By Peter Clegg (*) <br>
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I have been researching the British Overseas Territories (BOTs) and their geopolitical relationships for over twenty years, and I cannot remember so much focus on them as there has been in recent days. The FIFA World Cup match between England and Argentina provoked heated discussions over the future of the Falkland Islands (or Malvinas if you are Argentine). Gibraltar has received significant media coverage with the removal of the border infrastructure with Spain. The Caricom Reparations Committee has called for the British Virgin Islands (BVI) to be decolonized by the UK, and new UK Prime Minister Andy Burnham will likely retain the government’s commitment to return the Chagos Islands to Mauritius. So, are we witnessing centrifugal forces that could fracture the BOTs’ relationship with the ‘UK family’?
Let us start with the Falkland Islands. It is not unusual for the Falklands to be the source of heated debate when England play Argentina, but there has certainly been a lot of rhetorical exchanges. Before the game, Argentina’s vice-president, Victoria Villarruel, called England ‘usurping pirates’, which The Sun newspaper called ‘a hate-filled tirade’. Then, after Argentina’s win, members of the team held up a banner exclaiming ‘Las Malvinas son Argentinas’ (‘The Falklands are Argentine’). The response from the UK was swift, the government said: ‘The World Cup might not be ours, but the Falkland Islands definitely are’, while Conservative Party leader, Kemi Badenoch declared: ‘The Conservatives fought for them before; we will do so again if necessary’. And Nigel Farage, leader of Reform UK, called for the capacity of the Royal Navy to be boosted.
So, what can be discerned from all of this? First, nothing will change in the foreseeable future, but arguably the extent of diplomatic support for UK sovereignty is fraying. The Trump administration has hinted a more sympathetic position towards Argentina’s claim, and it defended the Argentina team’s right to unfurl the banner, while since Brexit the European Union has used ‘Malvinas’ in official communiqués. However, there is not a clear view at the United Nations or in international courts in relation to who has the strongest territorial claim, and the view of Falkland Islanders themselves is important when it comes to self-determination. It is also worth remembering that the Falklands has over 60 nationalities living there and should no longer be considered as a ‘white British’ population. Second, although it is highly unlikely that there will a repeat of the 1982 military conflict, concerns have been raised over the UK’s capability to defend the Falklands, however, the UK government is confident defenses are adequate.
Gibraltar was the focus of media attention on 15th July when the border infrastructure with Spain was removed—the last frontier fence in Western Europe. This was the culmination of protracted negotiations to avoid a hard border, which was a possibility after Brexit. The deal eliminates controls and customs checks at the border and gives Spain responsibility for Schengen controls at Gibraltar’s airport and port. In a related development, Spain removed Gibraltar from its blacklist of tax havens; Gibraltar had been on the list since 1991. Gibraltar Chief Minister Fabian Picardo said: ‘The frontier that has so often divided and constrained our region will now become a place of cooperation and shared opportunity’, while Spain’s prime minister, Pedro Sánchez, stated that an ‘open wound’ was finally being closed.
Commentary in sections of the UK’s right-wing media was highly critical. For example, Stephen Glover in the Daily Mail, claimed that Gibraltar ‘has virtually been handed to Spain’. Glover admitted that Brexit had posed a problem but then criticized the EU for behaving in a ‘bloody-minded way’. He also slated Picardo for going along with ‘this charade’. This illustrates two points: First, the widespread cognitive dissonance on the part of those who strongly argued for Brexit but can never bring themselves to admit the real challenges the decision caused and that pragmatic compromises are needed to resolve them. Second, the paternalist view towards Gibraltar—the local government was centrally involved in the negotiations and felt that on balance the deal was the right one. If UK politicians and commentators say they support the BOTs, they also need to accept the autonomy of the territories to make their own decisions. The removal of the border infrastructure will undoubtedly bring new challenges, but many opportunities—and it is this effective functional cooperation that is most important and may well lessen the centrality of formal sovereignty.
Caribbean BOTs. Then there is the Caricom (Caribbean Community) Reparations Commission, which has recently called on the UK to ‘decolonize’ its remaining territories in the region—the Caribbean BOTs. The Commission focused particularly on the BVI. Sir Hilary Beckles, chair of the commission, argued: ‘We object to the fact that in the Virgin Islands, our people cannot make fundamental decisions because they have to consult with the British governor and consult with Downing Street to make decisions’. This is to an extent true, but the BVI has significant autonomy, though it has not always used that power in the best way (see for example, Commission of Inquiry Report).
The focus on the BVI by the Commission coincides with the beginning of constitutional review talks between the territory and the UK. The House of Assembly of the Virgin Islands is asking for a significant reduction in the power of the Governor and greater devolved responsibilities to the local government. It will be interesting to see what is negotiated, but it is unlikely the BVI will get everything it wants and there is little appetite for independence. Thus, the Caricom Reparations Commission intervention is timely, but does not fully acknowledge the nuances of relations between the BVI (and other Caribbean BOTs) and the UK—that independence is not an option and while that remains the case the UK believes it should have certain powers to intervene, if necessary, to ensure its international obligations are upheld.
Finally, there is the situation in the Chagos Islands, also known as the British Indian Ocean Territory. I have written previously on the issue, and the handover has been paused because of opposition from the Trump administration despite earlier support. This is because US agreement is needed due to the UK/US military base on Diego Garcia. There is recognition from the UK that there will be a delay, and this was recently illustrated by the renewal of an agreement with another BOT, St Helena—that any migrants arriving in the Chagos Islands will be sent to St Helena (St Helena will receive £9 million from the UK as part of the deal). Notwithstanding, it seems that Burnham will stick to the original agreement and push it through once the US is again supportive. The decision was criticized by many on the right but as has been the case throughout this saga there remains a failure to recognize the real international legal pressures that will lead to the return of the Chagos Islands to Mauritius.
In conclusion, while recent events have generated an unusual degree of attention for the BOTs, it would be mistaken to view them as evidence of an imminent unravelling of the UK’s relationships with its remaining territories. One of the most important points is that the BOTs are too often discussed as though they constitute a single category with common interests and identical political aspirations. In reality, big differences exist between territories such as the Falkland Islands, Gibraltar, the BVI, and the Chagos Islands. These distinctions are not always recognized in public debate, yet such nuance is essential if recent developments are to be properly understood.
There are undoubtedly pressures on UK relations with the BOTs, but few of these are entirely new. Questions of sovereignty, self-determination, constitutional reform, international law, and decolonization have shaped these ties for decades. Such pressures may have become more acute in the current geopolitical environment, but they are not fundamentally different in character. Indeed, the Chagos agreement is an attempt to address colonial legacies, any new constitutional settlement with the BVI is likely to mitigate similar concerns, and Gibraltar has largely resolved one of the most difficult practical consequences of Brexit. Arguably, the Labour government is achieving a considerable amount in this policy space. Nevertheless, because the BOTs are deeply connected to questions of history, empire, war, and national identity, they will continue to provoke strong opinions and intense political debate.
(*) Peter Clegg is Professor of Politics and Head of Social Sciences at University Western England, UWE Bristol. He has written extensively on the political economy of the Caribbean and non-independent territories. Recent publications have focused on the Falkland Islands, the impact of Brexit, and COVID-19.
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Steve Potts
Read all commentsFalklands - the clear view is that Argentina has NO legal claim to the Falkland Islands
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