The First Capital Command (Primeiro Comando da Capital – PCC) is Brazil’s largest and most powerful criminal organization, with operations in more than 20 countries. In 2026, the group continued expanding its cocaine trafficking routes through Bolivia and Paraguay while maintaining significant influence in São Paulo’s prisons. The United States designated the PCC a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) in June 2026.
Table of contents
Recent PCC News
July 18, 2026 – PCC money laundering investigation examines possible links to terrorist financing
Brazilian authorities investigated an alleged money laundering network accused of moving around $19 million in drug trafficking proceeds between 2021 and 2024 for the First Capital Command (PCC), the Red Command and the Pure Third Command. The investigation, known as Operation Hawala, included ten arrest warrants and 37 searches across four Brazilian states. Investigators are also examining transactions involving a person sanctioned by the United States for alleged participation in a financing network linked to Al Qaeda and Hezbollah. However, Brazilian prosecutors have not charged the suspects with terrorism, and the possible connection remains a line of police investigation.
What’s the Story of the PCC?
The PCC formed in the wake of a massacre in São Paulo’s Carandiru prison in October 1992, in which Brazilian security forces killed over 100 prisoners following a riot.
In August 1993, a group of eight prisoners who had been transferred to Taubaté prison formed the PCC to fight for justice for the massacre and to push for better prison conditions. They expressed solidarity with another prison-based gang, the Red Command, adopting its slogan “peace, justice, freedom,” and advocated for revolution and the destruction of the capitalist system.
In 1999, the group carried out the biggest bank heist in São Paulo’s history, stealing over $7 million.
In subsequent years, the government moved to split up the PCC’s leaders, transferring them to prisons across the country. However, this allowed the gang to forge stronger links with other crime groups and to spread its ideas more widely.
It had become impossible to deny the PCC’s existence by 2001, when it coordinated the biggest prison rebellion the world had ever seen, with simultaneous shutdowns in 29 facilities across São Paulo state.
In 2006, the PCC launched an even more significant protest after members were transferred to remote facilities. Imprisoned gang members took control of more than 70 prisons across the country, holding visitors hostage. Simultaneously, the group launched coordinated attacks on the outside focused on São Paulo that left more than 150 people dead.
Over the next decade, the PCC grew in strength and sophistication, aided by a virtually unimpeded ability to conduct business in Brazil’s underresourced prisons, as well as a reported truce with the São Paulo police. In the early 2010s, the group began branching out to establish drug and weapons trafficking operations in neighboring countries like Bolivia and Paraguay.
During the early 2010s, the PCC also made attempts to influence politics in its home state of São Paulo.
With increasing recruitment rates and revenues, the gang began to emerge as the most powerful criminal organization in Brazil. Boasting more than 11,000 members across the country, and with multimillion-dollar monthly revenues, the PCC expanded its criminal portfolio to include large-scale international drug trafficking operations. The group developed ties with the powerful Italian mafia, the ‘Ndrangheta, and began laundering money in foreign countries like China.
In the latter half of the decade, the PCC grew bolder in its use of violence. The group was blamed for a series of armed robberies in Paraguay in 2015. And in early 2016, a video surfaced on the internet depicting the decapitation of a teenager, reportedly linked to a dispute between the PCC and its erstwhile ally, the First Catarinense Group (Primeiro Grupo da Catarinense – PGC).
In late 2016, the PCC broke a longstanding truce with the Red Command, setting off months of bloody prison riots that led to hundreds of deaths. Authorities linked the violence to clashes between the two groups over control of lucrative drug trafficking routes running through the remote northern Amazon region of Brazil. Reports also suggested that the PCC was seeking to challenge the Red Command in its home city of Rio de Janeiro, and that the PCC was fending off challenges from a rival group in São Paulo state, contributing to a spike in violence there.
In 2017, the PCC appeared to move into expansion mode. The group was linked to international drug shipments traveling through Uruguay, kidnappings and robberies in Bolivia, and attempts to recruit dissident members of the demobilizing Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC).
