July 17, 2026 | FDD's Long War Journal
Iran reportedly tells Houthis to close Bab al Mandeb Strait if US strikes power grid
July 17, 2026 | FDD's Long War Journal
Iran reportedly tells Houthis to close Bab al Mandeb Strait if US strikes power grid
Three sources told Reuters on July 16 that Iran has instructed Yemen’s Houthis to close the Red Sea to shipping if the US attacks Iran’s power network, which President Donald Trump threatened to do in a July 14 interview. A source close to the Houthis added that the Iran-backed terror group has placed drones and missiles in position to attack vessels in the Bab al Mandeb Strait, the chokepoint at the southern end of the Red Sea. The Houthis refrained from attacking commercial shipping earlier in the US-Israeli conflict with Iran.
The Red Sea has become a critical alternative route for Persian Gulf states’ energy exports following the Iranian closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Roughly 7 percent of the global oil output transited Bab al Mandeb in June, according to Kpler, a maritime trade analytics firm. In particular, Saudi Arabia has been rerouting its oil exports from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea via its east-west cross-country pipeline, with shipments departing from Yanbu Port. Other products are trucked across the Saudi desert for export via commercial ports.
Abdulmalik al Houthi, the leader of the Yemeni terror group, delivered a speech on July 16 in which he focused primarily on the Houthi-Saudi Arabia dynamic rather than a potential escalation in the Red Sea. The Houthis threatened airlines not to use Saudi airspace on July 14, and Abdulmalik reiterated threats to Saudi Arabia in his speech. “The real equation is Sana’a Airport for Riyadh Airport, airports for airports, ports for ports, and a blockade for a Saudi blockade,” Houthi said, adding, “All Saudi oil facilities and vital installations are targets for our missiles and drones if they embroil themselves in a full-scale aggression against our country and escalate the situation.”
On July 13, Saudi Arabia launched an airstrike on Sanaa International Airport in the Houthi-controlled capital to prevent the landing of a flight from Tehran that was returning a Houthi delegation to slain Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s funeral. The internationally recognized government (IRG) of Yemen and officials in Riyadh object to direct Tehran-Sanaa flights, which would enable Iran to arm and support its proxy in Yemen. For roughly a decade, Saudi Arabia has maintained an air blockade of Houthi-controlled airports that permits some civilian flights but prevents direct Iranian flights.
Houthi also reiterated his group’s stated blockade of Israeli vessels from using the Bab al Mandeb Strait, which connects to the southern Israeli port city of Eilat. The Houthis initially announced this ban in early June during a ceasefire between the US and Iran, after the Islamic Republic and the Jewish state exchanged attacks over Israeli strikes against Hezbollah in a suburb of Beirut, Lebanon. However, the Houthi leader did not announce any new aggression in the Red Sea.
On July 17, the Houthis held marches across their territory under the title, “Friday of Warning and Mobilization.” The group organizes regular demonstrations to portray unity and support from the population in its territory. However, Yemenis are often coerced into attending, with Houthi-selected supervisors monitoring individuals’ participation and tying it to their salaries.
Bridget Toomey is a research analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies focusing on Iranian proxies, specifically Iraqi militias and the Houthis.
Facts Only
* Iran reportedly told the Houthis to close the Bab al Mandeb Strait if the US strikes Iran's power grid.
* Three sources told Reuters that Iran has instructed Yemen’s Houthis to close the Red Sea to shipping if the US attacks Iran’s power network.
* The Iran-backed group has placed drones and missiles in position to attack vessels in the Bab al Mandeb Strait.
* The Red Sea is an alternative route for Persian Gulf states' energy exports following the Iranian closure of the Strait of Hormuz.
* Roughly 7 percent of the global oil output transited Bab al Mandeb in June, according to Kpler.
* Saudi Arabia is rerouting oil exports from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea via its east-west cross-country pipeline, with shipments departing from Yanbu Port.
* Abdulmalik al Houthi delivered a speech on July 16 focusing on the Houthi-Saudi Arabia dynamic.
* The Houthis threatened airlines not to use Saudi airspace on July 14 and reiterated threats against Saudi Arabia regarding oil facilities if they engage in full-scale aggression.
* Saudi Arabia launched an airstrike on Sanaa International Airport on July 13 to prevent a flight from Tehran returning a Houthi delegation.
* The Houthis reiterated their stated blockade of Israeli vessels from using the Bab al Mandeb Strait.
Executive Summary
Full Take
The narrative illustrates a complex interplay between regional energy politics, proxy conflict escalation, and strategic choke points. The core tension revolves around maritime control (Bab al Mandeb) and energy flows, leveraged by external geopolitical pressures involving the US and Iran. The Houthi position frames its actions within a broader strategic calculus involving Saudi Arabia, suggesting that access to vital infrastructure is contingent upon balancing threats between regional powers. This dynamic reveals how localized conflict can be weaponized through economic dependencies; for instance, the Houthis' stated goal concerning Saudi oil facilities directly links local maritime control to larger geopolitical maneuvers. The reference to the Houthi-Saudi Arabia relationship suggests a pattern where internal power dynamics are intentionally amplified or managed in response to external state actions. Furthermore, the tension between Saudi interests and Iranian influence over airspace and transit routes demonstrates how long-standing regional grievances are continually reconfigured to serve immediate strategic objectives. This highlights the fragility of open sea trade when geopolitical actors use maritime access as a direct instrument of coercion.
Bridge Questions: What is the mechanism by which kinetic actions against energy infrastructure translate into enforceable maritime blockades? How do regional actors perceive the long-term viability of maintaining internal proxy leverage versus engaging in broader conflict escalation? What alternative, non-maritime logistical pathways exist that could mitigate the risks associated with controlling critical sea lanes?
Sentinel — Human
The text exhibits characteristics of detailed geopolitical reporting, relying on attributed sources and specific timelines, pointing toward human journalistic origin rather than pure synthetic generation.