Longtime Israeli national security reporter Yossi Melman tells how he recently received some startling news from Iran.
This week, in the middle of the night between Wednesday and Thursday, feeling disappointed by England’s defeat by Argentina in the World Cup, I received some unexpected news.
I’m still not sure how to describe it. Was it gratifying? An honor? Frightening? Should I be concerned?
It was an official announcement issued by Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence. And there, in its target list, was my name.
The announcement included a list of people the Iranian authorities described as “hostile elements,” warning that anyone who provides them with information, photographs, or videos could face prosecution and, in some cases, imprisonment under Iranian law.
The list includes Iranian dissidents and opposition figures such as Reza Pahlavi, the son of the late Shah, and Nobel Peace Prize laureate and human rights lawyer Shirin Ebadi. It also names several Israelis, including Iran expert Dr. Raz Zimmt, journalist Amit Segal and yours truly. I am the only Israeli defense and security commentator to have received that “honor.”
Calculated Risks
Ever since I began my career as a journalist and author 52 years ago, I have known that this profession carries risks and that doing it properly is bound to anger quite a few people.
Arms dealers and businessmen have hired private investigators to follow me and, I suspect, to try to tap my telephone. After I published an article about a disgraced British MI6 intelligence officer, detectives from London’s Metropolitan Police traveled to Israel to question me in an attempt to uncover my sources. I refused.
Over the years, in order to silence me, I have also been sued dozens of times, and fortunately I prevailed in every case. Most notably, in 2007, the eccentric Israeli-French businessman and arms dealer Arkady Gaydamak, represented by the now-disgraced attorney Ronel Fischer, filed a defamation suit against me seeking 30 million shekels—the largest libel claim ever brought against an Israeli journalist. The case ended when Gaydamak withdrew the lawsuit and was ordered to reimburse Haaretz for part of the court fees.
Israeli security officials have, on more than one occasion, warned me that my articles are carefully read in Iran, as well as by Hezbollah and Hamas, and advised me to remain alert.
I have previously written about an incident that began on Nov. 23, 2022, when I received the following WhatsApp message:
“Allow me to introduce myself. My name is Oliver Thränert, and I am the head of the Think Tank at the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich. It is my pleasure to invite you to the Zurich Strategic Dialogue, to be held on January 14.”
I frequently receive invitations to international conferences on subjects I have covered for decades. What immediately aroused my suspicion, however, was that the invitation arrived via WhatsApp. Such invitations are normally sent by email.
The sender explained that he had emailed me but received no response. I immediately checked my inbox, including my spam folder—and found no such message.
A quick search confirmed that ETH Zurich is indeed a prestigious university, that the Center for Security Studies exists, and that it is in fact headed by Dr. Oliver Thränert. Even the profile photo on WhatsApp matched his official portrait.
Yet my suspicions remained.
Why, I wondered, was the WhatsApp message sent from a telephone number registered in Pennsylvania?
I called the number but received no answer. I then texted back, asking why the head of a Swiss institute had an American phone number. He replied that he had spent time in the United States as a visiting scholar and had simply kept his U.S. number after returning to Switzerland.
Instead of reassuring me, these explanations only deepened my doubts. I concluded that this was most likely an attempt by a hacker, or worse, by a hostile intelligence service.
I decided to cut off contact with “Dr. Thränert.” He nevertheless continued sending me WhatsApp reminders about the conference, making me even more suspicious. To convince me of the invitation’s authenticity, he even attached a guest list that included the heads of Swiss intelligence and ministers from the European Union.
I later discovered that the same “Dr. Thränert” had also invited former Israeli ambassador to Washington Prof. Itamar Rabinovich, Reichman University scholar Dr. Uri Goldberg, and former Defense Minister Moshe (Bogie) Ya’alon.
I informed Israel’s Shin Bet domestic security service, met with one of its representatives, and handed over everything I knew. I was asked not to disclose the matter publicly so as not to compromise the investigation.
About six months later, in May 2023, the Shin Bet announced that it had uncovered an Iranian intelligence operation run by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and its Quds Force targeting Israeli academics, former senior defense officials - and me.
The operation worked by stealing the identities of real people, including Dr. Thränert, and using those identities to lure invitees to what appeared to be legitimate meetings. It remains unclear where or how the Iranians intended to abduct us, but one can imagine a scenario in which participants would have been invited on an excursion to a neighboring country, where the operation would have taken place.
Identity theft—or the use of fabricated profiles—is only one of many methods Iran employs in its espionage campaign against Israel, which includes attempts to kidnap Israelis and even assassinate them. Most of this activity takes place in cyberspace, but over the past 15 years there have also been attempts around the world to assassinate Israeli diplomats, intelligence and army officers and other official representatives. At the same time, Iranian intelligence has persistently sought to recruit hundreds of Israelis from every sector of society.
