User interaction with digital platforms: A consumer protection perspective

Edited by Baruch Fischhoff, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA; received September 15, 2025; accepted December 26, 2025

Abstract

The rapid growth of digital platforms has transformed how consumers interact with the marketplace and led to new challenges for consumer protection. This Perspective describes how the Federal Trade Commission’s Bureau of Economics uses behavioral insights and empirical methods to support efforts to prevent unfair or deceptive business practices in digital markets. We highlight two studies that address critical knowledge gaps in digital consumer protection, including how consumers perceive and respond to advertising disclosures and how digital design choices affect the accessibility and effectiveness of consumer reporting tools. The studies illustrate how behavioral research can be used both prospectively, to evaluate potential remedies, and retrospectively, to assess the effects of past Federal Trade Commission (FTC) actions. The first study is a laboratory experiment that examines how the salience of advertising disclosures influences consumer recognition of and engagement with advertising content, where engagement is defined as the time users spend viewing ads. The second is a retrospective analysis of a redesigned consumer complaint website, using a natural experiment to evaluate the effect of usability improvements on complaint submission rates and information quality. Together, these studies demonstrate how applied research on user behavior can inform marketplace oversight and the design of consumer-facing tools. We conclude by outlining ongoing efforts to expand the role of empirical research at the FTC to strengthen the foundation for evidence-based policymaking in an increasingly complex digital environment.

Data, Materials, and Software Availability

There are no data underlying this work.

Acknowledgments

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent those of the Federal Trade Commission or any of its Commissioners. The US Government retains and the publisher, by accepting this article for publication, acknowledges that the US Government retains a non-exclusive, paid-up, irrevocable, world-wide license to publish or reproduce the published form of this manuscript, or allow others to do so for US Government purposes. We thank Katherine Chang, Baruch Fischhoff, Patrick McAlvanah, Dave Schmidt, and two anonymous referees for their comments on this article, as well as Alycia Chin and Baruch Fischhoff for organizing this special feature.

Author contributions

N.L. and D.R.R. wrote the paper.

Competing interests

The authors declare no competing interest.

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Published online: July 6, 2026

Published in issue: July 14, 2026

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Acknowledgments

Author contributions

N.L. and D.R.R. wrote the paper.

Competing interests

The authors declare no competing interest.

Notes

This article is a PNAS Direct Submission.

With Executive Order 14215, “Ensuring Accountability for All Agencies,” extending Executive Order 12866, “Regulatory Planning and Review,” Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) review to all federal agency regulations that were previously exempt, the FTC’s rulemaking process may increasingly resemble that of other federal agencies. However, certain procedural requirements remain unique to the FTC (1).

†

For the FTC’s settlement with Amazon, see https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2025/09/ftc-secures-historic-25-billion-settlement-against-amazon The FTC is now in the process of proposing a rulemaking to address unfair and deceptive fees in rental housing. See: https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2026/01/ftc-submits-draft-anprm-related-rental-housing-fees-omb-review On July 8th, 2025, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit vacated the Negative Option Final Rule amendments. See https://ecf.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/25/07/243137P.pdf for more details. The FTC is now considering new amendments to the Negative Option Rule: see https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2026/01/ftc-submits-draft-anprm-related-negative-option-plans-omb-review

‡

Independent research undergoes substantive review within BE by the Assistant and Deputy Directors for Research, as well as a distinct review by the Office of the General Counsel to ensure compliance with confidentiality requirements. Directed research is reviewed by multiple Bureaus and Offices and by the offices of all Commissioners, and its external release must be authorized by a Commission vote.

Alongside economists, marketing researchers have also contributed behavioral research that supports the FTC’s consumer protection mission (5).

Organic content refers to material that users encounter naturally in digital environments, such as algorithmic search results, social media posts from friends or followed accounts, or editorial content, rather than content that appears because a firm has paid for placement or promotion.

The letter stated “Since then [referring to letters sent in 2002], however, we have observed a decline in compliance with the letter’s guidance.” and “In recent years, the features traditional search engines use to differentiate advertising from natural search results have become less noticeable to consumers, especially for advertising located immediately above the natural results (“top ads”). Indeed, a recent online survey by a search strategies company found that nearly half of searchers did not recognize top ads as distinct from natural search results and said the background shading used to distinguish the ads was white.” See https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2013/06/ftc-consumer-protection-staff-updates-agencys-guidance-search-engine-industry-need-distinguish For the native advertising workshop, see https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events/2013/12/blurred-lines-advertising-or-content-ftc-workshop-native-advertising For the Mary Engle quote, see https://searchengineland.com/ftc-search-engine-disclosure-164722

See https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/consumer-sentinel-network for more details on the Consumer Sentinel Network. The Consumer Sentinel Network received 6.5 million complaints in 2024.

††

This case was brought against Ideal Financial, a company that bought consumer payday loan applications and then used the bank account details in the applications to withdraw money from the consumers’ bank accounts without their consent. See ref. 39.

‡‡

§§

For the FTC’s Tableau page, see https://public.tableau.com/app/profile/federal.trade.commission For the FTC’s data spotlights, see https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/data-visualizations/data-spotlight For details on the Division of Consumer and Business Education, see https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/bureaus-offices/bureau-consumer-protection/our-divisions/division-consumer-business

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User interaction with digital platforms: A consumer protection perspective, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

123 (28) e2525996123,

https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2525996123

(2026).

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