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The Islamic Republic’s expansionist project has led to the immiseration and repression of people beyond its borders.
When Israel assassinated Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, one of the many people who celebrated the death of the supreme leader was a Syrian surgeon not far from Damascus. He had lived through four years of siege and bombardment by pro-Iranian militias. Over WhatsApp, he told me that, in the West, “the discussion of the war against Iran reduces it to merely being a geostrategic struggle between powers fighting for influence in the region, and this discussion usually ignores the direct victims of this regime,” like him. He added: “For us who lived under the siege of the Iranian-backed militias, this looks completely different, so our happiness for the death of Khamenei was immense.”
Western audiences and policy makers naturally take greater interest in Western victims and the threats Iran poses to the West. However, the imbalance of power between Iran and the West, as demonstrated in the 12-day war and the current conflict, means that Iran has caused relatively limited harm to Western interests since its 1979 revolution. Countries in the region experiencing civil war and foreign invasions have had it worse. They were weak enough to become breeding grounds for militias serving Iran’s expansionist project. Khamenei believed that these militias could serve as a component in his grand plan to destroy Israel. The militias failed on both counts. These militias, however, attained Iranian political domination through the immiseration and repression of the people of the region, and thus their hatred and schadenfreude.
Kataib Hezbollah, an Iran-backed militia in Iraq, kidnapped me into one of its black sites in March 2023 and kept me in captivity for 903 days. Two Arab speakers were held in solitary cells next to and on top of mine and were subjected to even more horrific torture than I was. The Arabic writing on the walls in my cell indicated that the site had been used for years and occupied by multiple prior inhabitants.
Since its founding, the Islamic Republic has wished to export the Islamic Revolution beyond its borders. Early on, Iran established militias and operated cells in countries with a sizable Shia population—Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia—yet failed to overthrow the regimes. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps had success only in countries debilitated by conflict, with weak state institutions. During the civil war in Lebanon, after an Israeli invasion in 1982, Iran established the Shia Islamist militant group that came to be named Hezbollah. After assuming the position of supreme leader in 1989, Khamenei oversaw the rapid expansion of the IRGC’s external operations, masterminded by the Quds Force led by Qassem Soleimani. Until being assassinated by the United States in 2020, Soleimani oversaw the creation of networks seeking to carry out attacks against Israeli and Jewish targets outside of Israel, to assassinate Iranian dissidents abroad, and to shepherd new militias across the Middle East.
In post-2003 Iraq, with its state institutions dismantled and a sectarian civil war under way, Iran again set up a series of pro-Iranian militias. In Syria, after the outbreak of civil war, Iran significantly increased its influence, as the Assad regime grasped for foreign assistance to remain in power. Assad welcomed Iran-run militias made up of tens of thousands of foreign Shia fighters from Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. In Yemen, too, instability allowed the Houthi militia to take over large swaths of the country, including the capital, Sanaa. The Houthis have received significant financial and military support from Iran.
From Hezbollah’s inception, members have, at Iran’s orders, turned their weapons on fellow Lebanese. From 1988 to 1990, the group engaged in what came to be known as the “War of Brothers” against Amal, a Syrian-backed Shia militia. Hezbollah prevailed in this fratricidal war, which led to the deaths of hundreds of Shia civilians and militants. On May 7, 2008, following the decision of the Lebanese government to dismantle the independent communications network Hezbollah had set up, the militia stormed Beirut and took control of pro-government Sunni neighborhoods in the city, later clashing with Druze communities in the Chouf and Sunnis in the north and killing dozens of people. The Doha Agreement, which ended the conflict, cemented Hezbollah’s political dominance of Lebanon, granting Shia ministers a third of the cabinet.
Hezbollah carried out dozens of assassinations: politicians, intellectuals, journalists, and state officials. One of the recent prominent victims was Luqman Slim, a Shia intellectual and activist and critic of Hezbollah who was assassinated in 2021. A friend of Luqman, also a Lebanese intellectual, explained to me the chilling effect these assassinations have had on public discourse in Lebanon: “People are censoring themselves, particularly until the 2024 war,” which significantly weakened Hezbollah, he said. In private, individuals would be critical of Hezbollah, but when they were urged to be outspoken in media interviews, he recounted, they told him, “Do you want me to get killed?” That intellectual was granted anonymity, as were others I interviewed for this article, because of the legal prohibition in Iraq and Lebanon on “normalization” of relations with Israel, which in some court cases has been interpreted as a ban on even engaging with an Israeli citizen like me. The Syrian surgeon asked for his name to be withheld because of the political sensitivity of talking with me after the Israeli invasion of southern Syria that followed Assad’s fall.
In Iraq, pro-Iranian militias killed hundreds of American servicepeople, mostly through roadside bombs. But the number of Iraqi civilians they have killed far exceeds this. During the 2006–08 sectarian civil war, these militias murdered, raped, and tortured to death countless numbers of Sunnis. In 2014, during the anti-ISIS war, the militias kidnapped Sunni male teenagers and men and disappeared them into a network of torture sites. The militias also ethnically cleansed entire Sunni towns, such as Jurf al-Sakhr, and established military bases there, preventing the residents from returning to this day. The militias engaged in widespread looting of private property in Sunni areas, and stripped state assets such as the oil refinery in Baiji and multiple factories in Ninewa.
After years of abusing Iraq’s Sunnis, the militias turned their guns on the country’s Shia in 2019. Starting in the fall and continuing well into 2020, the militias violently repressed the mostly Shia anti-regime Tishreen (“October”) protest movement, spraying activists with bullets, as well as assassinating them or kidnapping them into their black sites. According to testimonies of survivors, in Baghdad the militias used the abandoned houses of Jewish residents as sites to torture and gang-rape female and male protesters they would kidnap from the city’s Tahrir Square encampment.
An Iraqi Shia seminary student was kidnapped by a militia for cursing Khamenei in front of a commander. The student was tortured, and then his father was kidnapped and tortured too. The student told me that when he heard of Khamenei’s killing, “I was happy as if it’s Eid al-Fitr,” one of the two main holidays in Islam. “He was part of the destruction of Iraq. He is the reason for sectarianism and extremism,” the student said.
Even the bloodshed caused by Iran’s proxies in Iraq and Lebanon does not compare with what they inflicted in Syria. Under IRGC command, the militias served as the ground troops in major offensives on rebel-held towns, usually augmented by Syrian soldiers and militiamen. The Iranian-backed militias imposed a series of sieges on rebel-held towns and neighborhoods, such as Zabadani and Madaya near the Lebanese border, the suburbs of southern Damascus, and eastern Aleppo, starving dozens, particularly children and the elderly, to death.
The Syrian doctor was the sole surgeon serving a population of about 10,000 people deprived of most medical help. He told me he carried out hundreds of amputations of limbs without anesthesia because of a shortage of staff, medical equipment, and medication. The Iran-run militias prevented all of these goods and personnel from entering the besieged enclave. The surgeon and the people around him would, he said, eat leaves and grass and drink water with spices to quench the hunger pains. He lost dozens of pounds under the siege.
The oppressive Iranian presence was evident in the surgeon’s daily life. “Khamenei lived among us through his proxies: in the checkpoints that besieged our city, in the militias that would storm our homes, in the kidnapped children and missing women, and in our villages that turned into ruins and mass graves,” he told me.
“Khamenei managed his colonial expansionist project from afar, but it was executed over our bodies and our cities.”

