Connecting South And Southeast Asia For Prosperity And Development – OpEd
Key Takeaways:
- The author argues Act East (India) and Look East (Bangladesh) only pay off if roads and ports sit on dialogue and stability. Myanmar’s war, Manipur unrest, illicit trade, and the Rohingya crisis stall the ~1,360 km India–Myanmar–Thailand Highway (Moreh–Mae Sot) and Kaladan (Kolkata–Sittwe–Kaladan River–Mizoram). Sittwe and river terminals work; the 109 km road to Mizoram is now aimed at 2027.
- India’s aims: a quieter northeast, Act East, and a hedge on China. Moreh, extra land customs posts, and border haats are part of that. New Delhi also has an interest in talking to Naypyidaw and local actors, including the Arakan Army. About 1.3 million displaced Rohingya are called a regional security problem, not only a humanitarian one.
- Bangladesh’s 2001–02 Look East line seeks less market concentration and more ASEAN/China/Japan/Korea investment without dropping India or the West. Ties with Myanmar stay frozen: Rakhine fighting, Naf insecurity, trafficking, thin contact with Rakhine communities and the AA. Ideas: Teesta and BRICS talk with China, a Chattogram–Rakhine–Mandalay corridor, Friendship Road and Paletwa links, a standing national committee. Commerce cannot replace repatriation but could ease the ground for it.
Cross-border transport and communication infrastructure can play a decisive role in advancing prosperity across South and Southeast Asia. Yet connectivity projects operate within a region shaped by strategic competition, domestic conflict, displacement, illicit trade and fragile bilateral relations. This article examines how India’s Act East Policy and Bangladesh’s Look East Policy intersect with developments in Myanmar. It reviews the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway, the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project, border-management measures, and the security challenges affecting Manipur, Mizoram, Chin State and Rakhine State. It also considers Bangladesh’s trade ambitions, its need for stronger links with Southeast Asia, and the continuing impact of the Rohingya crisis on relations with Myanmar. The central argument is that roads, ports and economic corridors cannot deliver their full benefits without political dialogue, local participation and sustained regional stability. India, Bangladesh, Myanmar, China and Thailand all have a stake in reducing conflict and maintaining secure trade routes. For Bangladesh, a renewed Look East strategy should combine infrastructure development, commercial diplomacy, engagement with relevant communities and authorities in Myanmar, and a credible effort to support a durable solution to the Rohingya crisis. The article proposes a coordinated, security-conscious and commercially practical framework for regional engagement and shared development.
Myanmar’s prolonged civil conflict is the most severe of these challenges. Instability in Manipur and along India’s border with Myanmar has also exposed the limits of relying on infrastructure without an equally strong political and security framework. India’s original Look East Policy has evolved in response to changing regional conditions, while several promised connectivity initiatives have faced delay or suspension. Bangladesh’s Look East Policy likewise deserves renewed examination so that the country can obtain greater economic and strategic benefit from closer engagement with its eastern neighbours. The region’s long-term prosperity will depend on diplomacy, practical compromise and sustained cooperation rather than further violence. There is considerable scope to expand legitimate commerce among Bangladesh, India and Myanmar.
India introduced its Look East Policy in 1991 and upgraded it to the Act East Policy in 2014 to strengthen economic and strategic ties with Southeast Asia. Major investments have included the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway and the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project. The approximately 1,360-kilometre trilateral highway is intended to link Moreh in Manipur with Mae Sot in Thailand through Myanmar’s Sagaing Region. The Kaladan project is designed to connect Kolkata with Mizoram through Sittwe Port and the Kaladan River in Myanmar’s Rakhine State. Although the port and river terminals are operational, the 109-kilometre road link to the Mizoram border remains under construction, with a revised completion target of 2027. Conflict in Chin and Rakhine States has disrupted progress. If the route becomes fully operational, it could shorten and simplify the supply of essential goods to India’s northeastern states. Continuing instability on both sides of the border is therefore damaging trade, communication and development.
India’s principal interests in Myanmar are to stabilize its northeastern frontier, advance the Act East Policy and balance China’s growing influence. The trilateral highway and the Kaladan project are central to these objectives. India has also considered additional Land Customs Stations, including Avangkhu in Nagaland, and the expansion of trade through Nampong and Pangsau Pass in Arunachal Pradesh. Border haats could further support local commerce and create livelihoods on both sides of the frontier. India has a strong interest in a peaceful and stable Myanmar. Cooperation among India, Myanmar’s authorities and influential local actors, including the Arakan Army, could support de-escalation and help create conditions for addressing the Rohingya crisis. Regional security cannot be achieved without a durable solution for the roughly 1.3 million displaced Rohingya. India’s Act East Policy will contribute meaningfully to regional development only if its connectivity projects are accompanied by efforts to build peace and political stability.
