Two decades ago, the Bush-Cheney Administration invaded Iraq in the guise of a Neocon democratization mission. That Neocon claptrap provided cover for a project that attempted to deal with America’s dependency on petroleum imports in the wake of the 9/11 attack. Even while that mission turned out to be a catastrophe, in the background, oilman Dick Cheney implemented a revised plan to make the US energy independent.
A month ago, Trump and Israel started bombing Iran. While Israel appears to have clear imperial goals, Donald Trump’s goals appear to boil down to his need to feel powerful and a belief that dominating petroleum and other resources is a source of power. Because Trump is incapable of thinking of complexity and consequences, the invasion has created a crisis far greater than the status quo ante, with the effect that America’s war goals are now limited to unfucking the problems in the Strait of Hormuz that Trump’s war has caused (Israel and the Gulf states will increasingly pursue their own goals, manipulating Trump’s feebleness all the way). Meanwhile, the resultant security threat led NATO to withdraw from Iraq, effectively ending the Iraq War by starting an Iran War.
Whatever else the Iran War does, the energy and economic crisis Trump created will result in a remapping of the world, with results that are largely unforeseeable. One thing is certain, though: the Iran War has killed the American order created in the wake of the Second World War. Trump currently believes he will accrue more power from this invasion, but that very much remains to be seen.
These two invasions, Iraq and Iran, bookend the collapse of American hegemony.
And with it, two annual reports on the state of democracy (V-Dem; Freedom House) lay out, has come an increase in autocratization, the exact opposite of what the Neocons claimed to be pursuing.
I’ll come back to the reports showing an acceleration of autocratization, led by the US, in the last year. I have noted in the past that reports on Trump’s embrace of autocracy often ignore how that embrace necessarily commits hegemonic suicide, which will have repercussions for the entire world. With few exceptions (Abraham Newman, who wrote one of the best books on US hegemony with Henry Farrell and is now theorizing an era of Neo-Royalism with Stacie Goddard, is a notable exception), experts are not considering how America’s hegemonic suicide will intersect with its autocratization. I’m not entirely persuaded by Newman’s model, but as I’ll explain, I’m certain that that intersection means the general model of autocratization often embodied by Orbán’s Hungary will not neatly apply to the US.
Because the US has been the world’s hegemon, we should not assume its autocratization will proceed according to the known model.
But first, let’s talk about America’s twin wars for oil.
During the early days of the Iraq War, I thought a lot about the opportunity cost of the war. Dick Cheney came into office focused on energy policy, and launched the Iraq war after mapping out oil fields in the country.
So while Cheney’s Task Force itself and Bush’s actual policies adopted a more complex approach to energy, the US blew its treasure and credibility on the eight year invasion of Iraq most saw and see as a war for oil.
Even in real time, I often thought about what would have happened if the US spent all that money — almost $3 trillion, even as Trump is currently trying to renege on some of those costs to pay for veterans care — on renewable energy? What if, instead of launching a war for oil, the US had instead focused its hegemonic moment on renewable energy?
And while Bush’s energy policy didn’t accomplish most of its own renewable plans, it did make the US a net energy exporter. Whatever else Dick Cheney did (and boyohboy he did a lot), he also turned the US into a petrostate, focused significantly on the fracking that Democratic Presidents would preserve as a less horrible option than the alternative.
At the apex of American hegemony and credibility, the US could have invested in a Manhattan project of renewable energy, and in so doing, made the volatility of the Middle East less of a security threat to the United States. Instead, Dick Cheney doubled down on the existing world order based on petroleum, not just by launching a war of a choice in the Middle East (which, whatever else it did, ensured the dollar remained the unit of exchange for petroleum and so the world’s reserve currency on which — as Newman and Farrell mapped out — US hegemony has expanded). More importantly, rather than minimizing US reliance on Middle East oil by investing in renewables, Cheney instead prioritized fracking, subsidizing new development, laying the groundwork for the US’ current dominant position in fossil fuel production.
And those choices Cheney made during the first war for oil have created a number of conditions that will drive the impact of the second.
Asymmetrical exposure to energy crisis: Because the US is less reliant on Gulf petroleum products than other countries (particularly, though not not limited to, Asia), it can mitigate the domestic energy shock better than most other countries, even accounting for our dysfunctional politics — though it will exacerbate real economic uncertainty for most in the US.
