This time, polar warfare is examined with the help of Kenneth Rosen. Because units previously stationed in the north have been sent to the Ukrainian front, Moscow has focused in the Arctic on strategic deterrence and nuclear blackmail, notes Harri Tiido.
We have talked about Arctic regions in the background stories before, mostly in the context of climate warming, but climate warming in the polar regions has also heated up the interests of the great powers — above all Russia — in this area.
The immediate impetus for this discussion is Kenneth Rosen's book "Polar War: Submarines, Spies, and the Struggle for Power in a Melting Arctic" (Kenneth R. Rosen, 2026). The title suggests an exciting treatment of the subject. In reality, the book was something of a disappointment — a kind of mix of travelogue, history, and descriptions of conditions in the Arctic — but the topic itself is worth addressing, as tensions there appear to be rising.
The Arctic has been regarded as such a cold place that no one would bother to plan any warfare there, although this was nevertheless done during the Cold War. And in fact, at least rhetorically, one war has taken place there. In 1867, a tiny island — really just a rocky outcrop less than a kilometer long — was discovered between Greenland's west coast and Canada. When borders were drawn between Canada and Denmark (as administrator of Greenland) in 1973, the little island suddenly came into focus.
Under the agreement, Greenland — i.e., Danish territory — extended to one end of the rock, and Canada's territory to the other. The rocky outcrop lay in between. At some point, a Canadian scientist ended up there, and in Denmark there were suspicions that perhaps Canada intended to expand its territory by that less-than-one-kilometer margin. In response, a Danish minister went there, raised the Danish flag, and left behind a bottle of aquavit as a sign of sovereignty. Then the Canadians arrived, replaced the flag with their own, and left behind a bottle of whisky. Thus began a cycle of flag-raising and bottle-swapping that lasted nearly 40 years, until an agreement was reached in 2022 and the last bottles were exchanged. The episode became known as the Whisky War.
Bad examples tend to spread. In 2007, Russia sent its flag to the seabed at the North Pole by submarine, as a sign that the area belonged to them. Earlier, during the Cold War, both the Soviet Union and the United States invested in demonstrating their presence in the Arctic.
In 1987, Mikhail Gorbachev declared in a speech in Murmansk that the region would become a permanent area of peace and cooperation. But as with many other issues, his declaration applied only temporarily in polar matters as well. After the collapse of the Soviet state, tensions did subside, and the polar regions became an area of cooperation.
The first signs of a new Cold War appeared around the early 2000s, although little attention was paid to them until about 2010. In 2014, Russian airborne troops carried out parachute jumps at the North Pole for the first time in history, and training landings were also organized there later.
Moving closer to the present day, in 2024 Russia organized an expedition to the North Pole and brought there a new Russian flag, this time marked with the letter Z. This can be taken as a reminder that a war is under way in Ukraine, or as a warning that, if necessary, Russia is also militarily present at the North Pole.
It is worth noting that on that occasion, Russian military personnel used the Russian settlement on Svalbard as a staging base. Svalbard is administratively part of Norway, but under an international treaty it is a demilitarized area open to economic and scientific activity by the treaty's signatories. Thus, using the territory as a staging base for military personnel was a violation of the treaty — but that hardly means much to Moscow. Russia's current aim is to get the world to recognize that it is the primary actor in the Arctic.
As the climate warms, prospects for utilizing Arctic areas have improved, and in parallel, relations between the various actors have cooled. On one side are the interests of Russia and increasingly China, since the opening of the Northern Sea Route would give China a shorter shipping route to Europe, while giving Russia an opportunity to increase its role by controlling it. On the other side are the Western allies — or rather, the former allies, considering U.S. solo moves, for example on the issue of Greenland.
The parties' readiness for potential conflicts, however, differs markedly, and Russia appears to have a major head start. In recent years, Russia has reactivated more than 50 military facilities that had previously been mothballed, including 13 airfields, 10 radar stations, and 20 border guard posts. Distinctions between naval and civilian vessels are being blurred, and new Russian icebreakers are being equipped with cruise missiles and artillery.
Because units previously stationed in the north have been sent to the Ukrainian front, Moscow has focused in the Arctic on strategic deterrence and nuclear blackmail. The means are available. Two-thirds of Russia's nuclear submarines equipped with intercontinental missiles are stationed on the Kola Peninsula. Russia also has more than 40 icebreakers and plans to build 11 more; the U.S. has only three, although it has now ordered additional icebreakers from Finland. For fighting in polar regions, the U.S. has only one division that is even partially suited to such conditions.
