The Sentry is an investigative and policy organization that seeks to disable multinational predatory networks that benefit from violent conflict, repression, and kleptocracy.
News Perspectives /
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07.24.26
Conflict Gold: Sentry Statement on EU Sudan Gold Ban and What’s Needed Now
Last week, the European Union (EU) announced an import ban on all gold from Sudan, which stood in contrast to the UK government’s newly announced network sanctions on gold traffickers in Sudan and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). While the EU’s concern about Sudan’s deadly conflict gold trade is laudable, the ban is not likely to be effective unless followed by other, more targeted policy measures.
Both sides in Sudan’s war, but particularly the genocidal and UAE-backed Rapid Support Forces (RSF), have profited heavily from the conflict gold trade. Sudan produced an estimated 70 tons of gold in 2025, worth approximately $230 million—roughly two-thirds of that gold was smuggled out of the country to the UAE, perpetuating the conflict.
Instead of ending the conflict gold trade, import bans such as the new EU initiative simply drive it further underground. Gold will still be mined, produced, and traded, just increasingly through black-market channels. Gold bans do slightly increase the costs, since traders and traffickers will now need fake documentation to “prove” the gold comes from Egypt, Chad, Ethiopia, or another neighboring country. But beyond that, the effects will likely be limited, other than making it more difficult to trace.
Sasha Lezhnev, Senior Policy Advisor at The Sentry, said:
“Conflict gold from Sudan, worth over $200 million per year, is fueling the war and flowing to the UAE and global markets. The EU and US should build on the UK’s recent network sanctions and target the illicit networks trafficking the conflict gold. It is only through accountability that illicit traffickers will change their calculations away from war profiteering.”
Moving forward, the EU, the UK, the US, the gold industry, and other actors should take three main steps to help curb Sudan’s deadly conflict gold trade:
The EU and the US should follow the UK’s lead in designating illicit gold trafficking networks in Sudan, the UAE, and the neighboring countries to Sudan where the gold is smuggled.
Banks, refiners, and jewelers should conduct enhanced due diligence on all gold from the UAE until there is a very significant reduction in the conflict gold trade from Sudan.
The EU, UK, US, and other governments should work with gold industry bodies such as the London Bullion Market Association and World Gold Council to set up a centralized gold initiative to make gold data transparent and to monitor and validate gold bullion centers. This would help standardize customs verification procedures and cut down on smuggling. The governments should also support initiatives to formalize the artisanal trade, particularly increasing artisanal miners’ access to finance.
Facts Only
* The European Union announced an import ban on all gold from Sudan.
* The UK government announced network sanctions on gold traffickers in Sudan and the UAE.
* Sudan produced an estimated 70 tons of gold in 2025, valued at approximately $230 million.
* Roughly two-thirds of that gold was smuggled out of Sudan to the UAE.
* Conflict gold from Sudan is estimated to be worth over $200 million per year.
* The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) profited from the conflict gold trade.
* The proposed steps include designating illicit gold trafficking networks in Sudan, the UAE, and neighboring countries.
* Banks, refiners, and jewelers should conduct enhanced due diligence on all gold from the UAE.
* Governments should work with bodies like the London Bullion Market Association and World Gold Council to create a centralized gold initiative for transparency.
* Governments should support initiatives to formalize the artisanal trade and increase miners’ access to finance.
Executive Summary
Full Take
The narrative posits that immediate, isolated policy actions, such as import bans, are insufficient to disrupt illicit financial flows rooted in conflict. The implication is that regulatory measures alone fail when powerful, established criminal networks benefit from the status quo; rather, systemic accountability and structural changes are necessary to alter incentives for profiteering. The proposed solution shifts focus from border controls to internal network disruption and data centralization among international bodies. This suggests a pattern where localized policy interventions risk being co-opted or circumvented by actors benefiting from globalized illicit economies. The call for enhanced due diligence and centralized monitoring reflects an understanding that physical movement of gold is secondary to the control of documentation and financial pathways. The absence of direct engagement with the systemic corruption driving the conflict leaves open the question of whether targeting downstream flows sufficiently addresses the root cause of exploitation.
What mechanisms exist beyond simple tracing to enforce compliance among powerful intermediary entities, and how can data standardization effectively bypass established layers of institutional resistance?
Sentinel — Human
The text reads like a synthesis of investigative findings and policy recommendations from an established organization, characterized by clear causal links and specific calls for international action.