The energy/economic crisis Trump created will result in widespread unrest around the world. In a piece focused on the UK, Sam Freedman notes the troubles this will cause in developing nations:
[T]he global financial crisis led to increases in energy and food prices in North Africa and the Middle East which helped kickstart the Arab Spring revolutions. They led to a series of hugely destructive civil wars, and a large rise in irregular immigration into Europe in the mid-2010s. That, in turn, gave the radical right a major electoral boost. It’s only in the last two years that numbers of immigrants have fallen back, due to tighter restrictions on entry as well as the end of the civil war in Syria.
A new round of prolonged energy shortages and higher food prices could have similar consequences. Poorer nations, particularly in South Asia and East Africa, are very dependent on the Middle East for oil, gas and fertilizer. Many are also reliant on remittances from workers in the Gulf who are losing income due to regional shutdowns.
To take a few examples, 25% of Bangladesh’s gas comes from Qatar, and the new government there has already closed universities and started imposing temporary blackouts. Their entire economy is dependent on export industries that use significant amounts of energy, and if that starts shutting down they’re in serious trouble. Pakistan is entirely reliant on the Gulf for gas and has already increased the state-set fuel price by 20%. Egypt has imposed restrictions on opening times and is encouraging people to work at home. Parts of Kenya are running out of fuel.
All of these states are politically fragile and have recent experience of mass protests. Over the past year we’ve seen a wave of so-called “Gen Z” revolutions hit countries from Indonesia to Madagascar, as younger populations frustrated at lack of opportunities and corruption push for change. A severe economic crunch, and serious food shortages, could throw numerous countries into political chaos. And, of course, Iran’s already fragile economy is being battered.
Another wave of immigration would undermine the UK government’s ability to do anything about small boats, helping right-wing parties. It could also boost the radical right across Europe, particularly in France where National Rally’s Jordan Bardella is already favourite to capture the Presidency next year, destabilising the EU. It would also, once again, expose the futility of trying to create fortress nations while withdrawing development support from the countries that need it most.
A rush to renewables: In response to the energy crisis Trump caused, sane governments have adopted three responses. Those that can (such as Europe) are adopting short-term price supports to mitigate the effect on consumers. Those that can are negotiating with Iran to get oil through the Strait, which Iran says it will allow for “non-hostile” countries.
Iran has told the United Nations’ maritime organization that “non-hostile” ships may pass safely through the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow waterway that has been effectively closed to tankers since the U.S.-Israeli military campaign began last month.
In a letter circulated to members of the International Maritime Organization on Tuesday, Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs defined nonhostile vessels as those which “neither participate in nor support acts of aggression against Iran” or belong to the United States or Israel.
But this is coming at a steep price, supplementing the bounty Iran (and Russia) has already experienced as Trump rewarded Iran for killing US service members.
Iran has started charging transit fees on some commercial vessels passing through the Strait of Hormuz, another sign of Tehran’s control over the world’s most important maritime energy channel.
Payments of as much as $2 million per voyage are being sought on an adhoc basis, effectively creating an informal toll on the waterway, according to people familiar with the matter, who requested anonymity to discuss sensitive dealings. Some vessels have made the payment, though the mechanism wasn’t immediately clear — including the currency used — and it doesn’t appear to be systematic, the people said.
The payments show Iran’s influence over Hormuz, through which normally about a fifth of the world’s oil and gas, and vast amounts of food, metals and other materials are shipped every day. With the war in the Middle East now in its fourth week, it also highlights the desperate need for some consumers to ensure continued energy flows.
People familiar with the matter said the payments have been handled quietly. The lack of transparency and uncertainty over who might be targeted next is adding a fresh layer of friction to the shipping lane. Only a trickle of vessels have crossed the waterway since the war, many of them Iranian-linked. Some of the few others appear to have taken similar routes close to Iran’s coastline.
At least in the short term, Iran has devised a way to get Trump to pay it while waging war against it.
Meanwhile, this will accelerate a shift to renewables already started in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine — precisely the change that Cheney could have pushed instead of doubling down on petroleum by invading Iraq.
The fallout from the Iran war is likely to expedite the shift away from fossil fuels and make countries think differently about the role renewables can play in shoring up energy security, analysts told CNBC.