In NATO's naval strategy published last fall, there is already discussion of Russia's military buildup in the Far North and the Arctic. In February, NATO launched the military mission Arctic Sentry to harmonize allied strategies in the region. In spring, NATO conducted the Cold Response 2026 exercises, involving troops from 14 member states. U.S. forces have begun to train for winter warfare in northern Sweden. In the 2024 U.S. Arctic Strategy, Chinese and Russian activities are identified as one of the main challenges in the polar regions.
Last year, the U.S. Arctic Institute warned that instead of Greenland, Washington should be more concerned about Alaska, as both Russia and China have become more active in the Bering Strait. In a February analysis by the Atlantic Council, it is noted that among five scenarios of Russian attacks for which Europe should prepare, the top priority is a military attack on Svalbard. The U.S. research center RAND, for its part, warns that after the war in Ukraine, Russia may focus militarily precisely on the Arctic.
Based on these warnings, the line of thinking gains confirmation that Russia could use Svalbard to test NATO. According to data from a few years ago, there are about 400 Russian citizens living in two Russian settlements there, whom Russia could claim to be protecting. Hybrid warfare is already under way there. The demilitarized status of the archipelago would allow it to be seized in a rapid operation. In reality, this may well be the place where Russia takes action against NATO.
Recommended reading
- Putin's next move? Five Russian attack scenarios Europe must prepare for - Atlantic Council
- Посол РФ в Норвегии: Запад стремится втянуть Шпицберген в "битву за Арктику"
- Alaska, not Greenland, should worry the United States in the Arctic | The Arctic Institute – Center for Circumpolar Security Studies
- Russia in the High North: Russian Strategy and Escalation Risks in the High North After the Russia-Ukraine War | RAND
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Editor: Kaupo Meiel, Argo Ideon
Facts Only
Harri Tiido discusses Arctic geopolitical tensions, referencing Kenneth Rosen's book "Polar War: Submarines, Spies, and the Struggle for Power in a Melting Arctic" (2026).
The Arctic has historically seen limited conflict, with a notable exception being the "Whisky War" (1973–2022), a territorial dispute between Canada and Denmark over a small island near Greenland, resolved in 2022.
In 2007, Russia symbolically claimed the North Pole by planting a flag on the seabed via submarine.
Russia has reactivated over 50 military facilities in the Arctic, including 13 airfields, 10 radar stations, and 20 border guard posts.
Russian icebreakers are being equipped with cruise missiles and artillery, blurring the line between civilian and military vessels.
Two-thirds of Russia's nuclear submarines with intercontinental missiles are stationed on the Kola Peninsula.
Russia has more than 40 icebreakers and plans to build 11 more; the U.S. has only three, with additional orders placed in Finland.
In 2024, Russia conducted an expedition to the North Pole, planting a flag marked with the letter "Z," a symbol associated with its war in Ukraine.
Russia used its settlement on Svalbard, a demilitarized Norwegian territory, as a staging base for military personnel, violating international treaties.
NATO's 2025 naval strategy highlights Russia's Arctic military buildup; NATO launched the Arctic Sentry mission in February 2026 and conducted Cold Response exercises involving 14 member states.
The U.S. Arctic Strategy (2024) identifies Chinese and Russian activities as primary challenges in the region.
Analysts warn that Russia may target Svalbard to test NATO, citing hybrid warfare tactics and the presence of approximately 400 Russian citizens in Russian settlements there.
The Atlantic Council and RAND Corporation have flagged potential Russian military scenarios in the Arctic, including an attack on Svalbard.
Executive Summary
The Arctic region, once considered a remote and strategically insignificant area, has become a focal point of geopolitical tension, particularly between Russia and Western powers. Historically, the Arctic was a zone of cooperation, but rising temperatures and melting ice have opened new economic and military opportunities, reigniting competition. Russia has significantly expanded its military presence in the region, reactivating over 50 facilities, including airfields, radar stations, and border posts, while also equipping icebreakers with cruise missiles. The U.S. and NATO have responded with increased exercises and strategic planning, though their capabilities in the Arctic lag behind Russia's. Recent provocations, such as Russia planting a flag marked with the letter "Z" at the North Pole and using Svalbard—a demilitarized Norwegian territory—as a military staging base, signal escalating tensions. Analysts warn that Russia may test NATO's resolve in the Arctic, potentially using hybrid warfare tactics or exploiting the presence of Russian citizens in Svalbard as a pretext for intervention. The region's strategic importance is further amplified by China's interest in the Northern Sea Route, which could reshape global trade dynamics. While cooperation remains possible, the current trajectory suggests a growing risk of conflict in the Arctic.
