The far-right AfD’s win in a small German state calls for dynamism in Berlin and hedging in Brussels
Problem
Saxony-Anhalt has returned 43.8% of the vote for the Alternative for Germany (AfD) in its state election. The result puts the party within reach of forming what would be the first state government run by the far-right in the history of the German federal republic.
The AfD has no executive experience and its Saxony-Anhalt branch is riven with tensions and splits. A chaotic state government could deter voters elsewhere from backing such parties. But if the AfD manages to govern halfway coherently, it will have the chance to pick fights with authorities in both Berlin and Brussels, and significant leeway to try out policies that could later be applied elsewhere. This might then embolden the radical right elsewhere in Europe.
Meanwhile the result increases the pressure on Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s centrist federal coalition. Already before the Saxony-Anhalt election, splits were widening between eastern and western branches of his Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU), and between him and his conservative party base. The result exacerbates these and, in turn, increases the chance that Merz will be too distracted and constrained by domestic politics to provide European leadership.
With France, Italy, Poland and Spain all entering election seasons, a Germany riven by internal drama cannot be the anchor that Europe needs.
Solution
Bold action is needed both in Berlin and beyond Germany. Talk of a party ban is too late and would anyway be unlikely to quell the underlying discontent felt by AfD voters. Action by the federal authorities against stand-out extremists in the party, and its funding streams, is both more realistic and more likely to keep its voters open to persuasion.
Meanwhile the CDU/CSU needs to make a strategic decision about what sort of party it wants to be; including where it will and will not cooperate with parties outside the traditional mainstream. Germany’s other pro-European parties also need to marshal a better answer to the radical right: substantive policies proving that they are on the side of ordinary people rather than powerful interests (Piotr Buras, Jeremy Cliffe and Susi Dennison have made concrete suggestions along these lines where climate policy is concerned.)
Other European capitals should curb their expectations of German leadership and nurture broader sources of impetus, including the new E6 group of major EU economies and the “coalition of the willing” on Ukraine. Merz, for example, is now even less likely to achieve a breakthrough on the EU’s 2028-2034 budget negotiations or on EU accession talks. Other European leaders, including European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen, will need to depend less on him to advance ambitious proposals. European diplomats in Berlin should think hard about how to sell their ideas into a more distracted and inward-looking government.
Context
Saxony-Anhalt is a small and demographically unrepresentative German state, with an atypically old and homogeneous population of 2.1m out of a national total of 83.5m. Nevertheless, its election result has reverberated through European capitals.
The vote on September 6th gives the AfD 39 seats, three short of a majority, requiring the party to seek support either from the left-conservative Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW) or the right flank of the CDU in order to govern. The only alternative would be a government supported (at least passively) by all five of the other parties, including the socialist Left party, cooperation with which is anathema to the CDU. The development comes as Merz’s fragile “grand coalition” is struggling to pass reforms aimed at reviving Germany’s stagnant economy.
Two upcoming state elections on September 20th—in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania and in Berlin—could further dent his authority. It is possible, though not currently probable, that he will be forced out as chancellor in the coming months. The obvious frontrunner to replace Merz is Hendrik Wüst, the premier of North Rhine-Westphalia, but his moderate politics may not fit the polarised mood.
The European Council on Foreign Relations does not take collective positions. ECFR publications only represent the views of their individual authors.
Facts Only
* The AfD returned 43.8% of the vote in the Saxony-Anhalt state election.
* The result puts the AfD within reach of forming a state government.
* The AfD lacks executive experience.
* The Saxony-Anhalt branch of the AfD has internal tensions and splits.
* The situation increases pressure on Chancellor Friedrich Merz's centrist federal coalition.
* Splits are widening between eastern and western branches of the CDU/CSU and between Merz and his conservative base prior to the election.
* The result increases the chance that Merz will be distracted by domestic politics, potentially limiting European leadership.
* Other European nations, including France, Italy, Poland, and Spain, are entering election seasons.
* Saxony-Anhalt has a small and demographically unrepresentative population of 2.1 million out of 83.5 million nationally.
* The AfD secured 39 seats in Saxony-Anhalt, needing support from the BSW or the right flank of the CDU to govern.
* Two upcoming state elections are scheduled for September 20th in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania and Berlin.
Executive Summary
The result in Saxony-Anhalt, where the AfD gained 43.8% of the vote, places the party near the threshold of forming a state government, though it lacks executive experience and internal cohesion. This situation creates potential friction both domestically and internationally for Germany. The instability within Merz's centrist federal coalition is exacerbated by existing splits between different factions of the CDU/CSU and tensions with the conservative base. This domestic fragmentation raises concerns that German leadership may be distracted, potentially undermining its ability to lead Europe amidst elections in France, Italy, Poland, and Spain.
The proposed solutions involve taking action against party extremists and their funding streams rather than relying on a party ban. Furthermore, other pro-European parties need to articulate substantive policies demonstrating alignment with ordinary people, particularly concerning issues like climate policy. Externally, other European capitals are advised to rely less on German leadership and focus on alternative impetus, such as the E6 group and the "coalition of the willing" on Ukraine.
Full Take
The dynamic observed in Saxony-Anhalt reflects a critical tension between localized political volatility and the demands for unified, stable European leadership. The movement of voters toward the AfD is not merely a regional electoral shift; it signals a potential fracture within the established consensus that Germany historically provided for Europe. The argument shifts from one of managing domestic dissent to recognizing how internal German fragmentation impacts external influence.
The suggestion that focusing on party bans is insufficient, and instead emphasizing action against extremism and demanding substantive policy alignment from mainstream parties, points toward a structural failure in political discourse. The core pattern here involves the diffusion of political energy: local instability metastasizes into questions about Berlin's capacity and Europe's reliance on Germany.
The implicit assumption driving the solution is that the locus of control must be decentralized—both domestically through targeted action and internationally through fostering alternative geopolitical anchors. This raises a critical question for observers: if established actors are unable to manage internal divergence, how can they effectively project coherent external policy? The pattern suggests a necessary recalibration where political strength in Europe is derived less from the position of a single member state and more from the resilience of supranational mechanisms and alternative political groupings.
Bridge questions: How do diverse European capitals balance their interest in German leadership with the need to foster autonomous geopolitical impetus? What are the specific mechanisms by which internal German fragmentation translates into tangible strategic vulnerabilities on the European stage? What constitutes effective "substantive policy" when navigating polarization between populist movements and established liberal consensus?