We came to Geneva for the 63rd Human Rights Council from different points in our advocacy journeys and different parts of the world, but with a shared commitment to the people of Myanmar. One of us has spent years walking the corridors of the United Nations, meeting diplomats, and pressing governments to act on the crisis in Myanmar. The other was attending the Human Rights Council for the first time, after years of documenting human rights violations in the country.
We were there for the same reason: to ask governments what they are prepared to do about Myanmar. After years of documenting atrocities, we left Geneva with a question that is becoming increasingly difficult to avoid: what happens when the evidence is already there?
Inside the Human Rights Council chamber, the scale of the crisis was once again laid bare.
The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, described a deepening crisis marked by attacks by the military junta, including airstrikes, forced conscription, arbitrary detention, sexual violence, displacement, and the weaponization of humanitarian assistance. He urged United Nations member states to refer the situation in Myanmar to the International Criminal Court through the Security Council and halt transfers of arms, ammunition, jet fuel, and dual-use items that risk facilitating violations of international law.
The head of the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, Nicholas Koumjian, reported that serious international crimes are being committed with greater frequency and intensity. The mechanism is continuing to collect and preserve evidence for future accountability.
At HRC63, we heard a wide range of approaches to the crisis in Myanmar.
Of the 39 governments and entities that took the floor, fewer than half – just 14 – explicitly raised accountability, justice, impunity, or international accountability mechanisms. While 20 speakers expressed broad support for stronger action, the rest of the room fragmented: eight, including Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, India, and Vietnam, appeared supportive but cautious, favoring regional engagement, dialogue, and a “Myanmar-owned or Myanmar-led” process.
Five governments – Laos, Belarus, Russia, China, and Venezuela – actively shielded the regime, emphasizing sovereignty, non-interference, and engagement with Myanmar’s authorities, while opposing international pressure.
After the session, we met with several diplomatic missions in Geneva. For us, these meetings created space for conversations about what more can be done. What we heard in the Council and in those meetings was not a lack of awareness. Myanmar is simply not a sufficiently high political priority for many governments to generate sustained action.
There are real diplomatic complications. Myanmar’s political representation remains contested, including at the United Nations, where the question of who represents the country remains unresolved. Governments also have different relationships with the military junta, the National Unity Government, ethnic resistance organizations, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). But these complications cannot be grounds for indefinite inaction and impunity.
In our view, a Myanmar-led or ASEAN-led process should have a major role. Humanitarian assistance is essential. But none of these should mean putting accountability or the protection of civilians on hold.
Dialogue with a brutal regime cannot become a substitute for accountability, and sovereignty cannot serve as a shield against international scrutiny.
Human rights defenders, within Myanmar and outside, are still doing their part. We continue to document violations, speak with survivors, share evidence with the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, and engage with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. Other Myanmar and regional organizations are doing the same.
Fortify Rights has documented the military’s aerial attacks on civilians, including the chain of command behind attacks in Kachin and Karenni states, and has continued to record new methods of aerial warfare.
Although more documentation is needed, what is missing is a comparable machinery of political action.
Some governments are already using some of the tools available to them. Canada maintains an arms embargo and aviation-fuel prohibition and has continued imposing targeted sanctions on Myanmar military officials and entities. The United Kingdom and the European Union have also imposed sanctions targeting aviation fuel suppliers and other entities linked to the military.
At the same time, accountability efforts are moving forward. Myanmar and Rohingya organizations have pursued universal-jurisdiction cases in Argentina, Germany, Indonesia, the Philippines, Timor-Leste, and Turkiye. In November 2024, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court requested an arrest warrant for Min Aung Hlaing, while in January 2026, the International Court of Justice held merits hearings in The Gambia’s genocide case against Myanmar.
And yet, from where we sit, there is still a striking gap between the evidence being gathered and meaningful accountability for crimes committed since the 2021 coup. No international court is currently prosecuting the full range of those crimes. National cases and international proceedings offer important pathways, but they do not yet amount to a comprehensive accountability process.
What stayed with us from the 63rd Human Rights Council was not a lack of information or evidence. The evidence is being collected, and governments should continue to fund human rights documentation. Cases are being pursued. Some governments are taking action. But the pieces are still not coming together at the scale needed to match the crisis.
We can continue to document, share evidence, and engage governments. But documentation can only go so far without political action. The people of Myanmar have been waiting for years, and the evidence is there. What happens next depends on what governments do with it.