As his war on Iran staggers on without victory in sight, Donald Trump is making overtures to North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-un. But Kim is likely to demand a high price for any headline-grabbing summit after his previous experience of dealing with Trump.
Donald Trump has made several recent overtures to North Korean leader Kim Jong-un for a new summit, seven years after their meeting in Hanoi ended inconclusively. Over the summer, he abruptly reduced the scale of the annual US–South Korea joint military exercises. Four times in the space of nine days, he posted pictures of Kim on his Truth Social account in an apparent wooing exercise.
These efforts have so far failed to lure Kim to the negotiation table. Kim Yo-jong, his powerful sister who occupies the number-two position in the North Korean hierarchy, declared on August 19 that North Korea has no interest in a new summit with the United States.
At the same time, she left a door slightly ajar by remarking that her brother retains good memories and feelings about Trump from their past summits. Trump responded in kind by sharing four throwback pictures of the two on Truth Social. South Korea’s spy agency, the National Intelligence Service, reported to lawmakers that a summit between Trump and Kim could take place at any time, citing signs of dialogue between Washington and Pyongyang.
Kim, however, appears to be raising the ante from their last summit. He will not sit down with Trump again unless the latter takes denuclearization off the table and the United States and South Korea suspend all military drills ahead of a summit. Ultimately, North Korea is now seeking arms-control talks with the US and international recognition of its status as a nuclear power.
A Useful Diversion
It was Trump who gained the most from the 2019 Hanoi summit, as he could divert public and media attention toward Vietnam’s capital and away from Washington, where the congressional testimony of Michael Cohen, his former personal attorney, was underway. He is now apparently using North Korea as a distraction again, this time from his disastrous failure in Iran.
For Kim, on the other hand, Hanoi was a nightmarish experience that could have threatened his monolithic control of the country. At the time, Kim was confident that he could reach a deal with Trump, allowing US inspections of North Korea’s known nuclear sites in return for a relaxation of economic sanctions. This would be a preliminary step toward a peace treaty to formally end the Korean War and normalize diplomatic ties.
Before hopping on his luxurious train that would take more than sixty hours to reach Hanoi, Kim hosted a huge departure ceremony. Some high-ranking officials wept with joy in anticipation of the concessions they expected to gain from Washington and Seoul after seven decades of bone-crushing sanctions and forced isolation.
Instead, the summit ended without an agreement, as Trump abruptly demanded access to additional sites for inspection. Kim had to ride the same luxurious, slow train back to Pyongyang, empty-handed and deeply humiliated. Later that year, Trump and Kim had an impromptu meeting at the joint security area of the demilitarized zone (DMZ) dividing North and South Korea, in a move widely seen as a face-saving gesture for Kim and another headline-grabbing public stunt for Trump.
Following the Hanoi fiasco, in which it had unusually high political and economic stakes, the Kim regime appeared to show signs of distress. Kim and his sister responded strongly, ordering the explosive demolition of a liaison building built by South Korea at the joint security area and blaming the Hanoi failure on Seoul’s role as a supposedly clumsy and deceptive middleman.
Kim also enacted a law that authorized the death penalty for watching or distributing South Korean movies and music, which had become a clandestine national pastime for his people. North Korea further accelerated the development and production of nuclear warheads without feeling the need to conduct another test, which underscored the maturity of its nuclear technology. It now has fifty-seven “very powerful” warheads, according to Trump, although South Korea puts the figure at 120.
Kim also sought to appease the populace, which culminated in his public apology in 2020 for failing to do enough to improve their difficult livelihoods. He severed all dialogue and shredded existing agreements with Seoul, renouncing reunification as a national goal. Nevertheless, during Trump’s first term, Kim never stopped exchanging letters with the US president, urging him to engage in direct dialogue without South Korean meddling.
The Grandson Also Rises
Kim’s entrenchment finally began to pay off in October 2024 when he dispatched an estimated 12,000 to 15,000 special operations troops to fight against Ukraine for Russia. North Korea had already been selling artillery shells and missiles to Russia, which in return helped its ally to circumvent sanctions and provided it with hard currency, military technology, and flour. The benefits were starkly visible even on North Korean state television, which began broadcasting a series of “flour food” exhibitions in a country where rice is the staple food.