The situation is complicated by shifting alliances and differing priorities among Western powers, with the U.S. occasionally pursuing unilateral actions, such as its focus on Alaska over Greenland. NATO's recent Arctic Sentry mission and Cold Response exercises indicate a recognition of the threat, but the alliance's preparedness for Arctic warfare remains uncertain. Russia's nuclear deterrence posture, bolstered by its fleet of nuclear submarines on the Kola Peninsula, adds another layer of risk. The potential for miscalculation is high, as historical precedents like the "Whisky War" demonstrate how minor disputes can escalate. The Arctic's future may hinge on whether diplomatic efforts can mitigate these tensions or if the region becomes the next frontier for great-power confrontation.
Full Take
The Arctic is emerging as a critical theater in great-power competition, with Russia leveraging its military and geographic advantages to assert dominance. The narrative presented here is compelling: climate change is unlocking economic and strategic opportunities, and Russia is moving aggressively to exploit them, while the West scrambles to catch up. The strongest version of this argument highlights Russia's tangible actions—reactivating Cold War-era bases, militarizing icebreakers, and violating treaties—alongside NATO's belated but growing recognition of the threat. The inclusion of historical context, like the "Whisky War," adds depth, illustrating how even symbolic disputes can escalate.
However, the analysis leans heavily on Western security frameworks, framing Russia's actions as inherently destabilizing while downplaying potential Western provocations or missteps. The U.S.'s unilateral focus on Alaska over Greenland, for instance, could be seen as equally disruptive to Arctic stability. The piece also assumes Russia's Arctic ambitions are primarily military, though economic motives—like controlling the Northern Sea Route—are equally plausible. The pattern of framing Russia as the sole aggressor, without equivalent scrutiny of NATO's expanding Arctic exercises, risks oversimplifying a complex geopolitical landscape.
At its core, this narrative reflects a Cold War paradigm: a zero-sum competition for resources and influence, where cooperation is fragile and conflict looms. The unstated assumption is that Arctic militarization is inevitable, rather than a policy choice. But what if the real driver is not just Russian ambition, but the West's inability to offer a compelling alternative vision for Arctic governance? The focus on military posturing obscures potential diplomatic off-ramps, such as joint scientific research or environmental cooperation, which have historically mitigated tensions.
The implications for human agency are stark. Indigenous Arctic communities, already facing existential threats from climate change, are barely mentioned, though they stand to lose the most from militarization. Meanwhile, the U.S. and Russia's nuclear posturing in the region raises the stakes for global security. Second-order consequences could include accelerated resource extraction, further environmental degradation, and the normalization of Arctic conflict as a "new normal."
Bridge questions: How might Arctic governance models that prioritize Indigenous sovereignty and environmental protection reshape this competition? What would it take for China, Russia, and the West to treat the Arctic as a commons rather than a battleground? And if Russia's Arctic strategy is indeed a bluff—aimed at extracting concessions rather than sparking war—how should NATO respond without escalating?
Counterstrike scan: If this were part of a coordinated influence campaign, the playbook would amplify fears of Russian expansionism while minimizing Western culpability, using selective historical examples to paint Russia as uniquely aggressive. The actual content aligns partially with this pattern—emphasizing Russian violations while giving less weight to NATO's role in escalation—but stops short of outright distortion. The inclusion of multiple analytical sources (Atlantic Council, RAND) adds credibility, though the absence of Russian or Chinese perspectives limits balance. Overall, the piece reflects genuine geopolitical concerns rather than a manufactured narrative.
Patterns detected: ARC-0024 Ambiguity (selective framing of historical context), ARC-0043 Motte-and-Bailey (implied inevitability of conflict without exploring alternatives)
Sentinel — Human
The text is a sophisticated synthesis of geopolitical arguments, utilizing historical context to frame current tensions. It displays strong coherence and human-like narrative flow, suggesting it was written by an experienced analyst rather than purely generated by an LLM.