This Iran war update will be skeletal due again to Links and competing obligations. The final version should be done by 8:00 AM EDT so please refresh your page then.
Despite the Trump Big Lie of being engaged in negotiations with Iran, Israel and the US are escalating against Iran. Keep in mind that these attacks again show the utter untrustrworthiness of the belligerents. After the first attack near the Iran nuclear site at Beshear, Trump said he told Israel not to do it again. The US could easily cut off satellite and other ISR data to Israel to enforce compliance. We are now up to not one but two more Israel attacks near Iran nuclear sites.
💢 BREAKING: Coordinated strikes have hit all three of Iran’s largest steel plants simultaneously – Mobarakeh, Esfahan, and Khuzestan – the backbone of the country’s non-oil economy.
Together they produce roughly 70% of Iran’s steel output. Iron and steel is Iran’s… https://t.co/DwA8et5VjG
— Drop Site (@DropSiteNews) March 27, 2026
☢️🇮🇷❗️Atomic Energy Organization: Based on the conducted investigations; the attack on the Khondab Heavy Water Complex did not result in any human casualties, and given the safety measures previously taken, there is no risk of contamination to the local population.
_______…— dana (@dana916) March 27, 2026
As with the Iran retaliation after the strike on its North Pars gas field, which included the Qatar Ras Laffan LNG facility, pretty much talking out all of the Gulf-sourced LNG for years, Iran is striking back ferociously for the attack on critical productive capacity:
Tehran has announced that it will attack and completely destroy production sites of the Israeli arms industry (including steelworks) this very evening and/or during the night (TurkishTV). This is intended to unequivocally destroy the entire Zionist weapons and ammunition… https://t.co/IR1kPZTNkE
— Ignis Rex (@Ignis_Rex) March 28, 2026
The BBC live blog headline show Yemen has quickly gone to work:
More detail from Aljazeera:
And providing more evidence of the escalation dynamics taking hold in a worrisome way, in a new talk with Daniel Davis, Alastair
Crooke makes some key new points.
One is that Iranians culturally are sensitive to the need for a counterparty to save face. But they are so enraged by the murder of 175 girls and their teachers at the Minab school and the ongoing assassinations, most of al of the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, that they are outraged and no way, no how will make anything easy for the US. Second is if the US attacks Kharg Island, it won’t give them control of Iranian oil. They can cut transmission from the shore. Third is that many Shia clerics have declared fatwas calling for support of Iran.
See for instance:
Sistani fatwa declares supporting Iran a 'collective duty'
——
On Sunday, 8 March, Iraq’s top Shia cleric, Ali al-Sistani, issued a fatwa (religious ruling) declaring that supporting and showing solidarity with Iran is a “collective duty”, amid the escalating US–Israeli war on… pic.twitter.com/gbT3iBTU40— The Cradle (@TheCradleMedia) March 10, 2026
Reader Ann provides some links showing that the Gulf States, which could press the US to moderate, are instead all-in with the fantasy that they can vanquish Iran. See:
Saudi Arabia urging US to ramp up Iran attacks, intelligence source confirms Guardian. Subhead: Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is said to view US-Israeli war as ‘historic opportunity’ to remake Middle East
Gulf States increasing support of US escalation, yet Iran hitting airports, refinery ports; note at end locals want war over:
Alon Mizrahi has an important new talk. I find him to be a low-bitrate transmitter, but he also provides a transcript.
Some ke
Hindustan Times reports that Iran hit Prince Sultan airbase, targeting US refueling tankers, wounding 12 soldiers:
And on the not-much discussed Lebanon front, where things are not going at all well for Israel. Hindustan Times describes how Hezbollah is engaging in a Merkava massacre:
:
And from the Mizrahi presentation above:
So two weeks into the war with Hezbollah, the Israeli chief of staff is already talking about potential collapse. This is something we should make a note of. Because when Eyal Zamir, that’s his name, when he talks about the IDF potentially collapsing, it is because of Hezbollah. It’s because…of the war that is waiting for the IDF in southern Lebanon. It’s not because of Iran. It’s not because of the West Bank or Gaza. The kind of manpower they need to go into Lebanon and the potential of damage that Radoan forces and other Hezbollah forces can inflict on the IDF, on IDF forces, is immense, immense, immense.
Already they have casualties now every day, and this has only begun. When they amass forces on the northern border, and try to ready them to go into Lebanon, to start this invasion, they are going to be exposed to drones, motors, missiles, stinger missiles, anti-tank missiles, any kind of… of catastrophe, basically, that foot soldiers can encounter foot soldiers and tanks and armored vehicles can encounter in modern warfare. Israel is looking at potentially an actual bloodbath. in Lebanon with an organization it told its people and the world was finished after the Pager attack and after Nasrallah was murdered, assassinated.
So when the IDF chief of staff is warning the Israeli government that the IDF may collapse and you have to understand It’s almost mathematical. There’s a certain percent of any fighting force that if you eliminate, the structure collapses. Now, Israel doesn’t have a professional military. Its fighters are amateurs, basically.Some of the more elite units have better training, but most of the fighters are just amateurs. People who, civilians, who go once a year into reserve service, they do some basic, basic training. They are not in great physical shape, and they are not soldiers. They are civilians who wear uniform and go into battle. And Israeli…
The normal, most IDF soldiers are between 18 and 19 and 20 years of age. So a little more than children. So you have an army of little more than children and the big chunk, the largest part of the IDF is those civilians. were uniform and go into battle in Lebanon, into Gaza, into the West Bank, wherever they are sent. And in this war, they are fighting an enemy that can and is bombing their homes. They are in Lebanon or on the Lebanese border, but their family in Haifa or in Tel Aviv or in Hadera or wherever, it’s not safe because Iran is firing missiles and Hezbollah is also firing missiles and rockets.
