When Chinese company DeepSeek released its open-source R1 model in January 2025, it made headlines around the world. The large language model (LLM) was reported to rival some of the most powerful AIs from US companies, but it was completely free for anyone to download. A trillion dollars was wiped off the value of US tech companies and US lawmakers immediately proposed banning it on government devices.
When another Chinese firm, Z.ai, released GLM-5.2 last month, there were similar claims about performance but, surprisingly, none of the panic. The AI arms race between the US and China appears to have taken an unexpected turn.
The US and China have been racing to develop a stream of new, more capable AI models, and to create the chips and data centres necessary to train and run them. The US government has also introduced and strengthened export controls on chips to countries like China in recent years, as well as switching on and off foreign access to the latest models.
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Proponents believe the technology can revolutionise everything from drug discovery to materials science, potentially giving economies a shot in the arm. Its increasing use in war to select targets and deploy weapons means it has become a matter of national security too. There is even talk from US President Donald Trump of taking a public stake in firms like OpenAI to ensure their goals align.
However, the way the US and China are approaching it is very different. Chinese firms tend to release models so that users can download and run them locally, at no cost, which is in stark contrast to how most US firms host them in the cloud, provide access for a fee and closely guard their inner workings.
Open-source AIs, including those from China, don’t tend to perform quite as well as the most expensive premium models, but many people find them adequate. As one UK software developer told New Scientist: “I used a local model [from Z.ai] and a cloud model [from OpenAI] for the same task – it took 30 per cent longer with local, but was fully free.”
Soon after Z.ai released GLM-5.2 last month it was ranked the most intelligent open-source AI available on the market by Artificial Analysis, an AI benchmarking company. Z.ai says that it outperforms OpenAI’s GPT-5.5 on a common benchmark used to test AI software engineering skills. However, Artificial Analysis found that GLM-5.2 performed slightly worse than GPT-5.5 on its intelligence tests – symptomatic of a problem across the AI industry where there are no standard tests of performance.
Nevertheless, it appears GLM-5.2 is finding an audience. It currently ranks as the fifth most commonly used LLM on OpenRouter, which captures only a tiny fraction of AI use but is one of the few public sources of such data. DeepSeek’s latest model sits at the number one spot with more than twice as much use. Seven of the top 10 are AIs built by Chinese companies.
New normal
That GLM-5.2 didn’t cause the economic shock waves that DeepSeek’s previous model did is perhaps testament to how quickly we can adapt to the idea that China has simply caught up on AI, just as it has done dozens of times over with other technology like smartphones, electric cars and robotics.
“It traditionally has been the case that Silicon Valley has been more innovative and China has been a fast follower that scales very effectively,” says Serge Belongie at the University of Copenhagen, Denmark. “And there’s this new dimension to that, which involves the aggressive open-source aspect – kind of attempting to shame the closed-model frontier labs and really put pressure on the West in that regard.”
Mikhail Belkin at the University of California, San Diego, says that Chinese open-source models are highly capable – perhaps equivalent to the best US models from six to nine months ago – and may even be more stable. American models can be withdrawn or modified at any time, whereas Chinese models can be run by anyone with a sufficiently powerful server, he says.
David Shrier at Imperial College London says the company that ends up dominant in AI is likely to benefit from a £60 trillion market, but there are political and tactical benefits for governments in taking part in the race too. “The Chinese models give you different answers to certain questions about political or other sensitive subjects than the US models,” says Shrier.
The US could play into China’s hands if it continues to react to new US models with market-leading performance by withdrawing foreign access. “It could actually be counterproductive because you’re forcing people to develop their own ecosystems and own technology,” says Philip Torr at the University of Oxford. “You saw it with Huawei and Android: cut them off from Google’s ecosystem and they built their own.”
Shrier is concerned that China can continue to narrow the performance gap between its own models and those from the US by picking apart how Western models operate just as US firm Anthropic has accused Chinese firm Alibaba of doing. “What this means from a practical perspective is that any US advantage gets eroded rapidly,” says Shrier.
What may save the large US firms in this race is the inertia and caution of business – red tape, says Belongie. Chinese open-source models might be free, run on a laptop and do a decent job, but for big companies with IT departments, risk analysts and cautious boards, a Chinese model downloaded from the internet feels like an unmanageable risk. That’s where the big, established technology firms that already supply industry-standard email, office and support software may be well placed.
“Why is it that Microsoft is so successful in the enterprise and so many universities and companies use it? It’s not because they have the best technology, but they really speak that language of compliance,” says Belongie.
Torr says Europe, lacking the AI activity of China and the US, is sleepwalking into a national security problem more serious than the nuclear arms race. AI is, he believes, the single most important technology that the human race has ever developed.
“We need to have our own Microsofts and Googles, and big tech firms within Europe, within European legislation, paying European taxes, to level the playing field,” says Torr. “Do we want to be an AI colony, totally dependent on systems which we don’t necessarily have full control over, or do we want to run our own?”
Facts Only
* DeepSeek released its open-source R1 model in January 2025.
* Z.ai released GLM-5.2 last month.
* US lawmakers proposed banning the DeepSeek model on government devices after its release.
* The US and China are racing to develop AI models, chips, and data centers.
* The US government has introduced and strengthened export controls on chips to countries like China.
* Proponents believe the technology can revolutionize drug discovery and materials science.
* There is discussion about using AI in warfare for target selection and weapon deployment.
* US President Donald Trump discussed taking a public stake in firms like OpenAI.
* Chinese firms release models for local, free download and execution.
* Local models require less control compared to cloud-hosted US models.
* GLM-5.2 ranked as the most intelligent open-source AI by Artificial Analysis on one benchmark but performed slightly worse than GPT-5.5 in intelligence tests.
* GLM-5.2 currently ranks as the fifth most commonly used LLM on OpenRouter.
* DeepSeek’s latest model has more use than seven of the top 10 LLMs, which are built by Chinese companies.
Executive Summary
Full Take
The dynamic described reflects a fundamental divergence in technological strategy: an open, decentralized approach versus a controlled, proprietary one. The perceived shift is less about which model is objectively superior and more about the structural implications of open access. The fact that Chinese models can be run locally contrasts sharply with the US model paradigm, where control remains centralized through cloud access and ownership. This difference is framed as a geopolitical contest: the ability to decentralize AI development offers potential advantages in autonomy, yet the established economic and security frameworks favor the centralized control structure.
The argument about US firms needing inertia to maintain dominance introduces an element of systemic resistance; large, risk-averse organizations may prioritize compliance and perceived manageability over raw performance when evaluating external, open alternatives. This suggests that market inertia, governed by regulatory environments and internal risk management protocols, acts as a powerful counterforce to disruptive technological shifts. Furthermore, the discussion around sovereign AI—the call for European entities to develop their own foundational models—points toward a potential trajectory where national security mandates force the re-evaluation of global tech dependency. The core tension lies between the efficiency gained through open innovation and the stability afforded by centralized governance structures.
Bridge questions: If localized, open models are demonstrably capable, what specific regulatory or economic barriers prevent large US enterprises from adopting decentralized operational models? How will the pursuit of sovereign AI standards in Europe influence the flow of foundational research and talent globally? Does the current dynamic of performance benchmarking truly reflect the long-term value proposition of an AI system when considering security and control alongside utility?