The PCC was also blamed for a spate of murders reportedly linked to conflict over the drug trade in Paraguay. And in April 2017, the gang reportedly carried out the biggest armed robbery in Paraguay’s history.
The fallout from the breakdown of the PCC-Red Command truce continued to generate violence in early 2018, with the PCC seemingly undeterred in its ongoing campaign of domestic and international expansion.
By the end of the 2010s, the PCC had become a significant transnational criminal organization, with strong control over drug trafficking and other criminal activities in much of Brazil, and strong connections to the international drug trade.
In the early years of the 2020s, however, the group came under increasing pressure from Brazilian and international authorities. The group’s senior leadership was destabilized after the government intercepted the group’s communications, as well as ongoing warfare with rival organizations, and the transfers of top leaders to federal penitentiaries.
In 2024, the gang entered the worst internal crisis in its 30 years of existence, following the leak of a recording of a conversation in which top-ranking PCC leader Marcos Willians Herbas Camacho, alias “Marcola,” calls fellow gang leader Roberto Soriano, alias “Tiriça,” a “psychopath.”
The recording of the conversation was used in the criminal case against Tiriça, and he declared that Marcola was a whistleblower. Together with Abel Pacheco, alias “Vida Loka,” and Wanderson Nilton de Paula Lima, alias “Andinho,” Tiriça issued a statement demanding Marcola’s exclusion from the PCC leadership, which was responded to with another statement by Marcola and the PCC highest level leadership group declaring the expulsion and ordering the death of the other three leaders.
The crisis remained unsolved in 2025, but Marcola’s exclusion was not unanimous. Marcola declared he was being slandered by the other leaders and most of the PCC members on the streets remained loyal to him, even as some of the gang’s traditional leaders questioned his authority. Meanwhile, Tiriça and Vida Loka were expelled from the gang.
Who Are The PCC’s Leaders?
The PCC is run at the highest level by a group of powerful regional leaders, many of whom are incarcerated. It organizes itself in cells, with local leaderships working on a vertical hierarchy. The gang’s highest cell is known as the General High Command (Sintonia Final Geral), and is run by Marcola and other six leaders. Dues are collected from members of the organization and are used to pay lawyers, buy off prison guards and police, and to purchase drugs and weapons.
Two founding members of the PCC, Jose Marcio Felicio, alias “Geleião,” and César Augusto Roriz da Silva, alias “Cesinha,” were expelled from the organization in 2002 as Marcola took power. Geleião and Cesinha founded a rival organization, the Third Capital Command (Terceiro Comando da Capital — TCC).
Marcola is the group’s maximum leader, operating from prison, where he is serving a two-decade drug trafficking sentence. After him, six other members are understood to be the group’s second-in-command, according to information by São Paulo’s Public Ministry from June 2025. Among them, Cláudio Barbará da Silva, alias “Barbará,” and Reinaldo Teixeira dos Santos, alias “Funchal,” allegedly replaced Tiriça and Vida Loka after their expulsion.
The chart also mentions Antônio José Muller, alias “Granada,” Eric Oliveira Farias, alias “Eric Gordão,” Márcio Luciano Neves Soares, alias “Pezão,” and Júlio César Guedes de Moraes, alias “Julinho Carambola,” as second-in-command after Marcola.
Where Does the PCC Operate?
The PCC is strongest in his home base of São Paulo, Brazil’s most populous and economically important state, though it maintains a presence around the country. In recent years, it has expanded its activities internationally, developing operations in nearly every country in South America in addition to establishing ties with European crime groups.
Paraguay has become an important stronghold for the Brazilian organization in Latin America. In Europe, Portugal is the country with the most PCC activity. According to a 2023 report by the Portuguese Security Intelligence Service, around 1,000 PCC members operate in the country.
Who Are the PCC’s Allies and Enemies?
