July 24, 2026 | Policy Brief
Treasury Extends Its Muslim Brotherhood Campaign to Europe
July 24, 2026 | Policy Brief
Treasury Extends Its Muslim Brotherhood Campaign to Europe
Pressure is ratcheting up on the Muslim Brotherhood. Months after targeting several of the Islamist organization’s chapters, Washington is now taking the fight to the group’s support infrastructure in the United Kingdom.
On July 23, the Department of the Treasury announced the designation of senior Muslim Brotherhood leader Mahmoud al-Abyari for acting on behalf of a Specially Designated Global Terrorist, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood branch. Al-Abyari was also targeted for fundraising for Hamas through previously sanctioned organizations.
The London-based Egyptian national serves as secretary general of the Muslim Brotherhood’s General Secretariat and is the editor-in-chief of Risalat al-Ikhwan, the organization’s weekly publication.
The designation signals that Washington intends to continue dismantling the Brotherhood’s international support network by targeting not only regional chapters, but also the senior officials, financiers, and facilitators who sustain the movement.
Treasury Looks Beyond the Middle East
According to the designation, al-Abyari helped raise funds benefiting Hamas through Filistin Vakfi and Hayat Yolu, two organizations previously sanctioned for providing material support to the terrorist group. Alongside al-Abyari, Treasury designated three individuals and three entities for providing material support to Hamas.
Al-Abyari’s role in these fundraising efforts demonstrates how the Brotherhood’s international infrastructure is connected to Hamas’s financial networks. Brotherhood officials have long sought to distinguish between the movement from Hamas. They have also worked to put distance between the movement’s various chapters, branches, and offshoots, allowing each to operate autonomously and adapt to different political circumstances. Treasury’s action undercuts both efforts, highlighting the continued overlap in their leadership, ideology, and support structures.
Europe Remains a Brotherhood Safe Haven
These designations spotlight the enduring importance of European capitals, London chief among them, to the Brotherhood’s international operations. Since the organization’s removal from power in Egypt in 2013, many senior leaders have relocated to the United Kingdom and other countries across the continent. There they have rebuilt command structures, coordinated media operations, raised funds, and managed relationships with affiliated organizations across the Middle East.
Operating from the West has afforded Brotherhood leaders legal protections and financial access that would be difficult to obtain in the Middle East, where the organization has been largely banned.
Although European governments have devoted increasing attention to Islamism, enforcement has often focused on violent actors while overlooking the broader ecosystem of charities, advocacy organizations, media outlets, and financial facilitators that sustain Islamist movements over the long term.
Washington Should Continue Targeting Brotherhood Leaders
Al-Abyari should not be the last Brotherhood official designated by Treasury. The United States should continue identifying the group’s senior leaders, like Acting-General Guide Saleh Abdel Haq and Spokesperson Osama Suleiman, operating from London and elsewhere in Europe who facilitate fundraising, coordination, or financial support.
Treasury should also continue mapping the Brotherhood’s international financial architecture, including charities, front organizations, businesses, and facilitators that enable the movement to move money and sustain its overseas operations. Where evidence supports such action, these entities should face sanctions alongside the individuals directing them.
Finally, Washington should deepen coordination with British authorities on Brotherhood financial networks operating within the United Kingdom. As Treasury has demonstrated, disrupting the facilitators who sustain Hamas and the Brotherhood’s international apparatus can impose costs well beyond the battlefield. Continued pressure on these overseas networks will make it increasingly difficult for the Brotherhood to exploit London and other European capitals as permissive hubs for fundraising, coordination, and global influence.
Mariam Wahba is a research analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). For more analysis from Mariam and FDD, please subscribe HERE. Follow FDD on X @FDD. Follow Mariam on X @themariamwahba. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focused on national security and foreign policy.
Facts Only
* The Department of the Treasury designated senior Muslim Brotherhood leader Mahmoud al-Abyari for acting on behalf of a Specially Designated Global Terrorist, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood branch.
* Al-Abyari was targeted for fundraising for Hamas through previously sanctioned organizations.
* Al-Abyari serves as secretary general of the Muslim Brotherhood’s General Secretariat and editor-in-chief of Risalat al-Ikhwan.
* Al-Abyari helped raise funds benefiting Hamas through Filistin Vakfi and Hayat Yolu, two organizations previously sanctioned for providing material support to the terrorist group.
* Treasury designated three individuals and three entities for providing material support to Hamas alongside al-Abyari.
* Senior Brotherhood leaders relocated to the United Kingdom and other European countries after the organization's removal from power in Egypt in 2013.
* These leaders rebuilt command structures, coordinated media operations, raised funds, and managed relationships with affiliated organizations in Europe.
Executive Summary
The Treasury Department designated senior Muslim Brotherhood leader Mahmoud al-Abyari as acting on behalf of a Specially Designated Global Terrorist, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood branch, for involvement in fundraising for Hamas through previously sanctioned organizations. Al-Abyari serves as secretary general of the Muslim Brotherhood’s General Secretariat and editor-in-chief of Risalat al-Ikhwan. This action targets the international support network of the Brotherhood by focusing on senior officials, financiers, and facilitators beyond regional chapters.
The designations highlight that European capitals, particularly London, serve as safe havens for Brotherhood leaders who relocated from Egypt after 2013. These leaders have used this operational space to rebuild command structures, coordinate media, raise funds, and manage relations with affiliated organizations across the Middle East, benefiting from legal protections unavailable in Egypt.
The analysis suggests that enforcement efforts in Europe often focus on violent actors while overlooking the broader ecosystem of charities, media, and financial facilitators supporting Islamist movements. The recommendation is for the United States to continue targeting these leaders and map the Brotherhood’s international financial architecture, coordinating with British authorities to disrupt these networks.
Full Take
The process demonstrates a strategic pivot by targeting the infrastructure that sustains transnational Islamist movements rather than solely focusing on localized militant activity. The implication is that sovereignty over physical territory is insufficient when ideological and financial support structures are decentralized across international legal and political boundaries. The pattern observed is the reliance of non-state actors on ostensibly legitimate or charitable entities—charities, media, and financial facilitators—as operational camouflage to achieve goals beyond immediate military confrontation.
The core tension lies in the disparity between addressing violent actors and dismantling the enabling ecosystem. When leadership relocates to jurisdictions offering greater operational latitude, it creates a structural challenge for accountability. The focus on disrupting financial networks rather than just individuals suggests an understanding that political and religious movements are sustained by complex, transnational administrative frameworks. This forces consideration of whether international security strategies adequately account for this diffuse support mechanism, especially when the facilitating structures operate under layers of perceived legal protection in Western states.
The question arises regarding the utility of targeting facilitators versus leadership. If the goal is to constrain global influence, does focusing on the nodes that channel resources—the financial and media facilitators—offer a more resilient strategy than pursuing only symbolic leadership arrests? How do institutional responses account for the symbiotic relationship between localized political mobilization and the transnational support architecture that allows these movements to persist across diverse legal systems?
Sentinel — Human
The text functions as a policy brief, linking specific government actions (designations) to broader geopolitical analysis regarding the Muslim Brotherhood's international infrastructure in Europe.