Correction: Self-allocation bias in performance-based cooperative decisions is driven by self-interest rather than distorted performance encoding

Figures
In Fig 3, the color labeling in panel A and the corresponding description in the figure caption were incorrect. The authors have provided a corrected Fig 3 and updated figure legend below.
(A) The categorization of contributions with respect to Shapley values determines “optimal” reward allocation according to individual contribution based on collective task criteria. Rewards are distributed exclusively in the “colored” areas. The values shown within colored squares denote the allocation ratios assigned to player 1, as calculated by the Shapley value. Contribution structure is classified into three categories: a value of 1 indicates rewards are allocated entirely to player 1 (“player1 only”, red area); a value of 0.5 indicates rewards are shared equally between two players (“both”, green area); and a value of 0 indicates rewards are allocated entirely to player 2 (“player2 only”, blue area). (B) The self-allocation bias was larger in the “player2 only” condition than in the “both” and the “player1 only” conditions. The self-allocation bias was calculated as the relative allocation difference between self-relevant and self-irrelevant conditions. That is, the bias was highest when participants’ performance did not contribute to the joint outcome. (C) In all contribution structures, SVO scores were negatively associated with the self-allocation bias, showing that participants with lower SVO scores had a larger self-bias. The slopes decreased from “player1 only” condition to the “both” condition, and then to the “player2 only” condition. Note: Panels (B) and (C) display the self-allocation bias averaged across trials within each participant for visualization only; all statistical inferences were derived from hierarchical Bayesian multilevel models applied to the full trial-level data. The data and code for panels (B) and (C) are available at https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/AFDQS
Reference
Citation: Zhang S, Yong X, Ma Y, Korn CW (2026) Correction: Self-allocation bias in performance-based cooperative decisions is driven by self-interest rather than distorted performance encoding. PLoS Biol 24(8): e3003967. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pbio.3003967
Published: August 21, 2026
Copyright: © 2026 Zhang et al. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.

Facts Only

* Figure 3 color labeling in panel A and its caption were incorrect and required correction.
* Panel A categorizes contributions based on Shapley values to determine reward allocation.
* Values within colored squares denote allocation ratios assigned to player 1 by the Shapley value.
* A value of 1 indicates rewards allocated entirely to player 1 ("player1 only," red area).
* A value of 0.5 indicates equal reward sharing between two players ("both," green area).
* A value of 0 indicates rewards allocated entirely to player 2 ("player2 only," blue area).
* Self-allocation bias was larger in the "player2 only" condition than in the "both" and "player1 only" conditions.
* Self-allocation bias is the relative allocation difference between self-relevant and self-irrelevant conditions, highest when performance did not contribute to the joint outcome.
* SVO scores were negatively associated with self-allocation bias across all contribution structures.
* The association slope decreased from "player1 only" to "both," and then to "player2 only."
* Statistical inferences derived from hierarchical Bayesian multilevel models applied to trial-level data.

Executive Summary

The figure labeling and caption for Figure 3 required correction. Panel A categorizes contributions based on Shapley values to determine an "optimal" reward allocation according to individual contribution relative to collective task criteria, with rewards distributed only in the colored areas. The color coding signifies contribution structures: a value of 1 denotes rewards allocated entirely to player 1 ("player1 only," red); 0.5 indicates equal sharing between two players ("both," green); and 0 indicates rewards allocated entirely to player 2 ("player2 only," blue). Panel B assessed self-allocation bias, which was largest in the "player2 only" condition compared to the "both" and "player1 only" conditions, indicating that performance not contributing to the joint outcome resulted in the highest bias. In all contribution structures, Self-Reported Value (SVO) scores were negatively associated with self-allocation bias, meaning lower SVO scores correlated with larger self-bias. The slope of this association decreased as the condition shifted from "player1 only" to "both," and then to "player2 only." These results are based on data analyzed via hierarchical Bayesian multilevel models applied to trial-level data.

Full Take

The analysis reveals a complex interplay between externally determined reward allocation (Shapley values), internal cognitive states (SVO scores), and self-interest (self-allocation bias). The central pattern observed is that the level of self-interest—the tendency to allocate rewards based on self-relevance rather than objective contribution—is most pronounced when individual performance is decoupled from the collective outcome ("player2 only"). This suggests that when an individual's effort seems irrelevant to the group result, the internal mechanism for reward allocation shifts toward self-serving biases. Furthermore, the relationship between SVO (presumably a measure of subjective value or perceived control) and this bias demonstrates a nuanced dependency: lower reported value correlates with higher self-bias across all scenarios, but this correlation is modulated by the context of contribution structures. The decreasing slope in the association suggests that while low internal valuation is generally linked to self-interest, the specific mechanism driving that self-interest changes based on how the allocation structure is framed—moving from an exclusive focus (player1 only) to shared focus ("both") to an exclusive focus on the other party (player2 only). The implication for agency is that mitigating self-allocation bias requires understanding not just the magnitude of perceived value, but the context in which performance is evaluated within a social contract.

Correction: Self-allocation bias in performance-based cooperative decisions is driven by self-interest rather than distorted performance encoding

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