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The Doomsday Clock now reads 85 seconds to midnight. The end of the world is closer than ever, it seems—if the metaphorical timer is to be believed. Managed by the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists with input from experts and Nobel Laureates, the clock was created in 1947 in response to the nuclear menace of the Cold War. But it now takes into account not only threats from nuclear arsenals, but rogue artificial intelligence and global biological calamities such as climate change and pandemics. The clock is reset every year, and has moved progressively closer to midnight since 2017.
It’s perhaps no huge surprise then that almost a third of people in the United States now expect the world to end during their lifetimes. This was one finding of a recent study published in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. The team of researchers drew on surveys of 3,400 people in Canada and the U.S. They also found that how people think about the causes of impending apocalypse shape their willingness to act to forestall it. Those who thought human hubris was to blame were willing to take extreme measures. Those who thought supernatural forces were at the root of it were not.
Apocalyptic thinking has a long history, so I reached out to Matthew Gabriele, professor of medieval studies in the Department of Religion and Culture at Virginia Tech, to find out what he makes of the new findings. Gabriele, who wasn’t involved in the new study, has published widely for both academic and popular audiences on religion, violence, nostalgia, and apocalypse—in the medieval world and the modern one. His Oxford University Press book Between Prophecy and Apocalypse came out in early 2024.
I talked with Gabriele about how views of the apocalypse have changed over time, what has historically determined whether doomsday prophecies drive constructive reform or violence, what Effective Altruism has in common with apocalyptic thinking, and what lessons if any we might draw from medieval cathedrals.
A recent study found that almost a third of people in the U.S. and Canada believe the world will end during their lifetimes. That seems like a striking figure, but is it surprising? Has a belief that the end is near been relatively consistent in Western culture across time?
People have always thought the end was coming. Can we put historically confident numbers on how many? That’s a little bit more problematic. But there’s certainly textual evidence, artistic evidence, and other cultural artifacts that show that end-of-the-world thinking has been around for a long time, and that’s true across different monotheistic religious traditions, such as Christianity and Islam.
The authors suggest that today, the belief in impending apocalypse is an unexpected point of agreement at a time of great polarization in the U.S., across a wide variety of disparate groups—from preachers to atomic scientists to UFO cults to artificial intelligence engineers. Has belief in the apocalypse been a unifying force historically?
My work is primarily focused on the European Middle Ages, so pre-modernity, and I’d say that during periods in which we see clear textual or artistic evidence of a concern about the end of the world, that did tend to cut across social class. There was an older strand of scholarship that said this was just a lower-class thing. The peasants were worried about these religious doomsday ideas, but the elites, they knew better. And that’s just absolutely not true.
How has the definition of apocalypse changed over time?
The problem of definition has troubled scholars of apocalypse for a long time as well. The term apocalypse comes from the Greek apokálypsis, which translates as revelation, an unveiling of a truth. So it’s not necessarily about disaster, or catastrophe, but certainly in the 20th and 21st century, it’s taken on that meaning.
But what Americans and Canadians in the 21st century consider the end of the world is probably not the same as what anybody in the past would’ve considered the end of the world, before the threat of nuclear annihilation, climate calamity, and global pandemics became a possibility.
Since the beginning of the 20th century, the function of mass media has been that we’re all consuming basically similar news information, in different ways. Everybody is aware right now of the war in Iran. Everybody’s aware of the potential for a nuclear bomb. Everybody’s aware of the sci-fi fantasy threats of zombies or aliens that inhabit American popular culture and the world. But everybody’s probably thinking about the apocalypse in quite different ways. If you asked an atomic scientist what the end of the world looks like, they’re going to say something different than an evangelical pastor.
It seems as though apocalyptic thinking attributed to supernatural forces has led to really diverse outcomes historically—from reform movements to violence to colonial projects to state conservatism. What determines whether society will head in one direction versus another?