Spain is crowing about the resilience it has due to its investments in solar power, Germany is regretting giving up nuclear power, and the renewables industry is pointing out that renewables are now cheaper than fossil fuel.
Unlike during previous oil shocks, renewable power is now competitive with fossil fuels in many places. More than 90% of new renewable power projects worldwide in 2024 were cheaper than fossil-fuel alternatives, according to the International Renewable Energy Agency.
A rush to renewables will benefit China’s renewables industry, which has remained focused on renewables as the US has equivocated (though unless and until Iran guarantees China preferential transit of the Strait, China will remain disproportionately exposed to the bottleneck there).
Trump, on the other hand, will charge American taxpayers $3 apiece so he can reject renewable projects, yet another instance of suicidal behavior from him.
Increased fiscal frailty of the United States: Meanwhile, Forbes used the event of the yearly release of the government’s financial statements to declare the US insolvent.
The U.S. government is insolvent. That’s not hyperbole — it’s the conclusion drawn directly from the Treasury Department’s own consolidated financial statements for fiscal year 2025, released last week to near-total media silence. The numbers: $6.06 trillion in total assets against $47.78 trillion in total liabilities as of September 30, 2025.
This is, in fact, hyperbole. But it is not frivolous. Last year, Trump cut benefits for Americans to give huge tax cuts to people like Elon Musk, and as a result, the deficit is growing worse.
Whiskey Pete Hegseth got confirmed with a promise to ensure DOD can pass an audit; it still cannot. But that has not stopped him from demanding a half trillion budget increase (before this war) and demanding $200 billion to fight it — both of which look quaint when you review how Iraq War costs ballooned from initial estimates of $50 billion.
If the US retained the goodwill of the rest of the world, this might be sustainable. But having squandered that goodwill, it will become increasingly unsustainable, an Achilles Heel that other countries can use to push back on the US. And that’s assuming Iran can’t make good on its promise to target countries that invest in US bonds.
The first war for oil shored up US hegemony for the next twenty years of declining democracy.
This one is unlikely to do so.
Ivo Daalder, in a piece (rightly, in my opinion) declaring the Iran War a bigger strategic blunder than the Iraq War, lays out why this will be worse.
Less than a month in, the world is now witnessing the largest oil and gas disruption in history. And as the fighting escalates to include gas and oil production infrastructure, the global economic consequences will be felt by every single country for months, if not years, to come — even if the conflict were to end soon.
The damage that has already been inflicted on the global economy is far greater than the economic consequences of the Iraq War in its entirety.
But that’s not all. Geopolitically, the U.S.-Israel war with Iran will also have far greater reverberations than the war in Iraq ever did.
For one, the Bush administration spent a lot of time and effort trying to get allies on board to participate in and support the war. It didn’t fully succeed in this, as key allies like Germany and France continued opposing the war. But it tried.
Trump, by contrast, didn’t even try to get America’s most important allies on board. Not only that, he even failed to inform them of his decision. And yet, when Iran responded predictably by closing the Strait of Hormuz, the U.S. president then demanded allies send their navies to escort tankers — despite the U.S. Navy so far refusing to do so.
And while it’s true that Iraq left many U.S. allies — even those that joined the war, like the U.K. — deeply scarred, Iran has convinced U.S. allies they can no longer rely on the U.S., and that Washington is now a real threat to their economic security.
That, too, will have a lasting impact well beyond anything the war in Iraq did.
Finally, the fact remains that when Bush decided to invade Iraq, Russia and China were still minor global powers. Russian President Vladimir Putin was only just starting his effort to stabilize the economy and rebuild Russia’s military power, while China had just joined the World Trade Organization and was still a decade or more away from becoming an economic superpower. In other words, America’s blunder in Iraq occurred at a time when the strategic consequences for the global balance of power were still manageable.
Trump’s Iran debacle is occurring at a time when China is effectively competing with the U.S. for global power and influence, and Russia is engaged in the largest military action in Europe since the end of World War II.
Both stand to benefit greatly.
[snip]
But while the U.S. was strong enough — and its adversaries still weak enough — to recoup much of the damage inflicted by Bush’s war, the war unfolding in Iran today will leave behind an America that will have lost much of its global power, standing and influence, destined to confront rising adversaries all on its own.
None of that is good for the world. When Trump took power, I thought it likely that Trump would simply ally with a bunch of authoritarian states — effectively Russia delivering Trump to BRICS on a silver platter. Thus far, the Iran War has resulted in something worse, Trump making concessions to those powers out of desperation rather than strategy.