The fact that Iranian intelligence takes an interest in me- and that my articles apparently provoke its anger- suggests that I am doing my job well.
Since this latest chapter in what might be called “Iranian Intelligence and Me” became public, friends and former colleagues from the intelligence community have jokingly congratulated me, saying that I now qualify for lifelong security protection.
This was a tongue-in-cheek reference to a recent decision by Shin Bet, now led by a political nominee and lackey of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, to provide lifetime security protection for his wife, Sara, who has frequently been described in the Israeli media as volatile and is known for a number of widely reported public outbursts.
Well, I jokingly replied to my friends, I might also request permanent bodyguards for my family, too.
SpyTalk Contributing Writer Yossi Melman is a longtime Israeli journalist specialising in security and intelligence affairs. He is also the co-author, with Dan Raviv, of Spies Against Armageddon.
Thank you Yossi Merman for continuing to do the vital and often dangerous work of trying to find and report the truth.
Dear David. Thank you.
Facts Only
* Iran's Ministry of Intelligence issued an official announcement listing "hostile elements."
* The list includes Reza Pahlavi, Shirin Ebadi, Dr. Raz Zimmt, Amit Segal, and Yossi Melman.
* The announcement warns that providing information, photos, or videos of these individuals may lead to prosecution or imprisonment under Iranian law.
* On November 23, 2022, Yossi Melman received a WhatsApp invitation to the Zurich Strategic Dialogue on January 14.
* The invitation was sent from a Pennsylvania-registered phone number by an individual claiming to be Dr. Oliver Thränert of ETH Zurich.
* The invitation was also sent to Prof. Itamar Rabinovich, Dr. Uri Goldberg, and Moshe Ya’alon.
* Yossi Melman reported the contact to Israel's Shin Bet.
* In May 2023, Shin Bet announced an Iranian intelligence operation run by the IRGC and Quds Force targeting Israeli academics and defense officials.
* The operation involved identity theft of real individuals to lure targets to meetings.
* Arkady Gaydamak filed a 30-million-shekel defamation suit against Melman in 2007, which was later withdrawn.
Executive Summary
Iran's Ministry of Intelligence has designated several individuals, including Israeli security journalist Yossi Melman and human rights lawyer Shirin Ebadi, as "hostile elements." This designation warns Iranian citizens that interacting with these figures could result in legal prosecution. This move is part of a broader pattern of Iranian intelligence activities aimed at Israeli targets, involving both public declarations and covert operations.
A specific instance of this targeting involved a sophisticated identity theft operation orchestrated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its Quds Force. In late 2022, high-profile Israeli academics and former defense officials were lured via WhatsApp with fraudulent invitations to a strategic dialogue in Zurich. The operators impersonated legitimate figures, such as Dr. Oliver Thränert of ETH Zurich, to establish credibility. While the specific end goal of these invitations—whether abduction or recruitment—remains unclear, the Shin Bet confirmed the operation's origin and intent in May 2023.
Full Take
The strongest version of this narrative is that the Iranian intelligence apparatus employs a hybrid warfare strategy, combining "loud" public threats (the target list) with "quiet" social engineering (identity theft) to neutralize or capture perceived adversaries. By publicly labeling figures as "hostile elements," Iran creates a chilling effect, isolating targets from potential informants or allies within the regime.
The pattern here is the "Digital Trojan Horse": using the prestige of established institutions (ETH Zurich) and the familiarity of modern communication (WhatsApp) to bypass traditional security instincts. The narrative leverages a personal account of professional risk to illustrate a broader systemic threat. While the author includes a satirical critique of Israeli domestic politics—specifically regarding security details for Sara Netanyahu—this serves as a cultural marker of the author's perspective rather than a load-bearing argument for the intelligence claims.
Root Cause: This echoes the "Great Game" of intelligence, where the battlefield is not territory but identity and perception. The underlying assumption is that the IRGC views intellectual and journalistic influence as a strategic threat equivalent to military capability.
Implications: For the individuals involved, the cost is a permanent state of hyper-vigilance and the erosion of trust in professional outreach. The second-order consequence is the potential for "false positives," where legitimate international academic exchange is viewed with suspicion, hindering global intellectual cooperation.
Bridge Questions: How does the public nature of the "hostile list" serve the Iranian regime differently than the covert nature of the Zurich operation? If these targets are viewed as significant enough to abduct, why is the regime also relying on public warnings to isolate them?
Counterstrike Scan: A coordinated campaign pushing this narrative would likely use "fear-escalation" to justify increased surveillance or budget for security services. However, the content remains a personal memoir of an encounter rather than a call for specific policy changes or an engineered panic.
Patterns detected: none
Sentinel — Human
The text reads like a highly personalized memoir or investigative anecdote woven into an article structure, exhibiting strong personal voice and specific, idiosyncratic detail characteristic of human reporting rather than synthetic generation.