequences of military and intelligence support for Ukraine.
* The actions are designed to create anxiety among NATO countries, prompting demands to end aid to Ukraine.
* An implicit threat was leveraged: if NATO does not act, it might face attack or invasion.
* Russia leverages U.S. efforts and the desire to reduce the U.S. presence in NATO to convince European nations of Washington's abandonment.
* Poland is the most strategically important country in NATO.
* Poland borders Ukraine and Belarus and serves as a defense foundation for the Baltic countries against a Russian strike.
* A hypothetical attack on the European mainland would first require attacking, defeating, and occupying Poland.
* The U.S. plans to develop military bases in Poland, potentially leading to US base closures in Germany.
* Russian ground forces are blocked by Ukrainian forces and must use Belarus for an attack on Poland.
* A surprise attack on Poland by Russian ground forces is considered unrealistic due to Polish, U.S., and NATO resistance.
Executive Summary
A visit to Poland revealed that Russia's strategy of hybrid warfare, characterized by sabotage and psychological operations against Europe, was not succeeding in achieving immediate capitulation from Polish officials. The author observed a confident defiance among Poles who were aware of the possibility of war but prepared for it, rather than seeking to end the support for Ukraine. This context is framed by Poland's crucial strategic position in NATO as the easternmost member, serving as a defensive foundation for the Baltic states should Russia act.
The geopolitical analysis suggests that a direct ground invasion of Poland is deemed unrealistic due to the presence of Polish, U.S., and NATO forces, especially considering the potential for Russian deployment through Belarus or an attack on the Baltic states. Therefore, Russia's strategy appears centered on psychological warfare—creating anxiety among NATO nations regarding their support for Ukraine—rather than immediate territorial conquest. The author concludes that Poland is indispensable to Russia if an attack were to occur and serves as a vital gateway to Europe's security.
Full Take
The narrative constructs a specific framework where geopolitical reality dictates military feasibility, focusing heavily on the strategic pivot represented by Poland. The core dynamic involves an external actor (Russia) attempting to achieve a desired outcome—instability or policy reversal in Europe—by exploiting perceived vulnerabilities and creating manufactured threats. The psychological element is elevated above material threat because physical occupation is assessed as unlikely against reinforced NATO structures.
The reliance on the Polish position suggests a pattern where the viability of any large-scale Russian action is inherently tied to Poland's defense posture and the existing NATO presence, which acts as a significant barrier. This narrative functions by framing the situation not just as a conflict between states, but as a test of collective resolve against asymmetric warfare tactics. The focus on local awareness ("they were aware there was a possibility of war") versus outward political response reveals a tension between internal security perception and external geopolitical signaling.
The implication for agency centers on recognizing that hybrid warfare attempts to collapse rational decision-making by injecting fear while simultaneously obscuring direct military pathways. A key pattern is the strategic amplification of perceived vulnerability (the drone strike) to generate a specific political reaction (demanding cessation of aid). The deeper implication is whether focusing on localized, tangible realities—like Poland’s defensive necessity and its role as an indispensable barrier—can effectively counter sophisticated, non-kinetic statecraft aimed at fracturing alliances.
Bridge Questions: If the psychological threat is successfully managed by the Polish leadership, what other perceived vulnerabilities might Russia attempt to exploit against NATO? How does the concept of "indispensability" in a geopolitical context influence the calculus for defensive alliances when facing low-intensity aggression? What alternative metrics of security or sovereignty exist that do not rely on direct military occupation as the ultimate guarantor of state integrity?