Ouahbi: 8 million legal cases listed in three years

* Approximately 160 million case files are kept in courts.
* Nearly 8 million case files have been cataloged over the past three years.
* The digitization project aims to facilitate document access via an electronic platform allowing location tracking.
* The project involves organizing judicial archives, digitizing case files, and identifying concerned parties.
* The scope includes the archives of deceased or retired notaries.
* Difficulties include some files being stored in depots and others in court basements.
* Duplication arose from separate digital programs developed by the Ministry of Justice and the judiciary.
* The project budget was agreed upon with the Ministry of Economy and Finance.
* The project was assigned to a public institution due to data sensitivity involving names of defendants and witnesses.
* The role of ordering authority for expenditure was proposed to be entrusted to the delegated president of the Superior Council of the Judiciary.
* The minister defended the independence of judicial authority from the ministry, while emphasizing cooperation.
* Coordination mechanisms were established between inspection services from the judiciary and the judicial administration.
* A distinction exists in budgets and administrations between the Ministry of Justice and the judiciary.
* The organization of courts requires consultation between the Ministry of Justice (for creation) and the judiciary (for appointments).

The pursuit of digitization in judicial archives highlights a tension between administrative efficiency, the protection of highly sensitive personal data, and institutional autonomy. The process reveals that centralized goals—like digital reform—often expose underlying structural incompatibilities. The effort to resolve duplication through joint budgeting suggests an acknowledgment of previous organizational fragmentation, yet the necessity of assigning execution authority to a public institution underscores the reluctance to cede control over sensitive judicial records entirely to a single executive branch, even when framed as a logistical necessity.
The insistence on delineating competencies reveals a deep-seated structural friction: the Ministry of Justice’s responsibility for external management versus the judiciary’s mandate over internal administration and appointments. The tension over vehicle allocation and court creation exemplifies how operational necessities translate into conflicts regarding jurisdictional authority; the need for functional collaboration is balanced against the preservation of institutional separation, suggesting that organizational integrity is often prioritized alongside mere administrative speed. Furthermore, framing reform as a "continuous improvement approach" acknowledges the inherent human element—the risk of error and correction—which serves as a necessary anchor against purely technocratic solutions. The implication is that true progress requires not just technological transfer but negotiated, mutually respected lines of authority among distinct institutional bodies tasked with upholding justice.
What are the hidden costs of prioritizing rapid digitization over fully resolving jurisdictional overlap? If cooperation remains contingent on maintaining separation, how do institutions manage systemic dysfunction when mandated coordination risks creating new bureaucratic bottlenecks? Does focusing on location tracking risk shifting accountability from the physical management structure to a purely digital interface?