As Kim sought to lean toward Russia, China has felt obliged to mend its relations with North Korea, which had previously deteriorated after Beijing began complying with the international sanctions regime. China steadily increased trade with North Korea to keep Pyongyang at arm’s length from Moscow. This trade rose 22 percent year over year during the first two months of 2026, after recovering to its pre-pandemic level in 2025.
North Korea’s economic and political rebound coincides with the decline of the US-dominated unipolar order. To Pyongyang, this decline means the restoration of an old bipolar order, under which North Korea stands to benefit from the military rivalry between the United States and its allies on the one hand and China and Russia on the other. Just as was the case during the Cold War era, Pyongyang can play the competing powers off against each other as they vie for influence over a strategically located and politically important region.
It should thus come as little surprise that Pyongyang is now enjoying a niche economic boom, strong enough to draw attention from such business media outlets as The Wall Street Journal, the Financial Times, and Bloomberg. The upturn appears to be real, making Gucci bags and Ikea furniture affordable to Pyongyang’s elite and keeping the lights on at ports and heavy industry plants along the east coast.
However, the rising North Korean tide still appears to be too low to lift all ships, at least for now. Most of all, the cost is being paid in the blood of working-class children shed on foreign soil. About 2,300 North Korean soldiers were killed during their first deployments alongside Russian forces, according to the BBC. In August 2025, Kim cried publicly again at the opening ceremony of a memorial for those killed in combat.
On the Eve of Something
If the Trump–Kim summit does go ahead, it will unfold against a highly complex global backdrop. Iran and the United Stats are still at war. Iran supplies drones to Russia; North Korea supplies combat personnel, artillery shells, and missiles to Russia; South Korea provides ammunition and artillery shells to Ukraine through Poland and the US; China supplies drone components to Iran and Russia, and food and other resources to North Korea; Russia supplies military technology, food, and financial support to North Korea; and Ukrainian drones recently sank an Iranian freight ship in the Caspian Sea.
Many South Koreans are concerned that a new Trump–Kim summit could heighten tensions on the peninsula rather than ease them as Trump’s overtures proceed while sidelining the South. The concerns are turning into anxiety, as starkly reflected in a recent Gallup Korea poll conducted after the truncated military drill. About two-thirds of respondents said that South Korea should have its own nuclear weapons, while only 30 percent were opposed to such a move.
South Korea is playing catch-up in response to Trump’s overtures and the replies from Kim, with all communication between Seoul and Pyongyang severed and a small White House coterie pursuing behind-the-scenes diplomacy. Although South Korea’s liberal president, Lee Jae-myong, welcomed Trump’s unilateral move, he also said he would accelerate efforts to regain wartime operational control of the South Korean military from the US — a form of control that Washington arrogated to itself during the Korean War back in 1950. It has been promising to relinquish this authority since 1989 but has yet to do so.
After North Korea amended its constitution in May 2026 to define the two Koreas as two hostile states rather than parts of a divided nation, much of South Korea’s nationalist left found itself in disarray. Supporters of this political tendency had long regarded North Korea as the more independent and self-reliant of the two, viewing the South as a prosperous US lackey destined to follow the North’s lead in the process of reunification.
Any US deal with North Korea that does not involve South Korea will likely prompt Seoul to go nuclear on its own or seek some form of nuclear deterrence. Jeong Se-hyun is a former reunification minister and an architect of the engagement policy with the North under the liberal government of Nobel Peace Laureate Kim Dae-jung. In a recent radio interview, he said that South Korea should demand that the United States redeploy to the South tactical nuclear warheads that it withdrew in 1991 if Washington recognizes the North as a nuclear power. The world’s tenth-largest arms exporter is also now in the final stage of launching a nuclear-powered submarine.
Summitry
A deal that ultimately excludes the South is unlikely, given that Trump will probably expect Seoul (in combination with Japan) to foot the bill for any agreement with Pyongyang. However, tensions and mistrust will continue to linger.
After all, we are seeing an attempt at a historic initiative by an octogenarian, autocratic figure with a severely limited attention span, who is dealing with a young and shrewd dictator willing to retain the power he inherited from his grandfather through his father, at the expense of the lives of his own young soldiers.
Nevertheless, in a world increasingly engulfed by wars and conflicts on a global scale, even a summit like this would be better than no rapprochement at all between the state with the world’s largest nuclear arsenal and a de facto nuclear power. No one should mistake it for peace, even if Kim cries in public again. The Left should be watching this space closely and cautiously for potential openings to build a strong antinuclear peace campaign from below.