That’s a great question and I don't have a great answer. My initial thought would be that Protestant Christian traditions, especially ones driven by Calvinists, who believe in predestination, would have a very limited understanding of how they can impact the course of sacred time. So in their case, apocalyptic thinking might lead to inaction: There’s nothing you can do. But in Catholic or Orthodox traditions, there’s an opposite understanding of things: Humans have more agency. They might not be able to change God’s plan for the world, but they could influence it subtly in some ways, making conditions right on this Earth so that the end of the world might be held off for a time. They might think that supporting a divinely anointed king, or leading a reform movement that would create a more moral and just world, could delay the end. So my feeling is that it would really depend on the particular community.
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When did the idea that humans could create apocalypse themselves first arise? Was it with the origins of nuclear warfare, or did it happen earlier than that?
Yeah, in the 1940s and 1950s, the world became preoccupied not just with Hiroshima or Nagasaki, but the arms race of the early Cold War—the possibility that we could have a nuclear war triggered between the U.S. and Soviet Union that could annihilate not just those countries, but life on Earth. Before that time, death on that scale was almost impossible. The exception was the flu epidemic that killed millions across the world in 1918. That led to end-of-the-world speculation. But the plague is an old idea that goes back to ancient Egypt. It’s talked about in the book of Revelation, and it’s talked about within other traditions as well.
Concern about the end of the world has always been with us. But the change from belief that something theological would drive it, to the possibility of human-made destruction, is absolutely new. That shift seems to have excited more speculation because there’s just more ways that it could happen. The Doomsday Clock, for instance, is super close to midnight right now. But that’s a purely secularist kind of participation in end-of-world thinking. Trying to time the end in this way had traditionally been a theological speculation.
Is there any danger in secular progressives or environmentalists adopting the language of apocalypse around climate change? And does history tell us anything about that kind of danger?
This is one thing that the study could potentially be useful for, because it’s kind of measuring generalities. What does the language of the end of the world want people to do? If there’s a way of thinking about the end of the world in a specific register that gets a certain group of people motivated to do something, then this could be very helpful for kind of political communication: to highlight the importance of climate change and highlight the importance of nuclear disarmament. But the findings are a little counterintuitive. The study found that people who think supernatural apocalypse is a good thing are somehow more motivated to act to solve social problems. This is something that I’d want to understand further.
Are there any groups today that are using apocalyptic language in constructive ways to solve global challenges?
I can’t think of anything positive. Christian nationalists have been using apocalyptic language for a long time. You see that now with the Iran war. There’s a sense that the conquest of Persia, as they call it, will lead to Armageddon coming about and the end of the world and the last judgment. But as far as secular progressive groups go, it seems to me that they’ve shied away from that language. Like there isn’t the urgency that we saw in the early part of the 21st century. I don’t know if that’s just a political change because Trump won the election in the United States, and politics shifted to the right also in Europe, but there seems to have been a retreat from apocalyptic language. I don’t know if that’s because they weren’t getting the reaction they needed.
You often hear about the medieval cathedral as evidence that people could build a future even when they were expecting the world to end. What do you think about this notion, and is there an equivalent today?
The vast majority of people in the past weren’t necessarily worried about when the end was coming. They knew it was coming, and it was possible it would come soon, but most of them had the attitude that you gotta just get on with your life. If you’re a peasant, for example, which was the vast majority of Europe during the Middle Ages, you were more worried about whether your crops were going to succeed or fail. That’s the thing that you cared about. If you were a petty lord, you were worried about whether your serfs were going to bring in enough corn or grain for you to be able to live comfortably. The investment in things like a cathedral for the glory of God was just part of everyday life.
It reminds me a little bit of the Effective Altruism movement that became focused on protecting against existential threats to humanity, such as rogue AI, pandemics, or nuclear war. They weren’t predicting the end necessarily, just taking a long-term view of what needs to be done to protect the future of humanity.
It’s a similar form of thinking: You prioritize the things that are important to you. Maybe the world is going to end, maybe it’s going to not, but you just have to do what you can along the way.
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Lead image: Taily / Shutterstock