Facts Only

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was assassinated by Israel, leading to celebrations among some victims of Iranian-backed militias.
A Syrian surgeon lived under siege by pro-Iranian militias near Damascus for four years.
Kataib Hezbollah, an Iran-backed militia in Iraq, kidnapped and held the author captive for 903 days in 2023.
Iran established Hezbollah in Lebanon in 1982 following an Israeli invasion.
Qassem Soleimani, leader of the IRGC’s Quds Force, oversaw the expansion of Iranian-backed militias until his assassination in 2020.
Pro-Iranian militias in Iraq killed hundreds of American service members and thousands of Iraqi civilians, including Sunnis during sectarian violence.
Iranian-backed militias ethnically cleansed Sunni towns in Iraq, such as Jurf al-Sakhr, and prevented residents from returning.
In 2019–2020, pro-Iranian militias violently repressed Iraq’s Tishreen protest movement, killing and torturing activists.
Hezbollah carried out assassinations of Lebanese politicians, intellectuals, and activists, including Luqman Slim in 2021.
Iranian-backed militias imposed sieges on Syrian towns like Zabadani, Madaya, and eastern Aleppo, leading to starvation deaths.
A Syrian doctor performed hundreds of amputations without anesthesia due to shortages caused by Iranian-backed sieges.
An Iraqi Shia seminary student was tortured for cursing Khamenei and celebrated his death.