A 20-year truce between the PCC and the Red Command broke down in late 2016, resulting in a rapid grab for territory and allies by both sides.
To shore up support in the northern territories, which are home to important drug trafficking routes, the PCC allied with rivals of the Red Command. However, some of those alliances appear to have broken down. The group maintains an alliance with the northeastern gang Bonde do Maluco (BDM), through which they trade drugs and weapons and enable the migration of criminals. Reports suggest that the Pure Third Command (Terceiro Comando Puro – TCP), a dissident gang from the Red Command, and criminal groups from the southern state of Rio Grande do Sul are also allied with the PCC.
Despite the rivalry, the PCC and the Red Command made some attempts at cooperation in 2025. In February, the gangs established a truce that lasted no longer than two months, due to local rivalries between branches of the groups across Brazil.
What is the Future of the PCC?
The PCC’s ambitions are not limited to the domestic environment. Its recent spread throughout Latin America has resulted in it filling a void in countries where no homegrown criminal organization has taken charge. The gang has also been diversifying the types of crime in which it operates through participation in cybercrimes, such as money laundering with cryptocurrencies and virtual fraud, as well as public contracting graft.
The gang’s diffuse leadership structure has made it resilient to challenges from rivals, as well as authorities’ attempts to disrupt its leadership. Despite tensions among top leaders, the group will likely remain among Latin America’s most powerful criminal organizations due to its strong territorial control and its involvement in a multitude of criminal economies.
First Capital Command (PCC) – FAQ
What is the PCC?
The First Capital Command, or PCC, is Brazil’s largest and most powerful criminal organization, with a presence across Brazil and an extensive international drug trafficking network.
Who leads the PCC today?
Marcos Willians Herbas Camacho, alias “Marcola,” remains the PCC’s maximum leader and operates from prison alongside six other senior commanders.
Where does the PCC operate outside Brazil?
The PCC operates across much of South America, with Paraguay serving as a major stronghold. It also has ties to European criminal groups, and Portugal hosts its largest presence in Europe.
Is the PCC a terrorist organization?
The United States designated the PCC a Foreign Terrorist Organization and a Specially Designated Global Terrorist group in June 2026.
What crimes is the PCC believed to be involved in?
The PCC is believed to be involved in international drug and weapons trafficking, robberies, kidnappings and money laundering, as well as cybercrime, virtual fraud and corruption in public contracts.
Facts Only
* The First Capital Command (PCC) operates in more than 20 countries.
* In June 2026, the United States designated the PCC a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO).
* An investigation known as Operation Hawala examined alleged money laundering of $19 million in drug trafficking proceeds between 2021 and 2024 for the PCC, the Red Command, and the Pure Third Command.
* The investigation included ten arrest warrants and 37 searches across four Brazilian states.
* The PCC formed after a massacre in São Paulo’s Carandiru prison in October 1992.
* In August 1993, eight prisoners formed the PCC to fight for justice and advocate for revolution.
* The group carried out a bank heist in 1999, stealing over $7 million.
* In 2006, members held visitors hostage in more than 70 prisons nationwide.
* Between the early 2010s and the late 2010s, the PCC established drug and weapons trafficking operations in Bolivia and Paraguay and linked with the Italian mafia.
* The PCC was linked to armed robberies in Paraguay in 2015 and carried out a major armed robbery in Paraguay in April 2017.
* In 2016, a video surfaced regarding an alleged dispute between the PCC and the First Catarinense Group (PGC).
* A truce between the PCC and the Red Command broke down in late 2016, leading to prison riots.
* In 2024, a recording surfaced involving top leaders, including Marcos Willians Herbas Camacho, alleging conflict.
* Marcos Willians Herbas Camacho was called a "psychopath" by Roberto Soriano.
* Following the recording in 2024, Tiriça and Vida Loka were expelled from the gang.
* The PCC has leaders, including Marcos Willians Herbas Camacho (alias “Marcola”), and six other senior commanders.
