In 1700, life was miserable everywhere. Nearly everyone was poor, most had to toil long days in fields just to feed their families, and half of all children died before adulthood. But throughout the following century, technological and political shifts in northwestern Europe unleashed something completely new in human history that transformed the world—sustained economic growth. Why and how this revolution started where it did is the focus of a new book by Philip T. Hoffman, Caltech's Rea A. and Lela G. Axline Professor of Business Economics and History, Emeritus.
Why Europe?: The Great Divergence and the West's Rise to Global Predominance - New Approaches to Economic and Social History was published on July 16, 2026, by Cambridge University Press.
"Today in the US, we take economic growth for granted, but it has greatly improved people's lives," says Hoffman, who uses economic theory and historical evidence to explain long-term changes in politics, society, and the economy. "I wanted to come up with an explanation of why sustained economic growth began in the 1700s in northwestern Europe and why it didn't happen elsewhere—for instance, Song Dynasty China."
Hoffman's 2015 book, Why Did Europe Conquer the World?, looked at how Europeans advanced gunpowder technology to conquer or colonize more than 80 percent of the world. While this military power allowed a relatively small number of people to quickly take over much of the rest of the globe, it didn't necessarily lead to the economic growth that began in Europe, particularly in Britain.
"There are people who would argue that military power was either an impetus for or a necessary condition for economic growth, but I found that's just not the case," Hoffman says. "Once you get technical change and economic growth, not just in the military sector but in general, that does make conquest a lot easier. So, it has some side effect, but the conquest is more a consequence of than a cause of economic growth."
Instead, he argues that several key economic, political, and intellectual factors converged in northwestern Europe, and particularly in Britain, in the 1600s and 1700s, including a growing interest in science and engineering that ultimately powered technological advances.
"Think of it like starting a fire, and the fuel is ideas from northwestern Europe's intellectual heritage, from the Enlightenment and the Scientific Revolution," Hoffman says. "Once the growth gets started, you can then share those ideas much more easily. You don't have to replicate all the conditions that were sufficient to get it started back then. Instead, you can simply pass the torch."
Political changes that secured property rights—including for intellectual property—also fostered economic growth, or so Hoffman's historical research shows. So did Western Europe's dominant religion, Western Christianity, which helped keep any one ruler from becoming too powerful and choking off growth, as happened in Eastern Europe and Asia.
"In Western Christianity, you had the head of the primary Western church—the Pope—who could keep political rulers from getting too powerful," Hoffman explains. "And that had a profound effect because it helped prevent a long-lasting emperor from arising in Western Europe. Sure, there was Charlemagne and Napoleon, but neither of them lasted very long."
Western Europe's political fragmentation also meant people could move relatively easily and might find resources to thrive elsewhere if they faced religious or political persecution. For example, Hoffman points to John Holker, a British textile maker—and one of the world's first industrial spies—who took his skills to France in the mid-1700s after opposing the British government. He helped establish some of the first factories in France for making cotton clothing.
"Cotton garments in the 1700s were the rage, and Holker was able to take advantage of new technology used to make them," Hoffman says, noting that the factories and the new machines in them cut the cost of cotton garments, making them affordable even for poor consumers. "This is what technical change is; it reduces the costs of things, and it makes them available, so they're no longer just a luxury. Sustained economic growth means those costs continue to fall."
The type of economic growth seen in Europe later took root in places like the US and Japan, but it did not spread uniformly across the world. Research by Hoffman and other economic historians shows that slow growth often resulted from authoritarian regimes and weak property rights. For example, while the US had low fees for patents in the 19th century and many financial institutions for lending, Mexico had high fees and very few banks.
"In Mexico, to start a business was very difficult, totally unlike the United States, and you had to be politically connected to do it," Hoffman says. "We can show that really slowed technical change in Mexico."
