Abstract
In this paper, I develop a normative framework for evaluating the use of new ICTs in the realm of religious faith. To this end, in Sect. 2, I argue for a partial account of religious faith, according to which typical religious faith requires certain skills and entails religious responsibility. Section 3 examines two specific challenges arising from the use of advanced ICTs for religious purposes, focusing on the recent debate regarding the authenticity of Islamic prayer apps and the challenges associated with so-called religious robots. Finally, in Sect. 4, based on the suggested account of religious faith in Sect. 2, I introduce the problems of ICT-driven religious deskilling and religious irresponsibility, which help explain important aspects of our intuitions regarding the considered challenges. The upshot is the general recommendation that policymakers, designers, researchers, and users of religious ICTs must remain sensitive to the risks of religious deskilling and religious irresponsibility.
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Notes
There are, of course, some exceptions; see, for example, Ohman et al. (), Chadhaury () Elmahjub (2023) Puzio (2023). Beyond philosophy, it should be noted, there is an independent discipline, called Digital Religion, which exclusively investigate the phenomenon of expansion of religion on ICTs. However, in this paper, I am concerned with the philosophical perspective on this phenomenon.
See Rettler (2018) for a relevant discussion.
These four religious are, in turn, the major religions in the world (See this link: https://populationeducation.org/world-population-by-religion-a-global-tapestry-of-faith/ While my argument in this section focuses on these four religions, I see no obstacle to extending the conclusions of this discussion to other types of Abrahamic or Eastern religions.
See, for example, Buchak (2012).
See Bishop and Mackaughan (2023) and Rettler (2018) for relevant discussions.
Khalaj confines this suggestion to Abrahamic religions; however, I argue that it also applies to Eastern religions.
Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for Minds and Machines for pressing me to discuss this objection.
Of course, Cuneo (2014) and Sliwa () argue that religious faith requires knowing-how. However, it is widely accepted in the literature on skill and knowing-how that these two notions have an intimate connection such that many think one of them can be explained in terms of the other. See Pavese (2016) for a discussion.
If someone still disagrees and is inclined to think that, when considering religious skills, faith is not the most relevant notion, we can reformulate the problem of religious deskilling and the normative criterion associated with it on the basis of other relevant religious notions. One reasonable option is the notion of practice. Practice is a part of every typical religion. Insofar as different religious practices (containing epistemic, moral, and practical ones) are constituted by various types of religious skills, deskilling poses a problem for executing these practices. For a discussion of the notion of religious practice see Lebens (2022). Of course, as discussed in the main text, I still prefer to locate faith at the center of my proposal.
See Talbert (2024), Moral Responsibility, in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
See, among others, Code (2020).
The only independent investigation on religious responsibility in philosophical literature on religion is Smith’s (2020) paper, entitled “Responsibility in religiosity”. Smith concentrates on ‘prophetic responsibility’, ‘maximal responsibility’, and ‘exemplars of religious responsibility’ such as Abraham and Confucius. In contrast, my concern is with typical religious responsibility, which applies to every ordinary religious adherent.
See The Long Discourses of the Buddha translated by Walshe (1995). See also an entry on the Sigālovāda Sutta in Oxford Reference, for an academic introduction to this Buddhist sacred text.
How can the second thesis philosophically be explained? Here is my tentative suggestion. Just as marriage, parenthood, friendship, and professional contracts are two-party relationships that generate special kinds of responsibility, the objectual faith of a person of faith in her God is another two-party relationship that creates its own type of responsibility.
Is there any connection between these two parts of my account? In response, I examine a tentative suggestion at the end of Sect. 4.
I use the terms ‘authentic’ and ‘normatively good’ interchangeably. In contrast, the term ‘genuine’ is utilized more broadly, without presupposing a normative sense.
See Puzio (2023) for a similar definition of religious robots.
As another example, Schuster and Lazar (2024) have recently investigated how algorithmic recommendations on social media—crucially coordinated by personalization—may lead to the deskilling of our attentional moral capacities.
For the case of memory, see, for example, Gillett and Heersmink (2019).
While distinct, these two aspects of the problem of responsibility are interconnected. In fact, those responsible for the creation and development of religious robots should be sensitive to the problem of religious irresponsibility arising from the expansion of ICTs.
Of course, as discussed in the previous subsection, large-scale and long-term outsourcing of religious tasks may pose a risk of religious deskilling.
Thanks to an anonymous reviewer of Minds and Machines who suggests this unifying proposal.
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Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Yasser Pouresmail for his valuable comments and assistance. This work is based upon research funded by Iran National Science Foundation (INSF) under project No. 40404653.
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This work is based upon research funded by Iran National Science Foundation (INSF) under project No. 40404653.
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Khalaj, M.H.M.A. Faith Over ICTs: On the Problems of Religious Deskilling and Religious Irresponsibility. Minds & Machines 36, 46 (2026). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-026-09802-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-026-09802-y