Facts Only
* Donald Trump made several recent overtures to North Korean leader Kim Jong-un for a new summit.
* Trump reduced the scale of US–South Korea joint military exercises in the summer.
* Trump posted pictures of Kim on Truth Social multiple times.
* Kim Yo-jong stated that North Korea has no interest in a new summit with the United States.
* Kim Yo-jong remarked that her brother retains good memories and feelings about Trump from past summits.
* South Korea’s National Intelligence Service reported that a summit between Trump and Kim could occur at any time.
* Kim demanded that negotiations include denuclearization and a suspension of military drills before a meeting.
* North Korea is now seeking arms-control talks with the US and international recognition of its nuclear status.
* The Kim regime ordered the explosive demolition of a liaison building at the joint security area.
* North Korea enacted a law authorizing the death penalty for watching or distributing South Korean movies and music.
* North Korea accelerated the development of nuclear warheads.
* North Korea has fifty-seven "very powerful" warheads, according to Trump; South Korea estimates 120.
Executive Summary
Donald Trump has pursued overtures to North Korean leader Kim Jong-un for a summit, following previous inconclusive meetings. Recent interactions included Trump posting pictures of Kim on social media, and North Korea’s sister remarked on favorable memories from past summits, which prompted reciprocal sharing by Trump. While South Korea's intelligence agency reported that a summit was possible based on signs of dialogue between Washington and Pyongyang, Kim has remained resistant to negotiations unless the United States agrees to denuclearization and halts military drills before a summit. North Korea is currently seeking arms-control talks and international recognition of its nuclear status.
The context for these diplomatic efforts involves past interactions, such as the Hanoi meeting seven years prior, which ended inconclusively. Trump utilized engagement with North Korea as a distraction from issues in Iran, whereas North Korea experienced the Hanoi process as a nightmarish experience that threatened its control. North Korea’s position has hardened since the Hanoi fiasco, demonstrated by actions like the demolition of a liaison building and the acceleration of nuclear weapon development.
Furthermore, North Korea's economic and political situation appears to be improving due to engagement with Russia and China, leading to an economic rebound that attracts international business interest. This shift coincides with the decline of the US-dominated unipolar order, creating a potential opportunity for Pyongyang to leverage geopolitical rivalries. However, this rebound is shadowed by human costs, including military losses and domestic political restructuring in North Korea.
Full Take
The narrative is structured around the use of North Korea as a geopolitical tool by external actors—specifically leveraging Kim Jong-un for distraction and leveraging North Korea’s shifting economic alignment for strategic advantage. The tension between the pursuit of dialogue (whether beneficial or manipulative) and the underlying security concerns creates a volatile environment. The failure at Hanoi established a pattern where diplomatic gestures are immediately met with resistance backed by internal hardening, exemplified by the regime's response to perceived weakness through increased nuclear capability and domestic control.
A critical pattern is the asymmetrical application of pressure: Trump seeks distraction, while North Korea seeks sovereignty and recognition, shifting the focus from bilateral negotiation to systemic changes like denuclearization. The economic rebound observed in North Korea, fueled by engagement with Russia and China, signals a potential re-emergence of a bipolar structure that Pyongyang can exploit. This growth is not purely positive; it is inextricably linked to the human cost borne by its populace, suggesting that geopolitical maneuvering often serves elite interests rather than broader societal welfare.
The ultimate implication is whether an attempt at rapprochement can genuinely supersede entrenched security doctrines and internal control mechanisms, especially when the structure of the great power rivalry remains fundamentally unchanged. The pursuit of a summit, even if framed as a step toward peace, risks becoming another performance where external powers manage optics while the core strategic and existential issues remain unresolved, leaving the populace bearing the ultimate burden of the resulting instability.
Bridge Questions: If the South Korean position on nuclear armament is leveraged against any potential US deal with North Korea, what alternative deterrence strategies are politically viable for Seoul? How can international frameworks be designed to incentivize verifiable de-escalation when core actors prioritize unilateral strategic gains? What mechanisms exist to ensure that economic rebounds do not disproportionately increase domestic human costs during periods of geopolitical realignment?
Sentinel — Human
The analysis presents a complex geopolitical narrative rooted in specific historical events, characterized by speculative reasoning regarding diplomatic outcomes, which is typical of high-level geopolitical commentary rather than pure synthetic generation.