* The PCC operates strongly in São Paulo, but also in South America and Europe, with Portugal having the most activity in Europe.
Executive Summary
The First Capital Command (PCC) is Brazil’s largest criminal organization, with operations spanning more than 20 countries, and the United States designated it a Foreign Terrorist Organization in June 2026. The group expanded its cocaine trafficking routes through Bolivia and Paraguay while maintaining influence within São Paulo prisons. A money laundering investigation, Operation Hawala, examined alleged links between the PCC and other groups regarding drug trafficking proceeds, resulting in warrants and searches across four Brazilian states, though no terrorism charges were filed by Brazilian prosecutors.
The PCC originated from a 1992 massacre in São Paulo's Carandiru prison. In 1993, a group of inmates formed the organization to seek justice and reform conditions, aligning with the Red Command. The group executed a significant bank heist in 1999 and later coordinated large-scale prison rebellions in 2001 and sustained protests involving hostage-taking between 2006 and 2007. Over the following decade, the PCC grew by establishing drug and weapons trafficking operations in neighboring countries and developed ties with international figures like the Italian mafia. By the end of the 2010s, the organization was a major transnational entity involved in large-scale drug trafficking and criminal activities across Brazil, supported by internal leadership restructuring and external alliances.
In recent years, the PCC has expanded its criminal portfolio to include cybercrimes, such as cryptocurrency money laundering and public contracting graft. The group's structure remains diffuse, with leadership concentrated in prison, yet it maintains strong territorial control in São Paulo and operates across South America and Europe, notably with a significant presence in Portugal. Ongoing internal disputes among leaders have occurred, including a 2024 crisis involving the alleged exclusion of Marcos Willians Herbas Camacho, demonstrating resilience despite external pressure from authorities and rivals.
Full Take
The narrative of the PCC illustrates a complex interplay between entrenched criminal organization, political volatility, and transnational adaptation. The shift from prison-based rebellion seeking justice to a sophisticated, multinational entity highlights a successful strategic pivot: leveraging institutional weaknesses (the prison system) into operational infrastructure for illicit economies. The pattern observed is one of adaptive resilience; when internal leadership structures faced crisis—such as the 2024 power struggle over leadership—the group demonstrated an ability to absorb or redefine internal conflict rather than collapse, maintaining its decentralized strength across multiple jurisdictions.
The expansion patterns reveal a movement from localized control (São Paulo prison system) to geographic dominance (Bolivia, Paraguay) and economic diversification (cybercrime, public contract fraud). This diversification suggests that the core resilience of the PCC is not solely dependent on direct territorial control but on its ability to integrate into and exploit disparate legal and economic systems. The involvement in international structures like Al Qaeda financing attempts, even if unproven by Brazilian courts, signals an attempt to position themselves within a broader context of global criminal networks, complicating the definition of domestic versus international security threats.
The tension between internal factionalism (e.g., Marcola vs. Tiriça) and external pressures (law enforcement, rival gangs, international designations) creates a dynamic equilibrium. The historical capacity for coordinated violence, evidenced by the 2006 prison takeover and subsequent border conflicts, remains a latent threat, even as the organization focuses on modern, less overtly violent economic crimes like cryptocurrency fraud. Understanding the future of the PCC requires analyzing whether this adaptive structure allows for effective governance or if the internal fractures will lead to greater fragmentation or renewed conflict between associated groups.
BRIDGE QUESTIONS: What are the measurable effects of the stated alliances with transnational groups and local criminal entities on the sustained profitability of the drug trafficking routes? How does the reliance on diffuse leadership structure affect the group's capacity to respond coherently to evolving international sanctions, such as the FTO designation? What is the long-term impact of using cybercrime for revenue generation versus traditional trafficking in shifting the paradigm of criminal power in South America?
Sentinel — Human
The text reads like detailed background reporting compiled from multiple sources, focusing on a complex criminal organization's history and structure.