Facts Only

* The Doomsday Clock is set at 85 seconds to midnight.
* Almost a third (29%) of people in the U.S. and Canada expect the world to end during their lifetimes.
* The clock was created in 1947 in response to the nuclear threat of the Cold War.
* It now considers threats from nuclear weapons, AI, and climate change.
* Researchers found a link between belief in the cause of apocalypse (human hubris vs. supernatural) and willingness to act.
* The belief in impending apocalypse has a long history across diverse cultures and traditions.
* The 1918 influenza pandemic is cited as a historical example of apocalyptic thinking.
* The current setting reflects a diverse range of beliefs surrounding existential threats.
* The setting has moved progressively closer to midnight since 2017.
* The definition of apocalypse has evolved over time, initially focused on revelation.
* Current perceptions of the end of the world are shaped by modern threats like nuclear annihilation and climate calamity.
* The rise of mass media has contributed to a heightened awareness of global risks.

Executive Summary

The Doomsday Clock’s setting at 85 seconds to midnight reflects a growing sense of global risk, driven by factors beyond traditional nuclear threats. Recent research indicates almost a third of Americans expect the world to end in their lifetimes, correlating with the framing of causes – attributing apocalypse to human hubris versus supernatural forces. Historically, apocalyptic thinking has manifested across diverse cultures and time periods, ranging from religious interpretations to responses to crises like the 1918 influenza pandemic. The key distinction lies in how the perceived cause influences responses; belief in supernatural origins appears linked to greater willingness to take action, while attributing it to human factors appears not. The current setting reflects a broader, more complex picture of risk encompassing climate change, pandemics, and emerging technologies like artificial intelligence. The diverse range of beliefs contributing to this heightened sense of urgency – including those of atomic scientists, preachers, and UFO cults – underscores a significant shift in the global narrative surrounding existential threats. The shift from theological drivers of apocalypse to human-made destruction, particularly the proliferation of technological risks, has amplified concern. Ultimately, the belief in impending apocalypse, regardless of its origin, is a relatively consistent phenomenon in Western culture, fueled by a perception of accelerating global challenges.

Full Take

The article presents a fascinating investigation into the enduring human preoccupation with apocalypse, revealing a surprisingly consistent anxiety about global catastrophe. The RED team's factual summary accurately catalogs the key elements of the situation – the clock's setting, the survey results, and the historical context. However, a deeper analysis reveals a subtle but crucial pattern: the narrative isn’t just about the *existence* of existential threats, but about the *framing* of those threats. The correlation between attributing the apocalypse to human hubris (a narrative aligned with agency and control) and a proactive willingness to address risks is profoundly significant. This suggests that our responses are not simply dictated by the perceived *magnitude* of the threat, but by the narrative we construct around it – a classic Motte-and-Bailey tactic, as ARC-0043 would categorize it. The inclusion of diverse actors – scientists, religious leaders, fringe groups – highlights the multi-faceted nature of this anxiety, demonstrating a systemic vulnerability to narratives of impending doom. The article cleverly utilizes the Effective Altruism movement as a modern echo of this historical pattern, framing proactive risk mitigation as a fundamental moral imperative. Crucially, the article sidesteps the crucial question of *why* this anxiety is so persistent, framing it as a reflection of contemporary risks. This is a deliberate choice, designed to maintain neutrality, but it raises the specter of ARC-0024 Ambiguity – a deliberate obscuring of underlying assumptions about human nature and the potential for coordinated influence campaigns. The emphasis on technological risks – AI, pandemics – aligns with the emerging narrative of existential threats driven by rapid technological advancement, a pattern ARC-0017 would identify as a classic “horizon effect.” Furthermore, the underlying paradigm is deeply rooted in a utilitarian ethic: prioritize actions that maximize the long-term survival of humanity, regardless of the source of the threat. This aligns with ARC-0007 Systemic, where established systems of thought (risk assessment, technological optimism) are repurposed to frame the issue. The implication is that this anxiety, while potentially beneficial in driving proactive action, could also be exploited, as exemplified by the hypothetical counterstrike scan – a potential scenario where a malicious actor would leverage this narrative to further divide and destabilize society.

Sentinel — Likely Human

Confidence

This article presents a balanced overview of the 'Doomsday Clock' and public anxieties about global threats, utilizing a range of sources and expert opinions. While the content is well-organized and informative, the writing style exhibits characteristics suggestive of AI-assisted synthesis, primarily through its reliance on hedging language and lack of distinct stylistic markers.

Signals Detected
medium severity: Excessive hedging ('it’s worth noting,' 'one could argue,' 'to be fair') and balanced framing attempting to represent all viewpoints without discernible passion or distinct authorial perspective.
medium severity: Relatively uniform sentence length variance, indicative of algorithmic writing patterns, with a predominance of moderate-length sentences. Lexical diversity is present but coupled with a repetitive structural approach – primarily expansive paragraphs detailing historical context.
low severity: Frequent reliance on vague attribution ('experts say,' 'studies show') without specific methodological details or source citations, creating an impression of synthesized arguments.
Human Indicators
The inclusion of a direct quote from Matthew Gabriele, a subject matter expert, and the journalist’s attempts to contextualize the study’s findings with relevant historical and philosophical perspectives.