Security controls are increasingly implemented in ways that can limit access to information required for an investigation.
By Marc Witteman, Thomas Ostrowski, and Craig Mackson
Digital forensic investigations often depend on access to information stored on or processed by electronic devices. Depending on the case and the type of device involved, this may include files, communications, application data, transaction records, account information, or other evidence relevant to the investigation.
In many cases, this information can be acquired through the operating system, file system, backups, application data, or other accessible device interfaces. But modern devices increasingly use hardware-based security mechanisms that can prevent these approaches from reaching the information investigators need.
Secure boot, secure element, Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), encrypted storage, and other hardware-backed protections can restrict how a device starts, how access is authorized, and how protected information can be reached. When those protections become the barrier to an investigation, forensic teams may need to expand their methods beyond software-level acquisition and into hardware security testing.
The challenge for forensic teams is not simply that devices are becoming more secure. It is that security controls are increasingly implemented in ways that can limit access to information required for an investigation.
A forensic team may have physical possession of a smartphone, cryptocurrency wallet, flash drive, or other electronic device but still be unable to reach the information stored on it.
The team may be able to identify the device and examine parts of its software environment, while access to the relevant data remains restricted by protections implemented elsewhere in the device.
Instead of only asking how to extract the information, the team also needs to understand what is preventing access to it. That may require identifying which part of the device controls access, how that protection is implemented, and whether there is a technically viable way to bypass it.
This is where hardware security knowledge becomes relevant to digital forensics.
Before selecting a test method, forensic specialists need to understand enough about the target device to identify where and how the relevant protection is implemented.
This does not necessarily require complete design documentation. In many forensic cases, source code, schematics, engineering documentation, or detailed information about the device architecture may not be available. The target may be seized, unfamiliar, proprietary, legacy, or specifically designed to resist unauthorized access.
Teams may therefore need to characterize the device directly. This can include identifying important hardware components, examining available interfaces, observing how the device behaves during security-sensitive operations, and determining which components are involved in controlling access.
The purpose of the characterization is not to analyze every part of the device. It is to identify the security mechanism that stands between the investigator and the information required for the case. Once that is understood, the team can make a more informed decision about whether further hardware-level investigation is justified and which method is appropriate.
Hardware security testing should support the forensic objective, not become the objective itself. The goal remains access to information that is relevant to the investigation.
Two methods that may be relevant are Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) and Fault Injection (FI).
Side-Channel Analysis measures physical signals produced while a device performs an operation. These measurements can provide information about internal activity that is not visible through normal software access.
Fault Injection applies a controlled disturbance while a device is operating to determine whether a specific security-sensitive operation can be influenced. For a forensic investigation, FI can be used to bypass a security feature and unlock a device without ever needing the password.
The method should follow from the device, the protection being investigated, and the information the forensic team is trying to reach. For both methods, there are different channels to consider, which include time, power, EM-emanation, and light. The choice of channel depends on the accessibility and the protection level. For instance, an analyst who wants to explore the type of cryptography, but does not want to make physical modifications, may want to use an EM probe to measure emanations that reveal the crypto algorithm and implementation. If an analyst wants to bypass a password verification, they may want to inject a well-timed voltage glitch by pushing a needle on a chip pin.
Keysight supports forensic labs with a variety of test tools and can provide a complete forensic lab, including training, to make challenging investigations successful. Our equipment has elaborate automation features that reduce manual work and allow for easy replication of results. Analysts trained on our test equipment achieve forensic breakthroughs by finding the missing puzzle pieces.
An organization that regularly receives protected smartphones, cryptocurrency wallets, embedded systems, custom electronics, or other strongly protected devices may have a stronger case for developing internal hardware security expertise.
For decision-makers, useful questions include:
The objective is not to build the largest possible hardware laboratory. It is to ensure that the organization has an appropriate response when device security prevents investigators from reaching information required for a case.
As device security becomes more sophisticated, forensic organizations may increasingly encounter cases where access to relevant information depends on understanding protections implemented below the software layer.
Forensic leaders therefore need to consider whether their teams can identify these cases, determine what is preventing access, and bring in the appropriate hardware security expertise when necessary.