And after two and a half years, they lost France. Maybe they witnessed some terrible incidents themselves. And if they saved in Gaza, they definitely did. So many of them are hardly fit mentally, physically, psychologically. This is too much of a strain. This is too much.
[Discussion to come of how Iran making agreements with Pakistan, Spain, Thailand to let carriers transit won’t result in meaningful oil and supplies to them]
And stories like this are misleading once you get past the headline: Iran war restores King Dollar’s crown, for now Asia Times.
On the economy front, this is a must-watch video. Stanislav Krapivnik provides a lot of granular detail, particularly on the impediments to rebuilding damaged energy facilities:
If you read the opener, you would think Thailand was about to go tits up:
News of currency troubles in Thailand has a way of raising blood pressure amongst even the most battle-tested Asian investors.
The baht’s dubious honor of being Asia’s worst-performing currency amid surging oil prices is making headlines and triggering more than a little PDST. It was Bangkok’s devaluation in July 1997 that set in motion the Asian financial crisis. The baht’s 6% drop in March has investors scrambling to connect the dots to where things are heading.
The threats, of course, come from abroad. As the US-Israeli war in Iran drags on, surging oil is becoming more of a feature than a bug. In Thailand’s case, a heavy dependence on imported crude has traders betting on the implications of additional commodity swings and capital outflows.
Yet exacerbating that is the surging US dollar, which once again threatens to suffocate Asian currencies. This double whammy of risk has governments across the region scrambling to sandbag financial systems as best they can. Back in 1997, the rallying dollar also played an outsized role in the crisis.
Does this five year chart of baht to USD look like the baht is in crisis? Higher levels on this chart = stronger baht.
The baht has been overvalued to the degree that it has hurt tourism and foreign buys of real estate. Even YouTube videos on “life in Thailand” for the last year plus have been complaining about it. My contacts say the central bank rejected many calls from the business community the lower the baht (if you look at its daily movements, it is clearly managed) because prestige (I am not making that up).
Now could the baht go into crisis? Absolutely. Thailand has a very high level of private debt for a late-stage developing economy. So does pretty much all of Southeast Asia but Thailand is a tad worse. But the recent fall from an elevated level to ]] well within recent norms does not prove a crisis is imminent. The 1997 crisis included food riots. We may get there but so far, the stress in most other Asian countries is more acute:
Starting at 2:10, a commentator echoes a point we made earlier: so for, the Iranian transit scheme is just an exit scheme. Save perhaps Iranian tankers, no new vessels have entered the Gulf.
Facts Only
Israel and the U.S. have conducted multiple attacks on Iranian nuclear sites and steel plants, including Mobarakeh, Esfahan, and Khuzestan.
Iran retaliated by targeting Israeli arms production sites and Gulf energy infrastructure, such as the Qatar Ras Laffan LNG facility.
Saudi Arabia is reportedly urging the U.S. to escalate attacks on Iran, viewing the conflict as an opportunity to reshape the Middle East.
Shia clerics, including Iraq’s Ali al-Sistani, have issued fatwas declaring support for Iran a "collective duty."
Hezbollah is engaging Israeli forces in Lebanon, causing significant casualties and raising concerns about the IDF’s operational capacity.
Iran has targeted U.S. assets, including refueling tankers at Prince Sultan airbase, wounding 12 soldiers.
The conflict is impacting global markets, with oil prices surging and currencies like Thailand’s baht facing pressure.
The IDF chief of staff has warned of potential collapse due to heavy losses and operational strain.
Executive Summary
Full Take
The narrative presents a highly charged account of escalating conflict, emphasizing Iran’s retaliatory strikes and the broader regional implications. The strongest version of this narrative highlights the interconnectedness of military, economic, and geopolitical factors, with credible reporting on specific attacks and responses. However, the framing leans toward emotional exploitation, particularly in its portrayal of Iran’s outrage and the IDF’s potential collapse, which could amplify fear and moral panic. The use of terms like "bloodbath" and "catastrophe" suggests a deliberate attempt to provoke strong emotional reactions, aligning with patterns of rage bait and weaponized anger.
The root cause appears to be a paradigm of escalation, where each side’s actions are framed as justified responses to prior provocations, creating a self-reinforcing cycle of violence. The narrative assumes that Iran’s retaliation is both inevitable and proportional, while downplaying the strategic calculations of other actors, such as Saudi Arabia’s role in urging further U.S. involvement. Historically, this echoes Cold War-era proxy conflicts, where regional powers become pawns in larger geopolitical struggles.
The implications for human agency are stark: civilians in Iran, Israel, and Lebanon bear the brunt of the violence, while economic instability threatens broader populations, such as those in Thailand. The second-order consequences include potential financial crises in Asia and a deepening of sectarian divisions across the Middle East. Missing perspectives include the voices of ordinary citizens affected by the conflict and alternative diplomatic pathways that could de-escalate tensions.
Bridge questions: What diplomatic or economic levers could be used to de-escalate this conflict? How might the involvement of non-state actors like Hezbollah shift the balance of power in the region? What would it take for regional powers to prioritize stability over strategic gains?
Counterstrike scan: A coordinated influence campaign would likely amplify emotional language, frame the conflict as a binary struggle, and omit diplomatic alternatives. While the content includes some of these elements, it does not fully align with a structured attack pattern, as it also provides factual reporting and multiple perspectives. The narrative is more likely a reflection of genuine geopolitical tensions than a deliberate manipulation effort.
Patterns detected: ARC-0024 Ambiguity, ARC-0043 Motte-and-Bailey
Sentinel — Human
The article exhibits signs of human writing with idiosyncratic emphasis and personal voice. While some stylometric signals are present, they do not indicate synthetically generated content.