Executive Summary

Iran’s expansionist policies under Ayatollah Ali Khamenei have had devastating consequences across the Middle East, particularly in Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon. The Islamic Republic has systematically supported militias in these countries, often exploiting civil wars and weak state institutions to extend its influence. In Syria, Iranian-backed forces imposed brutal sieges on rebel-held areas, leading to widespread starvation and suffering. In Iraq, pro-Iranian militias have engaged in sectarian violence, ethnic cleansing, and repression of anti-government protests. In Lebanon, Hezbollah has consolidated political power through violence, including assassinations and military crackdowns on dissent. While Western audiences often focus on Iran’s threats to Israel and the West, the most severe impacts have been felt by civilians in these conflict zones, who have endured torture, displacement, and systemic oppression under Iranian-backed groups. The article highlights personal testimonies from victims, including a Syrian surgeon who lived through sieges and an Iraqi seminary student tortured for criticizing Khamenei, underscoring the human cost of Iran’s regional ambitions.
The narrative also traces the historical evolution of Iran’s proxy strategy, from the establishment of Hezbollah in Lebanon to the expansion of militias in post-2003 Iraq and war-torn Syria. These groups have not only targeted Western and Israeli interests but have also turned their weapons on local populations, deepening sectarian divisions and entrenching authoritarian control. The article suggests that while Iran’s militias have failed to achieve their stated goal of destroying Israel, they have succeeded in dominating vulnerable states through repression and violence. The testimonies reveal a pattern of fear and self-censorship among civilians, who face retaliation for speaking out against these groups. The broader implication is that Iran’s regional influence is built on the suffering of ordinary people, whose voices are often overlooked in geopolitical discussions.

Full Take

The strongest version of this narrative is that Iran’s regional strategy has inflicted immense suffering on civilians in Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon, often through proxy militias that exploit weak governance and sectarian divisions. The article effectively centers the voices of victims—such as the Syrian surgeon and Iraqi torture survivors—to humanize the costs of Iran’s expansionism, which are frequently overshadowed by geopolitical framing. It also provides a clear historical arc, showing how Iran’s militia networks evolved from Lebanon to Iraq and Syria, often under the direction of figures like Qassem Soleimani. The inclusion of specific atrocities—sieges, ethnic cleansing, torture—lends credibility to the argument that Iran’s influence is built on repression rather than ideological appeal.
However, the narrative risks emotional exploitation by focusing heavily on visceral testimonies of suffering, which could amplify outrage without sufficient counterbalancing perspectives. For example, while the article critiques Western-centric discussions of Iran, it does not engage with Iranian or pro-Iranian justifications for their regional actions, such as countering perceived Western or Israeli aggression. The framing also leans toward a binary of "Iran as oppressor" without exploring how local actors—like the Assad regime in Syria or sectarian politicians in Iraq—have collaborated with or resisted Iranian influence. Additionally, the article’s reliance on anonymous sources, while understandable given security risks, limits verifiability.
The root cause of this narrative is a paradigm of state-sponsored violence as a tool of regional dominance, echoing historical patterns of imperial proxy warfare. The unstated assumption is that Iran’s actions are primarily driven by ideological expansionism rather than defensive or reactive motives, which may oversimplify a complex geopolitical landscape. The implications for human dignity are stark: civilians bear the brunt of these conflicts, facing torture, displacement, and censorship, while powerful actors—both regional and international—prioritize strategic interests over human rights.
Bridge questions: How might Iranian officials or supporters justify their regional policies in response to this critique? What role do local elites play in enabling or resisting Iranian influence, and how does that complicate the narrative of Iran as the sole aggressor? Would evidence of Iranian-backed militias providing social services or stability in some areas challenge the article’s focus on repression?
Counterstrike scan: If this were part of a coordinated influence campaign, the playbook would involve amplifying victim testimonies to demonize Iran while omitting context about Western or Israeli actions in the region. The actual content does not fully match this pattern, as it acknowledges Western focus on Iran’s threats but does not engage in systematic whataboutism. However, the selective emphasis on Iranian atrocities without proportional critique of other actors could align with a narrative aimed at justifying anti-Iranian policies.
Patterns detected: ARC-0012 Emotional Exploitation (use of vivid victim testimonies to provoke outrage), ARC-0031 Selective Framing (focus on Iranian actions without equivalent scrutiny of other regional actors).

Sentinel — Human

Confidence

The article exhibits strong human authorship signals, including personal narratives, emotional emphasis, and stylistic irregularities inconsistent with AI generation.

Signals Detected
low severity: Sentence length variance is high, with erratic rhythm and idiosyncratic phrasing (e.g., 'immiseration and repression of the people of the region, and thus their hatred and schadenfreude').
low severity: Strong narrative voice with personal anecdotes, emotional emphasis, and digressions (e.g., detailed accounts of torture, sieges, and individual testimonies).
low severity: No evidence of template-driven argumentation or verbatim talking points across sources.
low severity: Specific, verifiable details (e.g., names, dates, locations like Jurf al-Sakhr, Luqman Slim) reduce fabrication risk.
Human Indicators
First-person testimonies with emotional depth and idiosyncratic phrasing (e.g., 'Khamenei lived among us through his proxies').
Complex, non-linear storytelling with historical context and personal reflections.
Use of colloquial expressions (e.g., 'as if it’s Eid al-Fitr') and unpolished transitions.