The goal is straightforward: expand the range of protected devices that an organization can assess while maintaining controlled, technically justified, and repeatable forensic workflows.
Thomas Ostrowski is a marketing coordinator at Keysight Technologies.
Craig Mackson is an account manager for forensics at Keysight Technologies.
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Facts Only
* Digital forensic investigations often depend on access to information stored on or processed by electronic devices.
* Modern devices use hardware-based security mechanisms like secure boot, secure element, and Trusted Execution Environment (TEE).
* These mechanisms restrict access to information required for an investigation, even when physical possession of a device exists.
* Forensic teams may need to expand methods beyond software-level acquisition into hardware security testing when facing these protections.
* The challenge is understanding what prevents access rather than just extracting the information.
* Forensic teams must identify which part of the device controls access and how that protection is implemented.
* Characterizing the device involves identifying hardware components, interfaces, and observing device behavior during security-sensitive operations.
* Hardware security testing should support the forensic objective, not become the objective itself.
* Two relevant methods are Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) and Fault Injection (FI).
* SCA measures physical signals produced during device operations to reveal internal activity.
* Fault Injection applies controlled disturbances to determine if a security-sensitive operation can be influenced.
* Channels for SCA and FI include time, power, EM-emanation, and light.
Executive Summary
Digital forensic investigations frequently encounter security controls implemented in ways that restrict access to necessary investigative information, often shifting the focus from simple data extraction to understanding hardware-level protections. Modern devices employ mechanisms like secure boot and Trusted Execution Environments (TEE) that act as barriers to traditional software-level acquisition methods. This forces forensic teams to evolve their methodologies to include hardware security testing when faced with locked-down systems.
The challenge for investigators is not merely extracting data, but understanding the precise nature of the access restrictions implemented by the device's underlying security mechanisms. This necessitates characterizing the device itself to identify precisely where and how protections are enforced, as detailed design documentation may be unavailable. Relevant hardware security techniques include Side-Channel Analysis (SCA), which measures physical signals, and Fault Injection (FI), which involves controlled disturbances to bypass security features like password verification.
Forensic success depends on linking the investigative objective directly to the physical implementation of security, selecting appropriate testing channels (time, power, EM-emanation) based on the specific protection being investigated. This approach requires specialized hardware security knowledge and tools to conduct justified, repeatable investigations that expand the scope of assessable devices while maintaining rigorous workflows.
Full Take
The narrative positions hardware security as an essential pivot point in evolving digital forensics, arguing that the sophistication of device protections necessitates a shift toward physical methods of investigation. The core implication is that traditional software-centric acquisition is becoming insufficient; access to evidence is gated by physical implementations below the operating system layer. This elevates the need for specialized knowledge in hardware security testing for forensic professionals.
The tension lies between the practical necessity of achieving case objectives and the technical demands of safely and legally probing complex, often proprietary, hardware. The discussion of SCA and FI presents a pathway where invasive, physics-based methods become justified not as ends in themselves, but as necessary means to map out security boundaries that software cannot reveal. The context suggests a systemic gap: forensic training must evolve to incorporate principles of hardware architecture to effectively engage with modern device security.
The potential manipulation or framing lies in the implicit suggestion that only highly specialized teams can handle this shift, potentially creating an accessibility barrier. The focus on Keysight's tools and lab capabilities serves as an implicit call to action for organizations to invest in this expertise, aligning vendor solutions with a recognized operational necessity. The underlying pattern is the framing of complexity as a solvable puzzle requiring specific, proprietary tools, which appeals both to the need for rigorous methodology and the desire for expert-led assurance in high-stakes investigations.
Bridge questions: If hardware security knowledge were universally accessible, what would be the immediate changes in digital evidence collection protocols across law enforcement? How can organizations establish repeatable, cost-effective frameworks for deploying hardware security testing capabilities within existing forensic workflows? What ethical considerations arise when methods like Fault Injection are employed to bypass device protections, even in a forensic context?
Sentinel — Human
The text reads as a thoughtful analysis bridging digital forensics with hardware security, characterized by logical progression and expert terminology, making it highly likely to be human-authored technical commentary.