Still, Hoffman says the biggest drivers of economic growth were new ideas and the institutions, such as scientific societies, universities, and governments willing to invest in finding these new ideas. "We continue to rely on those institutions today," he says. Hoffman hopes that, like the leaders who first helped propel widespread economic prosperity, readers of his book will leave with the belief that economic growth is good but also realize that inequality hampers it.
"We could complain about all the bad things you may associate with economic growth, like pollution, but there are ways to solve these problems," Hoffman says. "I think we should come to appreciate the virtues of economic growth and, at the same time, work to make sure that it's more widely shared, both in our country and around the world."
Facts Only
* Philip T. Hoffman is the Rea A. and Lela G. Axline Professor of Business Economics and History, Emeritus, at Caltech.
* Cambridge University Press published "Why Europe?: The Great Divergence and the West's Rise to Global Predominance - New Approaches to Economic and Social History" on July 16, 2026.
* Hoffman published "Why Did Europe Conquer the World?" in 2015.
* Sustained economic growth began in northwestern Europe, specifically Britain, during the 1600s and 1700s.
* John Holker, a British textile maker, moved to France in the mid-1700s to establish cotton clothing factories.
* 19th-century United States patent fees were low and financial lending institutions were numerous.
* 19th-century Mexico had high patent fees and few banks.
* Key factors contributing to European growth included the Enlightenment, the Scientific Revolution, and Western Christianity.
* The Pope served as a religious authority that limited the power of political rulers in Western Europe.
* Institutional drivers of growth include scientific societies, universities, and government investment.
Executive Summary
Sustained economic growth emerged in northwestern Europe, particularly Britain, during the 17th and 18th centuries, diverging from the economic trajectories of regions like Song Dynasty China. This shift was driven by a convergence of intellectual, political, and religious factors. The Scientific Revolution and the Enlightenment provided the conceptual fuel, while political structures that secured property and intellectual property rights created a stable environment for innovation. Western Christianity contributed by preventing the rise of a singular, long-lasting imperial power, which fostered political fragmentation and allowed individuals to migrate in search of better opportunities.
Technical change, characterized by the reduction of production costs, transitioned luxury goods—such as cotton garments—into affordable commodities for the poor. While this model of growth eventually spread to nations like the US and Japan, it was hindered in other regions, such as Mexico, by authoritarian regimes and restrictive institutional barriers. Current evidence suggests that while economic growth improves general living standards, its effectiveness is hampered by inequality. The long-term sustainability of prosperity remains dependent on institutions that foster new ideas and wide distribution of wealth.
Full Take
This narrative presents a strong case for institutional determinism: the idea that specific political, religious, and legal architectures—rather than mere resource availability or military might—are the primary engines of prosperity. The strongest version of this argument is that "ideas" and "rights" act as a catalyst that, once ignited, can be exported regardless of the original conditions.
Since this is a media summary of a book, it operates in skeptical mode. The framing relies heavily on a "divergence" narrative, contrasting the "success" of the West against the "failure" of others (e.g., Mexico vs. USA). While logically consistent, it risks a teleological bias—viewing history as a linear progression toward a specific Western model of growth. However, the piece avoids load-bearing manipulation by acknowledging that growth produces negative externalities like pollution and inequality.
Patterns detected: none
The underlying paradigm is classical economic history, assuming that property rights and limited government power are the universal prerequisites for technical progress. This echoes the "Great Divergence" school of thought. The implication is that human agency is maximized when individuals are shielded from absolute state power and incentivized by intellectual property. The primary beneficiary of this framework is the institutional status quo of developed economies.
Bridge Questions:
1. How would the analysis change if the "fuel" of the Scientific Revolution was viewed as a byproduct of existing economic growth rather than its cause?
2. Are there historical examples of sustained economic growth achieved under authoritarian regimes or without strong intellectual property rights?
Counterstrike Scan: An influence campaign pushing this narrative would use it to justify "institutional reform" (privatization and deregulation) in developing nations as the only path to prosperity. The actual content does not match this pattern; it is a descriptive historical analysis rather than a prescriptive policy mandate.