The Rohingya crisis remains one of Bangladesh’s most serious foreign-policy and humanitarian challenges. Although the crisis originated in Myanmar, Bangladesh has carried its burden for years. Geography cannot be changed, but constructive relations with neighbouring countries can make difficult problems more manageable. Recognizing connectivity as a foundation of economic prosperity, Bangladesh began giving greater attention to Southeast Asia and regional cooperation in the 1980s. Bangladesh runs a substantial trade deficit with several East Asian economies. To reduce this imbalance and deepen economic, political and security relations with Southeast and East Asia, the country developed a strategic foreign-policy orientation in 2001-2002 that became known as the Look East Policy. Its central principle is strategic balance: Bangladesh seeks to reduce excessive dependence on a limited number of markets, attract investment from ASEAN members, China, Japan and South Korea, and expand regional connectivity while maintaining productive relations with India and Western partners.
Recent high-level visits to Malaysia and China have given new momentum to this approach. A successful Look East Policy could generate investment, employment, technology transfer, export growth and improved living standards. To realize these benefits, Bangladesh must establish itself as a reliable partner for development cooperation, investment, technology and market access.
Better relations with Myanmar are essential to Bangladesh’s eastern strategy, yet bilateral tensions remain acute. Myanmar’s conflict continues, much of Rakhine State is controlled by the Arakan Army, and there has been little progress towards a durable solution for the Rohingya or their safe, voluntary and dignified repatriation. Cross-border shelling, insecurity in the Naf River, threats to Bangladeshi fishers, renewed violence in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, and continuing narcotics and arms trafficking all add to the pressure. Reduced humanitarian assistance for Rohingyas in Bangladesh has further deepened the crisis. Bangladesh has not yet developed sustained and effective communication with Rakhine communities or the Arakan Army. This gap limits its ability to understand developments across the border, protect national interests and explore practical arrangements that could support stability. The absence of meaningful engagement is therefore a major obstacle to improving Bangladesh-Myanmar relations.
Myanmar’s authorities are also seeking wider diplomatic acceptance and greater control over the country’s principal communication and trade routes. General Min Aung Hlaing’s visit to India in April 2026, as his first foreign destination after assuming the presidency, formed part of that diplomatic effort. The Myanmar military has also sought to consolidate its position near the borders with India and Bangladesh after ceasefires or negotiations in areas bordering China and Thailand. Any further escalation could destabilize the Bangladesh-Myanmar frontier and trigger additional displacement. India, China and Thailand have each taken steps to protect their interests and preserve trade with Myanmar; Bangladesh must develop an equally deliberate strategy.
A renewed Look East Policy could open important opportunities for Bangladesh. China has reportedly offered cooperation on the Teesta Master Plan, a sustainable approach to the Rohingya crisis and closer engagement with BRICS. Discussions have also included a potential Bangladesh-Myanmar-China economic corridor. In practical terms, such a corridor would seek to link Chattogram and Cox’s Bazar with routes through Rakhine State and Mandalay and onward to China. If designed transparently and implemented safely, improved access between these markets and the Bay of Bengal could bring substantial economic benefits to Bangladesh.
Bangladesh’s engagement with Malaysia may also support stronger diplomatic relations, regional cooperation and closer ties with ASEAN. Bangladesh and Malaysia have expressed a commitment to work together on the Rohingya crisis. Such partnerships can strengthen Bangladesh’s regional position, but they should complement rather than substitute for direct, sustained diplomacy with Myanmar and other stakeholders.
Although formal trade between Bangladesh and Myanmar remains limited, the scope for expansion is considerable. Myanmar could supply raw materials to Bangladeshi industries, while Bangladeshi manufacturers and service providers could reach new consumers in Myanmar. Secure transit through Myanmar would also give Bangladesh improved access to Thailand, China and other Southeast and East Asian markets, while enabling the country to source goods at more competitive prices. To advance these objectives, Bangladesh should accelerate work on the Myanmar Friendship Road and explore road connections with Paletwa in Chin State. A future China-Myanmar-Bangladesh railway link could further expand regional trade. Border commerce, which remains largely underdeveloped, should be supported through secure infrastructure and transparent regulation. Bangladesh should simultaneously build communication with Rakhine communities and the Arakan Army. Economic cooperation alone will not resolve the Rohingya crisis, but it could help create conditions that support stability and eventual repatriation.
Connectivity between South and Southeast Asia can become a powerful driver of the region’s future development, but infrastructure must be matched by peace, political dialogue and institutional cooperation. India is working in a planned way to enhance cooperation and establish connectivity. Bangladesh should prepare and implement a comprehensive strategy for rebuilding relations with Myanmar. A standing national committee could bring together business leaders, journalists, law-enforcement agencies, civil administrators, political leaders, local representatives, Myanmar specialists, academics and other stakeholders. Its task would be to maintain communication, strengthen bilateral and local relationships, protect Bangladesh’s legitimate interests, and support practical efforts to resolve the Rohingya crisis. Continuity, professional expertise and coordination across government and society will be essential if Bangladesh’s Look East Policy is to deliver lasting prosperity and regional stability. Finally, stronger communication and commercial links among South and Southeast Asian countries could accelerate regional growth and improve livelihoods. Countries in this region should continue to strengthen one another through physical connectivity, people-to-people contact, peace, and political stability, despite existing problems and limitations.
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