A Theodicy, or, Vindication of the Divine Glory

A THEODICY;

                                    OR

                     VINDICATION OF THE DIVINE GLORY,

                           AS MANIFESTED IN THE

             CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT OF THE MORAL WORLD.

                        BY ALBERT TAYLOR BLEDSOE,

 PROFESSOR OF MATHEMATICS AND ASTRONOMY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF MISSISSIPPI.

                                NEW YORK:

                     PUBLISHED BY CARLTON & PHILLIPS.

                           200 MULBERRY STREET.

                                  1854.





CONTENTS


Introduction. Of The Possibility Of A Theodicy.
   Section I. The failure of Plato and other ancient philosophers to
   construct a Theodicy, not a ground of despair.
   Section II. The failure of Leibnitz not a ground of despair.
   Section III. The system of the moral universe not purposely involved in
   obscurity to teach us a lesson of humility.
   Section IV. The littleness of the human mind a ground of hope.
   Section V. The construction of a Theodicy, not an attempt to solve
   mysteries, but to dissipate absurdities.
   Section VI. The spirit in which the following work has been prosecuted,
   and the relation of the author to other systems.
Part I. The Existence Of Moral Evil, Or Sin, Consistent With The Holiness
Of God.
   Chapter I. The Scheme Of Necessity Denies That Man Is Responsible For
   The Existence Of Sin.
      Section I. The attempts of Calvin and Luther to reconcile the scheme
      of necessity with the responsibility of man.
      Section II. The manner in which Hobbes, Collins, and others,
      endeavour to reconcile necessity with free and accountable agency.
      Section III. The sentiments of Descartes, Spinoza, and Malebranche,
      concerning the relation between liberty and necessity.
      Section IV. The views of Locke, Tucker, Hartley, Priestley,
      Helvetius, and Diderot, with respect to the relation between liberty
      and necessity.
      Section V. The manner in which Leibnitz endeavours to reconcile
      liberty and necessity.
      Section VI. The attempt of Edwards to establish free and accountable
      agency on the basis of necessity—The views of the younger Edwards,
      Day, Chalmers, Dick, D’Aubigne, Hill, Shaw, and M’Cosh, concerning
      the agreement of liberty and necessity.
      Section VII. The sentiments of Hume, Brown, Comte, and Mill, in
      relation to the antagonism between liberty and necessity.
      Section VIII. The views of Kant and Sir William Hamilton in relation
      to the antagonism between liberty and necessity.
      Section IX. The notion of Lord Kames and Sir James Mackintosh on the
      same subject.
      Section X. The conclusion of Mœhler, Tholuck, and others, that all
      speculation on such a subject must be vain and fruitless.
      Section XI. The true conclusion from the foregoing review of
      opinions and arguments.
   Chapter II. The Scheme Of Necessity Makes God The Author Of Sin.
      Section I. The attempts of Calvin and other reformers to show that
      the system of necessity does not make God the author of sin.
      Section II. The attempt of Leibnitz to show that the scheme of
      necessity does not make God the author of sin.
      Section III. The maxims adopted and employed by Edwards to show that
      the scheme of necessity does not make God the author of sin.
      Section IV. The attempts of Dr. Emmons and Dr. Chalmers to reconcile
      the scheme of necessity with the purity of God.
   Chapter III. Scheme Of Necessity Denies The Reality Of Moral
   Distinctions.
      Section I. The views of Spinoza in relation to the reality of moral
      distinctions.
      Section II. The attempt of Edwards to reconcile the scheme of
      necessity with the reality of moral distinctions.
      Section III. Of the proposition that "The essence of the virtue and
      vice of dispositions of the heart and acts of the will, lies not in
      their cause, but in their nature."
      Section IV. The scheme of necessity seems to be inconsistent with
      the reality of moral distinctions, not because we confound natural
      and moral necessity, but because it is really inconsistent
      therewith.
   Chapter IV. The Moral World Not Constituted According To The Scheme Of
   Necessity.
      Section I. The scheme of necessity is based on a false psychology.
      Section II. The scheme of necessity is directed against a false
      issue.
      Section III. The scheme of necessity is supported by false logic.
      Section IV. The scheme of necessity is fortified by false
      conceptions.
      Section V. The scheme of necessity is recommended by false
      analogies.
      Section VI. The scheme of necessity is rendered plausible by a false
      phraseology.
      Section VII. The scheme of necessity originates in a false method,
      and terminates in a false religion.
   Chapter V.