In 2000, the US hegemon could have had renewables and democracy. In 2026, Trump’s failures may deliver renewables and autocracy. Or, it may deliver a period so unstable that something new will result.
But whatever it delivers, the US will no longer be in the driver’s seat.
Yep. That’s it. Yep.
Thanks for the analysis. It covers two parallel wars which seem easier to fight, than to spend the money on renewable independence from the region’s shifts and grudges. When will our nation learn, the oil barons are nobody’s friend. The punishment Trump deserves is to be chained outdoors, to a wind turbine, to see it all the time, to here its rotation sounds, and if a tornado comes through to see it close up, ground level. But that’s just a thought. He has shown bounds of executive power to undo our nation never dreamed of before, and there’s more than half a term left, however leadership trends from here into the future.
Dick Cheney had maneuvered himself into the vice presidency, arguably manipulating a naive and politically vulnerable W to embrace him for the role, with his own agenda that came to dominate the administration (at least until W started pushing back in his second term). I’m surprised you didn’t mention Halliburton, the company he left to “serve” a grateful nation–the company that would in fact benefit so many times over that it became a byword during those years.
Who is Trump’s Cheney? Putin, who wormed his way in through means that have been much speculated about but never yet clearly delineated; who might as well have been calling the shots during this administration. Trump is so vulnerable that he has sub-Cheneys, like MBS and Bibi, all manipulating him to serve their own ends. But Putin is the Supreme Dick. Always has been.
And – Iran tells Von Shitzinpants to get bent with his 15 point proposal:
https://apnews.com/article/iran-us-israel-trump-lebanon-march-25-2026-be07c54139bcc70672bb33f0773ede6a
“Iran will end the war when it decides to do so and when its own conditions are met,” Press TV quoted the official as saying. The official added Tehran will continue its “heavy blows” across the Mideast.
So, two things happened last night. A friend at the local watering hole was bemoaning the lack of Iran war coverage and analysis beyond immediate impacts like gas prices. And I then headed home to listen to a weekly podcast on the Asian-Pacific war in WWII.
It occurred to me that the imperial powers (France, Great Britain, Netherlands, US) failed to provide security for the territory they controlled in Southeast Asis. Yes, you can decry it as imperialism and oppressive, but the security failure resulted in Japanese occupation and millions of deaths from famine, forced labor, and brutality.
The Iran war is demonstrating the US’s inability to uphold security in the Gulf. We have military bases in the Gulf Coalition Countries because those countries expected the US to be able to protect their territorial integrity, populations, vital infrastructure, and freed transit of the sea. We failed and did so by initiating a war of choice with no objectives or plans.
Obviously the two situations are very, very different. That said, the failure to provide security with respect to a large chunk of the world’s economy and hundreds of millions of people comes with a price.
I think the article is correct to posit the notion that the Iran war may lead to a radically different world not premised on US security guarantees.
I don’t know how long the Iran will last or how it will conclude. But it is shaping up to be the worst foreign policy decision of my lifetime and that includes the Vietnam War. And if we are contemplating an amphibious assault of Kharg Island, WWII proffers some unpleasant food for thought.
Those of us who went through the oil crisis of 1974 and who saw nothing worthwhile come of that in the US beyond a shift from domestic white whale fuel guzzlers to Japanese automobiles, as well as the abovementioned lost opportunities since, might rightly wonder if even the Mad King and his obsessive hatred of renewables might cause the US body politic to finally forswear its entrenched petroaddiction.
I was with you until that last phrase.
We have seen since Jan 20, 2025 how Trump’s power grabs play out. The DOGE kidz play with their AI toys, and then cut cut cut things like public health money (Hi, Measles! Long time no see!), VOA and other public diplomacy agencies, and soft power programs like USAID.
“Billions for missiles, but not a dime for non-military aid!” has been Trump’s foreign affairs mantra since day one. He thinks it projects power, but all it does is prove that we are untrustworthy and increasingly impotent, both at home and abroad.
This does not remain to be seen.
If it was all about oil, why didn’t we attack Saudi Arabia, you know, those who attacked us on 9/11? They own us and at this time have all the cards. Three Trillion dollars spent for the benefit of the military industrial complex and our debt based economy.